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In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), the Supreme Court 
issued a landmark decision addressing the constitutionality of university affirmative 
action policies.  Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. concluded that universities could consider 
race as a factor to achieve the goal of a diverse student body.   
This study situates Bakke within its broader rhetorical environment of public 
discourses about race, law, and education, examining the selection process by which 
Powell found “diversity” to be the most justifiable answer to the question of 
affirmative action’s permissibility.  Using materials retrieved from Powell’s archives 
at Washington and Lee University, including memoranda, personal notes, and draft 
opinions, the project makes three interrelated arguments.   
First, this study asserts that the Supreme Court is a rhetorical institution, 
dependent upon rhetoric for its inventional needs and its credibility while 
simultaneously cloaking its reliance on rhetorical invention in a rhetoric of formalistic 
inevitability.  As such, it attends to how the legal invention process, explicated by 
classical rhetorical theorists and manifest in contemporary legal practice, enhances 
understanding of Powell’s decision.   
 Second, the project examines how Powell pulled from far-reaching rhetorical 
and ideological environments for his “diversity” rationale. Here, the study traces 
public discourses about race and examines Bakke’s legal briefs, outlining the appeals 
to multiculturalism, colorblindness, race consciousness, and individualism that 
comprised Powell’s inventional warehouse.  A critical scrutiny of Powell’s opinion-
writing process reveals an inventional program guided by an ideological negotiation 
of these competing and compelling rhetorics of race and education in the United 
States.  
Third, this project argues that Powell’s opinion-writing process is a corporate, 
rather than individual, process.  Examining the negotiations between Powell, his law 
clerks, and fellow justices further illuminates the rhetorical nature of the Court, as 
well as the ideological influences upon individual Court opinions. 
The study concludes by explicating how Bakke reflects the ways that the 
Supreme Court works as part of a broader rhetorical culture, constructing its decisions 
from the materials of public arguments and the architecture of jurisprudential norms. 
Finally, the study explores the ideological circulation of Powell’s decision: divorcing 
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On the morning of June 28, 1978, nervous energy swept the main courtroom 
of the U.S. Supreme Court building as Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. spoke.  The 
anxious crowd awaited the Court’s decision on Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, a closely watched case questioning the constitutionality of 
affirmative action in higher education.  The case brought to the fore persistent 
questions about equal opportunity, quotas, white privilege, discrimination, and the 
role of race in higher education that had simmered in American legal discourse for 
centuries.  Washington Post reporter Jacqueline Trescott described the scene in the 
courtroom:  “In the massive, grand Supreme Court Building, a siege is underway. A 
media vigil. Waiting for Bakke, a countdown that grows more tense as the court nears 
the term's end, has the press corps jittery each morning the court sits.”1 After 
providing a brief background of the case, Powell leaned toward the microphone to 
announce the decision of the Court.  “I will now try to explain how we divided on this 
issue,” he said. “It may not be self-evident.”2 
The Bakke case was complex from its beginning.  Allan Bakke, a 32-year-old 
white male Vietnam veteran, was rejected by each of the eleven medical schools to 
which he applied in 1973.3  One of these schools, the University of California at 
Davis (UC-Davis), had reserved sixteen of the 100 available seats for economically or 
educationally disadvantaged students.  During this program’s existence, none of the 
reserved seats were filled by a white student.  Bakke applied again to UC-Davis in 
1974.  UC-Davis interviewed him both years, but rejected him both times.  Bakke’s 
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test scores and grade point average fell within the range of those accepted to UC-
Davis, although his interview scores put him out of the upper range.  Both white and 
minority applicants with better and worse interview scores than Bakke were admitted 
to the university.  
Bakke hired lawyer Reynold Colvin and brought suit in the summer of 1974.  
They argued to the Yolo County Superior Court that Bakke should be admitted to the 
UC-Davis medical school because the dual-admission program violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment by denying him equal protection under law.  The Regents of 
the University of California filed a counter-complaint, asking that the program be 
reviewed and declared valid.  The Yolo County Superior Court found that the UC-
Davis admissions program was invalid and that Bakke has been discriminated against 
based on his race.  However, because the court found insufficient evidence to show 
that Bakke would have been admitted but for the special program, it did not order him 
admitted to the school.4  
The decision pleased neither Bakke nor UC-Davis.  Bakke sought admittance, 
and UC-Davis wanted their program declared constitutionally valid.  Both sides 
appealed.  The California Supreme Court bypassed the Court of Appeals and took the 
case directly due to the “importance of the issues involved.”5  In September 1976, the 
California Supreme Court affirmed six-to-one the lower court’s decision regarding 
the unconstitutional nature of the UC-Davis special program.  Citing the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority argued that the 
protection against racial discrimination applied to any person, regardless of majority 
or minority status.6  Additionally, the California Supreme Court ordered UC-Davis to 
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prove that Bakke would not have been admitted even without the special program; 
otherwise, UC-Davis was required to admit him. 
 The Board of Regents of the University of California appealed the ruling to 
the United States Supreme Court.  Their question to the Supreme Court was whether 
the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution forbids universities from 
creating limited admissions programs to help those minorities affected by decades of 
discrimination, in an attempt to remedy the effects of said discrimination.  Bakke’s 
lawyer petitioned the Court to deny certiorari, claiming that the lower court had 
decided correctly.  
In addition to Bakke and the Regents, more than one hundred individuals and 
organizations included their names in a record fifty-eight amicus briefs filed for the 
case.7   Some briefs encouraged the Court to overturn the California Supreme Court 
decision and allow the affirmative action program to continue in order to help 
historically disadvantaged students gain admission and to promote a diverse student 
body; others wanted the Supreme Court to stem the tide of “reverse discrimination” 
by issuing a decisive opinion on the issue.8  Several parties petitioned the Court to 
deny certiorari because they considered Bakke a weak test case for affirmative action 
in higher education.9   
Several members of the U.S. Supreme Court were inclined to agree with those 
who argued against granting certiorari.10  They had narrowly avoided issuing a 
decision about affirmative action in higher education several years before in DeFunis 
v. Odegaard (1974).  Former Justice William Douglas had chastised his fellow 
justices for doing so when he dissented at length from the Court’s decision to dismiss 
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the case and asserted that, given the facts of the admissions policy, “we have no 
choice but to evaluate the Law School’s case as it has been made.”11  Conference 
discussions about Bakke, then, focused on the necessity to hear the case, coming as it 
did so soon after DeFunis.12  Moreover, most of the justices who found the program 
unsavory did not want to decide on the constitutionality of the program at all, hoping 
to resolve this issue statutorily under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.13  Justice 
Thurgood Marshall rejected formal legalistic decision-making for Bakke, however, 
proclaiming that the “legality of affirmative action simply could not be resolved 
without consideration of the historical, legal, and sociological context of past racial 
policies and practices.”14 
Justice Powell’s apologetic beginning to the Court’s announcement of the 
Bakke opinion was warranted.  Powell’s opinion for the Court bridged its main voting 
blocs.  In all, six different opinions were penned in the case. Two groups of justices 
were evenly divided on the case: one group, led by Justice William Brennan, felt that 
race was a permissible consideration in order to overcome the legacy of 
discrimination, while another bloc, following Justice John Paul Stevens, argued that 
the use of race in college admissions violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  Powell wrote the deciding opinion that drew in part from each camp, arguing 
that while affirmative action in college admissions is constitutionally acceptable, it is 
only permissible when narrowly focused on the goal of diversity and implemented 
without the use of quotas.  Because the program at UC-Davis failed under these 
standards, it was unconstitutional, and the university was thus ordered to admit Bakke 
into its medical school.  Many who were following the case – especially legal 
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scholars and admissions officers – found the fractured results disappointing and 
nonsensical.  However, when the Bakke decision is considered as an instance of 
public discourse and as an act of deliberation, it emerges as a strategic compromise 
sensitive to conflicting public needs and values with regard to race conscious policies 
enacted within educational settings. 
This project situates the Bakke case within its broader rhetorical environment 
of ongoing public discourses about race, law, and education in order to explicate the 
inventional process through which Justice Powell, in his final opinion, pulled upon 
the public concept of diversity as the most justifiable answer to the question of 
affirmative action’s permissibility in higher education.  Because Justice Powell’s 
opinion was the guiding one for the Supreme Court, and because his opinion most 
actively attempted to build on the shared premises of other arguments about 
affirmative action, this study centers on Powell’s decision-making process.  I treat 
this case as a form of public address; one that conforms to the rules and expectations 
of legal argumentation while negotiating the political and public values enmeshed in 
the case.  As such, I extend the timeline of the “process” beyond its legal emergence 
in the 1970s, attending to the case’s rhetorical and situational backgrounds.  This 
project begins with a history of the rhetorical invention process in legal discourse, 
illuminating the long tradition of rhetorical invention in legal argument, as well as the 
sublimation of the rhetorical nature of legal argument to the rhetoric of certainty 
during the disciplinary separation of rhetoric, philosophy, and jurisprudence.  Next, I 
reconstruct the foundational and emergent public arguments about race, law, and 
education in the United States which comprise the wider field of argument from 
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which the Bakke discourses emerged.  These histories are followed by an examination 
of how these arguments and their corresponding assumptions were pulled through the 
legal briefs of the numerous interested parties in Bakke, as well as through Justice 
Powell’s memoranda and draft opinions.  In doing so, I examine how Powell chose 
from the available means of persuasion those arguments that best matched his goals, 
given the social and institutional constraints and opportunities surrounding the case.   
Understanding the Rhetoric of Bakke 
Legal scholars have debated Bakke’s controversial questions about race, its 
worth as a legacy of Brown v. Board of Education (1954), its relevance to subsequent 
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, its lack of a clear majority decision, its 
constitutional ramifications, its potential for being overturned, and its potential impact 
on other decisions.15  Because of the long-standing controversy over affirmative 
action, the fractured results were considered by many to be disappointing.  Measured 
against jurisprudential norms, Powell’s opinion is inelegant at best and a disaster at 
worst.16  Common arguments include observations that Powell misread the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, misinterpreted the Fourteenth Amendment, ignored precedents, 
supplanted constitutional interpretation with political and personal beliefs, and 
attempted to create constitutional values where they did not previously exist.   In legal 
scholarship, Bakke has been meticulously discussed from the time it was granted 
certiorari by the Supreme Court, to its 30-year anniversary, and through the most 
recent legal challenge to affirmative action’s constitutionality in 2003.17    However, 
despite the widespread dissatisfaction with Justice Powell’s opinion, the two most 
recent cases regarding affirmative action in higher education – Gratz v. Bollinger 
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(2003) and Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) – were decided along the same rubric as 
Justice Powell’s conclusion.18  Racial classifications cannot be used in a 
“nonindividualized, mechanical way,” the Supreme Court maintained, but they may 
be used as one factor in considering the overall contribution an individual student 
offers to the university, by means of a diverse student body.19  Moreover, the 
diversity justification offered by Justice Powell was upheld as precedent by Chief 
Justice John Roberts in a 2007 case, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No.1, regarding the assignment of students to public schools 
according to racial categories – even as Roberts used it to render unconstitutional the 
program under question.20 
The widespread interest in the Bakke case is best explained because of its 
convergence of social, political, and legal struggles about which principles should 
guide our thoughts and actions about racial inequities in the United States.  Richard 
K. Sherwin notes that notorious legal cases “are social dramas that take place on a 
field of embattled discourse where contested stories, metaphors, and character types 
vie for dominance in the culture at large.”21  In turn, “the nation uses these events for 
addressing psychological and social agendas on a large scale.”22  Amidst public 
debates about the values of colorblindness, race consciousness, individual merit, and 
equal opportunity, Powell settled on a seemingly tame ‘diversity’ as the most 
compelling reason to consider race in college admissions. 
In this study, I argue that the U.S. Supreme Court is best understood as a 
rhetorical institution, wherein actors use forensic justifications to forward deliberative 
decisions, conscious of and reflecting the surrounding cultural milieu.  In doing so, I 
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extend the goals articulated by Craig Allen Smith and Kathy B. Smith, who argue that 
“by emphasizing institutionalized rhetorical patterns we recognize that one’s position 
in the institutional structure provides opportunities and audiences in exchange for 
conformity with normative rhetorical expectations.”23  Exploring Powell’s inventional 
process sheds light on those areas of contingency and doubt in the arguments 
surrounding affirmative action that must be reconciled by the time the final opinion is 
published.  As Peter Goodrich asserts, “Law…is a genre of rhetoric which suppresses 
its moments of invention” and Gerald B. Wetlaufer describes law thusly:  “the 
particular rhetoric that law embraces is the rhetoric of foundations and logical 
deductions…one that relies, above all else, upon the denial that it is rhetoric that is 
being done.”24  Yet, during the review process, “judges and lawyers alike face the 
rhetorical challenge of ‘saying what the law is,’ which is a rhetorical activity rather 
than a contemplative exercise, a question of argumentation rather than dialectical 
demonstration.”25  Thus, argues John Day, “the United States Supreme Court is an 
interesting microcosm of public, deliberative argument. Supreme Court justices must 
constantly walk the fine line between argument invention and deference to previous 
lines of Court precedent.”26  
Examining the rhetorical invention process of a particular Supreme Court case 
also forwards the ongoing mission of rhetorical critics who are interested in revealing 
the rhetoricity of legal practices without reducing them to the charges of personal 
subjectivity that most legal scholars fear, and of which critical legal theorists have 
been accused of promoting.27  Those who deny the existence of rhetoric within legal 
theory or practice hold an “impoverished view of rhetoric” to begin with, argues 
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James Arnt Aune.28  Francis J. Mootz III agrees, asserting that, “ironically, viewing 
law as intrinsically and irredeemably rhetorical reaffirms its integrity and legitimacy 
as a practice of securing reasonable adherence, even as it rejects, once and for all, 
conceptualist and formalist approaches to law.”29  Mootz argues that this is true 
because judicial reasoning actually more closely mirrors moral reasoning.  Chaїm 
Perelman reconciles the need for legal reasoning to appear non-rhetorical when it 
must, in fact, rely on argumentation in order to reach acceptable conclusions, 
asserting that: 
The essential value of legal security distinguishes legal reasoning from other 
forms of practical reasoning.  In this type of reasoning one has always sought 
to minimize the intervention of the will which is very often identified with the 
arbitrary and the irrational.  But the personal factor cannot be eliminated from 
legal reasoning.  Like all argumentation, being the function of the people who 
argue, its value will depend, in the final analysis, upon the integrity and 
intelligence of the judges who determine its specific nature.30 
Rhetorical theorists from Aristotle to Perelman assert that rhetorical activity 
begins with rhetorical invention.  This is as true in legal argument as in other fields, 
because the legal principles and particulars of the case must be worked against “a 
storehouse of arguments and strategies that generally are deemed acceptable and 
persuasive by the audiences to whom they speak.”31  Most analyses of Bakke focus on 
the arguments given in the final Supreme Court opinion, a shared territory of this 
study.  However, this study extends the scope of legal argumentation to Justice 
Powell’s internal memoranda, with the understanding that, in Supreme Court 
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decisions, “later construction of a syllogistic justification is only the tip of the 
rhetorical iceberg that has resulted in the decision, and undue attention to this latter 
phase of judging clouds the nature of the rhetorical process in adjudication.”32  Janice 
Schuetz argues that the communication discipline “seldom examines a large segment 
of the political process or the development of one argument through the hierarchy of 
the decisional process,” and this study contributes to that mission.33   
This project takes note of the complex relationships among courts and their 
publics, the rhetorical trajectories of the parties involved, the public values that were 
subsumed into legal arguments, the Supreme Court’s debates and decisions over those 
values, and the ways in which the justices justified their decisions in appropriate 
institutional ways.  In doing so, this study examines how various political actors, and 
ultimately Justice Powell in his final opinion, negotiated the rhetorical grounds on 
which he justified the constitutionality of affirmative action policy.  As a result, what 
previously had been viewed as an ideological commitment to equality – treating every 
person the same way – was shifted to a commitment to diversity – recognizing the 
value of difference – as a constitutionally permissible goal.  As Robert Post asserts, 
“Powell’s opinion…was designed to work as an ideological construct, not merely as a 
functional one.”34   
Just as ideas of equality and justice did not originate within Supreme Court 
chambers, neither did the negotiation of the term diversity begin or end with Powell’s 
opinion.  While the Supreme Court may have helped to legitimize diversity as a 
public value, it did not create the value.  Stephen Macedo notes that “[d]iversity is the 
great issue of our time: nationalism, religious sectarianism; a heightened 
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consciousness of gender, race, and ethnicity; a greater assertiveness with respect to 
sexual orientation; and a reassertion of the religious voice in the public square are but 
a few” of the ways in which the United States engages with diversity.35  Affirmative 
action is but one framework under which diversity works, and diversity has not 
always been part of affirmative action’s mission.   
 Equality, Education, and Affirmative Action 
Affirmative action is a public policy program that developed as a tangible 
solution to the disjunction between a rhetorical commitment to equality and ongoing 
disparities in opportunities for discriminated-against groups to take part in 
employment, military service, and education in the United States.  Most parties 
engaged in arguments about affirmative action value equality in some sense; but these 
different senses of equality make a profound difference.  John Lucaites and Celeste 
Condit have asserted that part of the strength of the appeal to equality lies in its 
ambiguous definitional status that allows different communities to value different 
conceptions of equality simultaneously, while also allowing a unified theme for all.36  
However, these differences become problematic once a formal definition is needed to 
enact a specific goal.  For instance, to those who are against affirmative action, 
equality generally means pledging to treat everyone the same, regardless of race.  On 
the other hand, proponents of affirmative action argue that in order to achieve 
equitable results, we must recognize differences, especially in past treatment.  For 
much of affirmative action’s history, the reasoning has been that, because certain 
groups have been treated unequally in the past, these groups should be given special 
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consideration in order to account for that history and to help them reach a place where 
they can compete equally.   
The justifications for affirmative action have varied, to a certain extent, by the 
environments in which the policies are implemented.  Within Supreme Court 
decisions, the racial composition of schools has been a special concern, as American 
schools have been viewed as training grounds for responsible adult citizenship.  
Former Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for a unanimous court in Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954) that “education is perhaps the most important function of state and 
local governments… It is the very foundation of good citizenship.”37  Former 
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor echoed this belief when she argued in 
2003 that the Court has “repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of 
preparing students for work and citizenship,” with education being pivotal to this goal 
as it holds “a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society.”38  Chief Justice 
Roberts asserted the continuity of this belief in 2007, arguing that “in upholding the 
admissions plan in Grutter…this Court relied upon considerations unique to 
institutions of higher education,” noting that in light of “the expansive freedoms of 
speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a 
special niche in our constitutional tradition.”39  This tendency has made legal 
challenges to educational policies about race a key strategy in attempts at social 
change.  
For instance, when the NAACP launched a campaign in the 1930s to break 
Plessy v. Ferguson’s (1896) separate-but-equal doctrine and its segregationist 
legacies, the organization did so by concentrating on access to schools.  One large 
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victory came with Missouri Ex Rel. Gaines v. Canada (1938) and the successful 
argument that aspiring African American student Lloyd Gaines should be admitted 
into the state law school because there was no black equivalent to that school. This 
opinion was reaffirmed by Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma 
(1948), which applied the same reasoning to an Oklahoma law school.  In response, 
universities intent on keeping their students segregated quickly set up black law 
schools or segregated classrooms within existing schools.   
Two Supreme Court decisions in 1950 dealt serious blows to the separate-but-
equal doctrine.  McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents of Higher Education (1950) 
declared that segregated graduate instruction violated George W. McLaurin’s equal 
protection of the laws.  In Sweatt v. Painter (1950) the Supreme Court decided that 
the makeshift black law school set up in lieu of segregation did not provide equal 
educational benefits, in part because segregated schools have negative effects on both 
blacks’ and whites’ understanding of their roles as integrated citizens.40   
In Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the Warren Court produced a long 
fought-for unanimous opinion, striking down Plessy’s separate-but-equal doctrine.  
Amidst the justices’ concerns that calling for desegregation would incite violence, 
political upheaval, and institutional discredit, the Supreme Court announced that 
racial segregation in schools was unconstitutional.  Arguments about benefits of racial 
integration in education, and the necessity to take affirmative steps for integration to 
occur, were central to the Brown decision.  Thus, the most recognizable theme of the 
earlier movements had been the value of integration, legally validated by Brown.   
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Yet, in the middle 1960s, federal workers, legal professionals, scholars, and 
civil rights organizations were disturbed by the lack of progress toward the equal 
outcomes that race-neutral policies had promised, and pushed for more direct, 
affirmative action to alleviate disparities.41  School districts continued to delay and 
stifle integration, and in 1968 the Supreme Court struck down the passive “freedom-
of-choice” plan of a Virginia school district in Green v. County School Board.42  Yet 
the Court was more ambivalent in its decisions about more active steps toward school 
integration – especially after Earl Warren retired in 1969 and Warren E. Burger was 
appointed to replace him as chief justice.  In 1971, the Supreme Court unanimously 
declared busing acceptable when there was a proven history of segregation within the 
school district.43  Three years later, however, a split Court held that busing policies 
should not cross district lines between the city of Detroit and its suburbs.44  
Russell Nieli notes that, “[In] the late 1960s, a major shift occurred in 
American thinking about the desirability of the then-current policy of government-
enforced racial and ethnic neutrality in the areas of hiring, promotion, and university 
admissions.”45  Legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights 
and Immigration Acts of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 forbade 
discrimination and called for equal treatment of all groups.  Yet amidst these gains, 
widespread urban rioting occurred, and the results of the 1968 Kerner report from the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders pointed to African American 
frustration not just with overt discrimination, but also with disproportionate poverty, 
unemployment, poor education and housing, and systemic police bias.46  It became 
clear to some that abandonment of discriminatory practices does not erase the legacy 
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of those practices.  The recommendations of the Kerner commission included 
fostering programs that carried an immediate impact “in order to close the gap 
between promise and performance” for all minority groups.47   
The enactment of such programs began to draw lawsuits from whites who felt 
that minority set-asides, preferences, or affirmative hiring of minorities discriminated 
against them because of race.48  DeFunis v. Odegaard (1974) was one of these cases, 
addressing the practice of affirmative action in higher education.49  Marco DeFunis, a 
white male, was twice rejected by the University of Washington School of Law, 
which had a policy of considering separately African American, Hispanic American, 
Native American, and Filipino American applications.  The school placed different 
weights on grades and compared the minority applicants to each other rather than the 
entire pool, with target percentage goals for minority student admittees.50  DeFunis 
filed suit, claiming that the law school’s program constituted “reverse 
discrimination.”  The Supreme Court agreed to take the case, both because of interest 
in the issue and due to concern that they would appear avoidant if they did not take 
it.51  However, by the time oral arguments were made, DeFunis was in his last 
semester of law school.  A majority of the court declared the case moot, amid strong 
dissents from four of its members, who argued that DeFunis’ situation was not 
specific to him, but reflected a larger constitutional issue that would need to be 
addressed.52 
Thus, when Bakke made its way to the high court in 1977, the justices felt 
pressure to take the case.53  Most of the justices were the same ones who had 
narrowly avoided issuing a decision in DeFunis.  After a tumultuous 1960s with 
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notable legislative civil rights gains for women, African Americans, Native 
Americans, and Latinos, the United States amassed some carefully crafted (and 
bitterly negotiated) legislation that rendered the equal treatment of all its citizens 
enforceable by law.  What, exactly, those laws should look like became a source of 
contention even before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was affirmed.54  How, legally, to 
enforce equality was the question of the day. Civil rights activist Morris Abram 
reports that, by the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, much of the civil rights leadership 
and their political liaisons were frustrated by the slow pace of progress and “had 
become increasingly preoccupied with equality of results.”55  Yet others, including 
some among the civil rights community, found this version of equality onerous to the 
Constitution and counter-productive to the integrationist movement toward equality.56  
The discourse surrounding the Bakke case, including the amicus briefs, Supreme 
Court conference discussions, Supreme Court opinions, and subsequent public 
reaction, reflected these robust tensions.   
 Portrayals of Bakke’s Legal Relevance  
Most research about Bakke comes from legal practitioners, and thus focuses 
largely on technical, specialized aspects of legal reasoning and consequences 
including the legal traditions that may explain Powell’s decision.57  For instance, Kirk 
Kolbo lauds Powell’s finding that the UC-Davis program was invalid, because 
according to Kolbo “it is a settled feature of equal-protection analysis that 
government has the burden of justifying any racial and ethnic classifications under the 
‘strict-scrutiny’ standard, meaning that it must prove that the classifications are 
supported by a ‘compelling’ interest and that they are narrowly tailored to achieve 
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that interest.”58  Legal scholar Michael Rosman traces Justice Powell’s constitutional 
justification while critiquing it for its solitary status:  “Justice Powell …applied strict 
scrutiny to the Davis program…conclud[ing] that ‘academic freedom,’ although not a 
specifically enumerated Constitutional right, was a ‘special concern’ of the First 
Amendment and thus a sufficiently compelling interest to meet strict scrutiny.”59  
This type of research provides insight into legal doctrine and accepted forms of legal 
reasoning, both of which are important to this project because they reflect particular 
motivations and audiences that justices must consider when framing their arguments.  
However, they grant the constitutional justifications offered in the published opinions 
as the entirety of the reasoning process. 
 Other research explains the major public sentiments of the time, mostly with 
the purpose of critiquing or justifying Powell’s decision either because of his legal 
realist principles that considered such public sentiment or because of his narrow-
mindedness that forced him to ignore such sentiments.60  Girardeau Spann argues that 
affirmative action cases do not even merit judicial review, making the Bakke case a 
blatant exercise in politics.61  Conversely, Elizabeth Anderson critiques the limited 
scope of Powell’s opinion because, “Powell's argument excluded integrationist 
practices intended to advance racial justice in ways that do not operate through the 
educational benefits of diversity.”62  These studies provide a wealth of knowledge 
about jurisprudential norms and modes of justification, although they focus “upon the 
internally generated doctrinal and institutional changes at the expense of attention to 
external sources of normative values.”63  To the extent that these analyses recognize 
larger rhetorical influence, they generally critique the justices for their legal realism.  
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This charge implies that Supreme Court reasoning can – and should – be completely 
removed from public discourse, and that any similarities between public arguments 
and Supreme Court decisions reveal a conscious choice by those justices to forward 
particular political or social values.  At the same time, opponents of the Bakke 
decision point to public opinion polls also showing opposition to affirmative action as 
evidence that the decision was wrong.  For instance, Rosman argues that growing 
public distaste in race-conscious decision-making, as evidenced in poll numbers, can 
be traced to Justice Powell’s expansion of affirmative action from African Americans 
to a wider category of minorities.64 
Several studies of the Bakke case trace it thematically:  two to three main 
ideas usually culled from either other editorials about affirmative action, from the 
main litigants in Bakke, in cases surrounding Bakke, or from the opinions of the 
justices in these cases.65  For instance, Laurence H. Tribe, a law professor and lawyer 
who has argued many cases before the Supreme Court, wrote about the Bakke case in 
order to “extract several distinct themes from the Bakke decision” –  namely those of 
equal protection, procedural fairness, and structural justice – then to “speculate on 
their independent significance for the future.”66  These analyses, though useful, treat 
Supreme Court cases as if they are an end unto themselves – not generally 
recognizing Supreme Court opinions as more publicly regarded and highly jargonized 
forms of arguments already circulating within the public.   
The majority of Bakke analyses attribute the “fractured” decision to be the 
near-fatal weakness of affirmative action itself, rather than viewing the decision as 
one that allows a flexible and polyvalent reading more sustainable with multiple 
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groups than an up-or-down decision.67  For instance, Rosman argues that, amongst 
other problems with Justice Powell’s decision, “the first problem with the ‘academic 
freedom’ rationale is that no other member of the Court adopted it. Thus, its value as 
precedent has always been questionable.”68  The lack of a clear majority opinion is 
considered a weakness, in large part because most of these scholars are thinking of 
legal reasoning, wherein the appearances of certainty, of clear precedent, and of 
unanimity are the ultimate goals in maintaining its authority.69  “It is easy to be 
skeptical about the Supreme Court’s affirmative action cases,” Cass R. Sunstein 
grants in his essay about the deliberative aspects of Supreme Court decisions.  “From 
the standpoint of the rule of law, the cases are truly a mess.”70  
From a rhetorical standpoint, however, the Bakke case is a marker for a shift 
from reliance on equality to the celebration of diversity in the consideration of racial 
inequities.  Scholars of rhetoric recognize the contingency of truth and the degrees of 
agreement and disagreement that come with deliberative discourse.71  Many law 
studies focus on what they call the “diversity rationale,” a term of substantive interest 
in this project.  However, the legal analyses begin and end the exploration at 
diversity’s constitutionality, with perhaps a stretch into its effects on law.  Similarly, 
several books trace the import and effects of Bakke, affirmative action, and diversity 
in higher education.72  Instead, this project traces the importance of the decision in the 
opposite direction: what Powell’s conclusion of diversity reveals about the rhetorical 
invention process within Supreme Court opinion writing, and the latter’s social 
embeddedness as a mode of discourse. 
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 The Rhetorical Supreme Court 
Approaching the Bakke case from a rhetorical standpoint highlights the 
dynamic relationship between legal actions and public thought. As Austin Sarat and 
Thomas R. Kearns argue, contentious cases “open up the question of politics and of 
law’s connection to the world of contingency.”73  Law, Wetlaufer notes, “is the very 
profession of rhetoric,” although it builds its reputation on denying its central 
feature.74  The law is “not only a particular field to which rhetoric can be applied; it is 
also rhetorical through and through.”75  Whereas rhetoric is contingent, legal 
discourse diminishes this contingency by speaking in the language of certainty, using 
highly technical language, and appealing to “pre-set” legal rules and norms beyond 
which legal actors proclaim they cannot venture.  Thus, Marouf Hasian Jr. argues that 
“legal formalism hides the constitutive nature of America’s judicial rules and 
norms.”76   
Because the Supreme Court serves an appellate role, it often makes the final 
legal decision on looming questions such as the viability of affirmative action.  At the 
Supreme Court level, many cases that garner public attention are those that reflect 
competing public values.77  The ability to appeal perceived injustices to the Supreme 
Court affords the Court the opportunity to negotiate, change, dismiss, or reconceive 
looming conflicts of the day.  Moreover, the adversarial format of legal conflict 
necessitates a winner and a loser, promising resolution by its very structure.78  Within 
the justices’ opinions, the “rhetorical use of language is seen as inducing, by symbolic 
or figurative means, the co-operation and accommodation of social and institutional 
forces whose real affinities are antagonistic and conflictual.”79  The Supreme Court 
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gains its authority from its role in accommodating these forces, in “helping to guide 
the nation…with respect to those long-term ‘value-questions’ that are so vital to the 
maintenance of a just political order.”80   
This authority itself is one constructed by the Supreme Court.  Because the 
Supreme Court has no enforcement power, it must find support for its assertions 
through its own constructed authority.  As Jeffery Mondak and Shannon Smithey 
note:  
The Supreme Court is an inherently weak institution.  To give impact to its 
decisions, the Court depends on legislators for funding, the executive for 
enforcement, and the public for compliance.  This last relationship—between 
the Supreme Court and the public—provides the Court with its most daunting 
obstacles….Despite the Supreme Court’s nominal insulation from the 
American people, the Court’s justices have strong incentives to be concerned 
with their public standing.81 
Thus, the Supreme Court must “establish its authority as being something less 
than naked power, but something more than advisory influence” in order for decisions 
to be viewed as legitimate.82  A key rhetorical feature of the Court is its need to 
motivate support for its decisions in lieu of forcibly imposing them.  Perelman notes 
that, in democratic societies, “the role of the judge, servant of existing laws, is to 
contribute to the acceptance of the system.  He shows that the decisions which he is 
led to take are not only legal, but are acceptable because they are reasonable.”83  
Gerald N. Rosenberg describes a Supreme Court constrained by broader social 
conditions, including matters of public opinion.84  In cases of public interest, the need 
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to sound reasonable extends beyond legal practitioners involved with the case to a 
wider audience who may not know the legal precedents or doctrinal habits relating to 
the subject area.  In cases such as this, “the authority of the court opinion is not a 
given—it must be earned; and the audiences from which assent must be won are often 
multiple.”85   
Because judicial opinions are the public venue for explicating the justices’ 
reasoning and conclusions, most legal and rhetorical analyses focus on them as the 
relevant discourse in judicial decision-making.  Such an approach often treats legal 
texts as solitary and complete, often isolated from their social contexts by legal 
philosophies that expect neutrality.  This habit is unrealistic and unreflective of the 
legal process in cases of social importance.  Although Michael Klarman assures 
readers that justices do not make decisions solely based on public opinion, he notes 
that “because constitutional law is generally quite indeterminate, constitutional 
interpretation almost inevitably reflects the broader social and political context of the 
times.”86  Hasian points out the incomplete rhetorical history of focusing solely on 
judicial opinions, remarking that, “often we are left with judicial edicts that have 
simply withstood the push and pull that comes from the centripetal and centrifugal 
forces of competing audience positions.”87  James Boyd White explains that it is less 
valuable to treat judicial opinions as a legal field of study than it is to conceive of law 
“as a ‘culture of argument’—or, what is much the same thing, as a language, as a set 
of ways of making sense of things and acting in the world.”88   
Moreover, treating Supreme Court opinions as representative of the entirety of 
the authors’ reasoning process truncates the elaborate negotiation between justices 
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and disallows more pragmatic considerations which would not be prudent – or 
relevant – to work into the final opinions.  Justices must make their final opinions 
consonant with accepted forms of legal decision-making, but that does not mean that 
the reasons given in the opinions were the only factors (or even the main factors) 
considered when deciding how to vote in the first place.  Judicial opinions are public 
justifications for rulings, written with a sense of textual inevitability that undermines 
the contingent nature of judicial argument.89   A thorough examination of archival 
materials, such as memoranda among the justices, and between each justice and his or 
her law clerks, as well as drafts of the justices’ opinions and the responses offered to 
them, accords a better understanding of the forms of reasoning that prompted the 
decisions that preceded the penning of the opinions. These memoranda reveal which 
premises, warrants, forms and sources of evidence, and overarching goals guided the 
justices’ arguments:  for instance, concerns about public perceptions of the Court, 
consideration of editorials and respected legal scholars writing about the issues, 
negotiations and compromises between the justices about what issues within the case 
will be covered by whom (and who is the most credible to speak on them), and, most 
importantly, which ideas of justice were to be privileged in the case. 
While the public was generally unaware and unconcerned with the Bakke case 
until it reached the Supreme Court, the ongoing struggles about race and equal 
opportunity that brought about the University’s policy and Allan Bakke’s reaction to 
the policy were already part of the public culture.  The rhetorical significance of the 
case does not end with the decision itself, because “when a court renders an opinion 
or an agency makes a ruling, it not only resolves a particular dispute, it 
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validates…one way of looking at the world, one way of speaking and thinking.”90  
The shared resources among legal and public discourses are particularly salient in 
Supreme Court cases because, as Bernard Schwartz describes the Court, it is “both a 
mirror and a motor—reflecting the development of the society which it serves and 
helping to move that society in the direction of the dominant jurisprudence of the 
day.”91   
Indeed, constitutional interpretation lies in the tension between textual and 
contextual factors, and exploring this tension is the mission of public address 
scholarship.  Thomas Rosteck argues that public texts should be considered as forms 
of “culture in practice…not as objects to deconstruct, but forms of activity 
inseparable from wider social relations.”92  Stephen Browne considers it one of the 
fundamental goals of the critic to explore the negotiation of the “productive tension 
between form and content, text and context, coherence and fragmentation,” and while 
Stephen E. Lucas charges that the critic’s primary focus should be on the text itself, 
he grants that each text’s linguistic, social, and textual contexts are what give 
meaning to it.93  Furthermore, Richard K. Sherwin argues that, “law’s stories, images, 
and characters leach back into the culture at large.”94  Because legal institutions such 
as the Supreme Court are part of the larger national culture with which they deal, they 
cannot be separated from those symbolic, ideological habits of the mind that inhabit 
the communities in which they are involved.95   
By expanding the analysis to Bakke’s social context, the amicus briefs, and 
debates among justices, this study considers the arguments of the various publics that 
were manifest in the discovery and selection process by which Justice Powell decided 
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how to decide.  Supreme Court decision-making does not rely entirely on precedent, 
nor does it rest wholly on personal preferences.  These processes are evidenced in 
part through memos and conference notes that reveal, according to Del Dickson, “an 
intricate and shifting composite of law, politics, policy, principle, efficiency, 
expedience, pragmatism, dogmatism, reason, passion, detachment, individual 
personality, group psychology, institutional forces, and external pressures.”96  Robert 
A. Ferguson argues that, whereas a court decision necessarily truncates the stories of 
the various parties, the “complete chronicle of a courtroom event…comes closer to 
evoking the overall range of communal pressures than the crafted conclusion of the 
presiding judge.”97   
Outline for Study 
This study examines how Justice Powell sifted through the arguments 
surrounding affirmative action policies in the 1970s to settle on diversity as a 
constitutionally justifiable platform upon which affirmative action in higher education 
could rest.  It does so by exploring the goals, constraints, and purposes of the various 
parties to the Bakke case as they utilize the linguistic resources available to them, 
culminating in the Bakke decision.  These linguistic resources have been shaped by 
centuries of struggles for civil rights, and that contextual history is considered as well. 
Chapter One provides a theoretical exposition on the rhetorical invention 
process in legal contexts.  In doing so, it traces how the rhetorical invention process 
explicated by classical rhetorical theorists, separated from the rhetorical process and 
placed under the umbrella of philosophy, then reconceived by contemporary 
rhetorical scholars, influences legal practice in ways that offer an enhanced 
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understanding of Powell’s perplexing Bakke conclusion.  Chapter One also explicates 
the common starting places of Supreme Court arguments – that is, contemporary sites 
of rhetorical invention in appellate legal argument. 
Chapter Two provides an exposition of the development of affirmative action 
as a concept and a policy, situating the Bakke case within the broader scope of public 
arguments about twentieth century race relations.  Although values such as equality 
as tend to be treated as universal, when policies purporting to embody those 
principles are brought into legal question, their contingent nature is made more 
visible, because “criticism and justification are always found in a historically 
determined context.”98  This chapter highlights that historical context, examining 
discourses about colorblindness, race consciousness and racial pride, assimilation, 
diversity, and reparations for discrimination in order to detail the rhetorical history of 
affirmative action.  As these concepts were reflected in law, the Supreme Court was 
asked to respond to conflicting arguments about which remedies would best resolve 
existing economic, social, and civil liberty disparities between races.  Chapter Two 
also traces early legal challenges to affirmative action, ending with the educational 
policies and legal challenges that became the Bakke case.   
Chapter Three analyzes the publicly available party briefs and amicus briefs 
submitted to the Supreme Court in Bakke in order to draw out the argumentative 
scene from which Justice Powell crafted his arguments.  Thus, Chapter Three 
highlights the disparate arguments about the merits or harms of affirmative action in 
higher education specifically.  These arguments include references to other types of 
“preferences” already instilled in law and policy regarding athletes and children of 
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alumni; definitions of merit which benefit middle- and upper-class applicants even as 
their language appears race and class-neutral; the benefits of a diverse student body; 
the continuing need to rectify past discrimination; the denial of individualism by 
group consideration and numerical goals; and the “reverse discrimination” of such 
policies.99  These individual arguments are also textual embodiments of ideological 
beliefs about racial identity, professional and social progress, and the law’s role in 
negotiating the relationship between individual and collective identities, and Chapter 
Three interrogates those ideological markers and their interdependencies.   
Chapter Four focuses on those arguments that Justice Powell considered as he 
worked toward his final opinion in Bakke.  These texts, retrieved from the Justice 
Lewis Powell Archives at Washington and Lee University, include the 
correspondence among the justices, between Justice Powell and law clerks, personal 
notes about the case, and drafts of his final opinion.100   Chapter Four narrates 
Powell’s process of discovery and judgment of existing arguments and institutional 
constraints as he worked from deciding how to decide to the justification of his 
conclusions.  Sarat and Kearns speak to the importance of internal documents 
analyzing legal arguments: “trial transcripts display the full range of the available 
rhetorical resources of a community and its historical epoch; they enable us to 
understand the central argumentative preoccupations of a culture as well as the limits 
on what can be spoken about within law’s ambit.”101  Accordingly, the chapter 
explores how Justice Powell and his law clerk engaged in the classical invention 
process of working the specifics of the case against legal topoi, considering 
counterarguments and repercussions to the possibilities before them.  Chapter Four 
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also traces the coauthorship process with his clerk and colleagues as Powell crafted a 
judgment that would forward the institutional needs of the Court as well as the needs 
of the public.    
I conclude this project with a discussion of how the Bakke case reflects the 
ways in which the Supreme Court works as part of a broader rhetorical culture, while 
upholding the public expectations of judicial decision-making, to construct their 
decisions using the materials of public arguments, and the architecture of 
jurisprudential norms.  This examination is important to the understanding of legal 
rhetoric as part of a larger rhetorical culture.  As Hasian points out, if one is to take 
seriously “the constitutive nature of rhetoric in a constitutional democracy, then you 
must look at ‘reciprocal dialogue’ in ‘public conversation.’”102  Studying legal 
discourses, reconceived as discursive fields rather than singular and isolated texts, can 
provide insight into the shift from equality to diversity as the justification for 
affirmative action.  Finally, the conclusion argues that an important ideological 
function of Powell’s reliance on diversity was to immerse the concept of race 
conscious within the structures of individualist ideology and meritocracy, thus 
separating the justification of affirmative action from its roots in social justice. 
Conclusion 
The Bakke case brings together ideas of justice central to the American public 
and centered around one of our most longstanding controversies:  the “race problem.”  
Mootz finds the topic of affirmative action to be ideal for a study of law because:  
the question of affirmative action challenges our sense of justice quite unlike 
other public policy questions…because it brings sharply into relief the 
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antinomic commonplaces of liberty and equality that are the mainsprings of 
our nomos, equally implicating our social acknowledgment of responsibility 
for one's situation as just desert and an entitlement to assistance as a matter of 
right.103 
Studying the inventional mechanisms Justice Powell used as he wrote the 
Supreme Court’s guiding decision in Bakke helps to explicate the process Mootz 
describes.  The construction of Powell’s justification about affirmative action in 
higher education uncovers an argumentation process by which individual judges 
reconcile objectivity with compassion, their roles as judges with their roles as 
citizens.  Perelman describes the role of the judge thusly: 
A just judge is not an objective and disinterested spectator whose judgments 
are just because in describing faithfully what he sees they conform to some 
exterior reality.  The judge cannot stop at letting the facts speak for 
themselves: He must take a position with respect to them.  The just judge is 
impartial; having no tie with any of the litigants before him, he applies to all 
of them the juridical rules prescribed by the legal system.  Yet the judge is not 
a simple spectator, for he has a mission, which is to state the law.  Through his 
decisions he must make the norms of the community respected.104 
Aside from its historical and legal import, the role of the Bakke case in 
popularizing ‘diversity’ as a positive value should pique interest because it performs a 
task central to rhetoric:  situating the individual in the collective, creating cohesion 
out of difference, whether that difference is real or perceived.  Rhetorical acts help to 
constitute a collective subject through “narratives that foster identity superseding 
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individual/class interests.”105  The commitment to diversity performs this task, in part, 
by asking the American public to treat those disparate interests as the cohesive force 
that brings us together.  Bakke, as the legal forum’s articulation of our commitment to 
diversity, pits individual rights against group rights, and in this conflict perhaps sees 
rhetoric in its premier form – reconciling individual and collective interests.  For, as 
Trevor Parry-Giles notes, “Individuals are only aware of collectivity because 
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Chapter One:   
Rhetorical Invention and Supreme Court Opinion Writing 
 
The Supreme Court made a difficult decision in 1978 to grant certiorari in the 
case of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, a case which questioned the 
constitutionality of a race-conscious admissions policy at the University of California 
at Davis.  The student who initiated the case was a white male who had been denied 
admission to the UC-Davis Medical School.  At that time, UC-Davis had a separate 
admissions program for considering the applicants who indicated that they were 
either economically disadvantaged or underrepresented minorities.  When the case 
reached the Supreme Court, several justices were hoping to decide Bakke on narrow 
statutory grounds, without dealing with broader constitutional issues.1  Even the more 
conservative justices were reluctant to strike down the practice of affirmative action 
altogether, but they did not want to declare the use of race constitutionally acceptable 
because, in part, of the precedent it would set.  Justice William H. Rehnquist 
complained, for example, in a memo written to his fellow justices that “the 
University’s admissions policy in this case seems to me to make its ‘affirmative 
action’ program as difficult to sustain constitutionally as one conceivably could be.”2   
Justice Lewis F Powell Jr., however, cautioned against stopping short of 
constitutional arguments in their decision:   
[T]here is no evidence that this problem will ‘go away’.  When DeFunis was 
here three years ago, we avoided – I thought on sound grounds – the 




constitutional issue.  We were criticized then for leaving the hundreds of state 
colleges, universities and graduate schools without guidance.  The need for 
resolution of this issue certainly has not lessened.  Inevitably, after some 
presently indeterminate time – perhaps another two or three years – the 
constitutional issue will again be before us.3 
Chief Justice Warren Burger summarized the Supreme Court’s concerns in a 
confidential memo, in which he offered a challenge to the justices:  “The program 
excluded Bakke from the medical school on the basis of race and this is not disputed. 
I am open to being shown how, consistent with the prior decisions of the Court, we 
can escape the significance of this fact…If it is to take years to work out a rational 
solution of the current problem, so be it.  That is what we are paid for.”4 
Although Bakke was a particularly high-profile and complex case, Bernard 
Jacob argues that “the opportunity for reconsideration, innovation, rejection, and 
amendment appears as a moment in the basic structure of every legal problem,” 
because “each legal situation begins in conflict and uncertainty, and no single answer 
is immediately apparent.”5  To Aristotle, this uncertainty is where rhetoric begins as 
well, for there cannot be debate without doubts: the rhetor “will be concerned not 
with all, but [only] those which can both possibly come to pass and [possibly] not.  
As to whatever necessarily exists or will exist or is impossible to be or to have come 
about, on these matters there is no deliberation.”6   
Chief Justice Burger’s call to action highlights the complexities and 
ambivalences of the inventional process within the Supreme Court.  In their final 
opinions, justices must issue decisions reflecting the circumstances of the particular 




case – as opposed to their feelings about the law or practice as a whole – and their 
decisions should be consonant with previous rulings.  Because of institutional 
expectations crafted by a confluence of political theory, legal philosophy, and 
pseudo-scientific epistemological frameworks, the final opinions are often written in 
the language of certainty and grounded in ideas of legislative intent and informed 
interpretation.  Yet in complex cases dealing with controversial social issues like 
affirmative action, a policy unconsidered by the authors of the Constitution and only 
vaguely referenced in federal legislation, institutional standards alone do not meet the 
needs of the case. 
Met by institutional expectations that often work against creative solutions, 
Supreme Court justices nevertheless encounter novel problems that reframe or 
recontextualize old doctrine, rendering the existing precedents and accepted 
interpretations inadequate.  Justices must find solutions that appear to already exist; 
solutions that uphold the expectations of judicial review, that avoid the appearance of 
“legislating from the bench,” and fit within the existing flow of discourse (both public 
and legal) surrounding the issue.  A central focus of this study is on what inventional 
practices justices invoke as they enact and articulate rhetorical spaces in legal 
doctrine.          
Jacob asserts that a primary value of the contemporary use of inventional 
topoi is to complicate what seems at first non-deliberative, or that which legal theory 
glosses over in its neatness.  According to Jacob, “Theory unrestrained will…cover 
over the real facts of the problem, or will treat the problem as no problem. It is 
precisely this tendency that a topical consciousness is meant to resist.”7  A return to 




classical rhetoricians benefits those interested in legal argument, because “we can 
turn to [Aristotle’s] the Rhetoric…and enrich this definition of ‘problem’ in a way 
that may help us to justify this insistence on intellectual messiness and disorder as one 
of the purposes of the topical method.”8  Josina M. Makau describes the study of 
argumentation as ideal for those interested in legal argument because it is “a marriage 
between the ancient field of rhetoric, on the one hand, and contemporary 
philosophical inquiry on the other. Argumentation theory provide[s] fertile ground for 
interdisciplinary explorations of ethical and effective decision making in practical 
contexts.”9 
Constrained by the limits of a less-than-perfect affirmative action plan and a 
public need for an authoritative answer to the question of affirmative action’s 
constitutionality, a divided group of justices who wanted neither to support this 
particular plan nor forbid the use of affirmative action altogether sought to craft a 
creative solution in Bakke.  The majority of the task fell to Justice Powell, whose 
court opinion was the deciding vote in the case, and whose mission it was to bridge 
the reasoning of the two groups of justices.  Powell’s final opinion has been both 
celebrated and reviled since it was opined.  Despite fractured voting blocs in the case, 
Powell’s deciding opinion withstood a direct court challenge in 2003, and has been 
used as a platform for affirmative action programs across the country.  The present 
question becomes how Powell negotiated the standards of appellate court reasoning, 
multiple and conflicting authorship, and a deluge of amicus briefs to carve out a 
justification for affirmative action without undermining the credibility of the Court.   




Thus, this project explores the inventional process undertaken by Justice 
Powell as he crafted the deciding opinion in Bakke.  Makau argues that the Bakke 
case is fascinating because “the Court’s complex decision in this case, with its five 
‘minority’ opinions, reflects perhaps better than any other decision, the Court’s 
responsiveness to the rhetorical complexities inherent in this area of adjudication.”10  
This chapter situates judicial opinion writing in general, and Powell’s Bakke opinion 
in particular, within the larger framework of theories of rhetorical invention and legal 
reasoning.  In doing so, it contributes to the mission put forth by Karl Wallace to 
study invention as “a fresh examination of systemic ways through which persons 
engaged in communication may be directed to sources of information and argument 
and to modes of perception, interpretation, and judgment.”11  This chapter describes 
how contemporary judicial argument, crafted from a range of sources, interfaces 
dialectic with the rhetorical, forensic with deliberative, institutional and subject-
specific topoi with creative thought, and single-authorship with collective writing in 
order to “discover and select among the arguments available for use in the particular 
situation at hand.”12  In doing so, it illuminates how the novel legal conclusion was 
reached in the Bakke case by a fundamentally rhetorical, inventional process during 
deliberations and during the process whereby Powell researched, edited, and crafted 
his final opinion.   
 




Classical Roots of Contemporary Legal Rhetoric 
The study and practice of legal rhetoric has a long history; classical rhetorical 
scholar George A. Kennedy places the roots of the rhetorical tradition with the needs 
and abilities of citizens in Athens, during the fifth century B.C.E.13  The newly 
emerging Athenian democracy carried two features central to the development of 
rhetorical theory:  an expectation of adult male citizens to participate in political and 
legal activities, and the “literate revolution” which made written suggestions for 
speechmaking accessible to significant numbers of the population.14  Athenian law 
courts held juries in numbers between 201 and 501 people, and male citizens were 
expected to argue on their own behalf (or on the behalf of their female family 
members) for both the prosecution and the defense sides.  There were few written 
documents, except for statements taken from witnesses and read aloud in court.  
Although one could buy speeches to deliver before the court, there were no lawyers to 
hire.15   
Given the constraints of the Athenian legal system, there was a need for 
instruction on how to create and deliver successful legal arguments.  This need was 
met in several ways.  One way to learn the art of judicial oratory was to imitate a 
successful orator, either by buying and memorizing legal speeches, or by paying to 
study with a sophist, where imitation was also central.16  Several notable Sophists 
went beyond imitation to teach functional elements of public speaking, including 
organization, style, and philosophies. Gorgias, for instance, believed that certain 
stylistic features would make a speaker more persuasive, and sought to teach them to 
Athenians.17  Isocrates combined teaching types of speech with the belief that each 




speech and its parts must be specific to the situation and to the speaker; a speech that 
was too formulaic was useless.18  Particularly useful to the invention process was the 
sophistic focus on the concept of kairos, defined as “the right moment” or “the 
opportune.”19  For most Sophists, conflict and situational contingencies were the 
starting place of discourse.20  The early style of sophistic teaching was criticized by 
Aristotle, among others, for its “lack of conceptualization of technique and the 
formation of rules.”21   
The earliest attempts to offer technical instruction on public speaking have 
been attributed to Corax and Tisias of Syracuse.22  For a fee, they offered oral 
instruction on techniques of argumentation and presentation, focused mostly on 
courtroom arguments.  According to Michael Frost, “the chief contribution that Corax 
made to the art of rhetoric was the formula he proposed for the parts of a judicial 
speech – proem, narration, arguments (both confirmation and refutation), and 
peroration – the arrangement that becomes a staple of all later rhetorical theory.”23  
Originally taught in oral form, these lessons were written down, sold, and reached 
Athens, where similar books in “the art of speech” were published.24   
The focus of arguments before the court, and thus on early rhetorical 
instruction about legal argument, centered on arguments based on levels of 
probability. This focus emerged in part because of the flood of citizens rushing the 
courts to claim property overtaken during tyrannical rule, for which there was no 
documentary evidence.25 Corax and Tisias-inspired technical books were prescriptive 
in nature, focusing mostly on judicial rhetoric via suggestions for organization and 




parts of argument, and sometimes accompanied by examples.26  Aristotle addressed 
the insufficient nature of these rhetorical handbooks in On Rhetoric: 
As things are now, those who have composed Arts of Speech have worked on 
a small part of the subject [of rhetoric]; for only pisteis [logical proofs] are 
artistic (other things are supplementary), and these writers say nothing about 
enthymemes, which is the ‘body’ of persuasion, while they give most of their 
attention to matters external to the subject; for verbal attack and pity and 
anger and such emotions of the soul do not relate to fact but are appeals to the 
juryman. 
As a result, if all trials were conducted as they are in some present-day states 
and especially in those well governed, [the handbook writers] would have 
nothing to say…some [trial courts] even adopt the practice and forbid 
speaking outside the subject…rightly so providing; for it is wrong to warp the 
jury by leading them into anger or envy or pity; that is the same as if someone 
made straightedge rule crooked before using it.27 
 Socrates and his student Plato distrusted both sophistic teaching and the 
technical rhetoric handbooks.28  They studied and taught philosophical thinking, and 
saw the practice of rhetoric as at odds with the goals of philosophy.   However, 
Plato’s student Aristotle saw the two more closely joined.29  As an introduction to the 
description of political topoi that can be used in deliberative arguments, Aristotle 
describes rhetoric as “a combination of analytical knowledge and knowledge of 
characters and that on the one hand is like dialectic, on the other like sophistic 
discourses.”30  In this blend of theory and practice (praxis) can be seen a major 




difference between Plato’s and Aristotle’s interests in political theory:  Aristotle had 
an “interest in political theory [that was] clearly developed out of Plato’s work but 
again was more pragmatic, based on a study of existing constitutions in their 
historical development and defining the checks and balances that might create 
stability in a mixed constitution rather than imagining an ideal state, as Plato did in 
the Republic and Laws.” 31 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, and subsequently Cicero’s On Invention, reveals a more 
complex relationship between philosophical dialectic and situation-specific rhetoric. 
In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, he proclaims that “rhetoric is an antistrophos [counterpart] to 
dialectic; for both are concerned with such things as are, to a certain extent, within the 
knowledge of all people and belong to no separately defined science…A result is that 
all people, in some way, share in both; for all, to some extent, try both to test and 
maintain an argument [as in dialectic] and to defend themselves and attack [as in 
rhetoric].”32  Aristotle defined rhetoric not merely by its persuasive effect but also by 
its inventional tools to aid in discovery and judgment; logical conclusions about 
philosophical truths arrived at dialectically may not win before a broader audience 
without rhetorical strategies, he argued, such as the ability to “argue persuasively on 
either side of a question…in order that it may not escape our notice what the real state 
of the case is.”33  Furthermore, the abstract principles of justice established by laws 
may, in their abstraction, become incapable of speaking to the nuance of specific 
situations if one does not allow for the situation-specific argumentative forms of 
rhetoric, which bring equity to the justice of laws.34 




Some argue that Aristotle’s categorization and systemization of Plato’s rich 
ideas of logic, law, and philosophy also served as the basis for the scientific approach 
to logic and, by extension, to the law.  Huntington Cairns argues, for instance, that 
“the systemization of formal logic as a distinct domain of knowledge, if not as an 
independent science, is undeniably an achievement of Aristotle…For jurisprudence, 
Aristotle’s works represent the first example of the use of a precise scientific method 
in the exploration of legal propositions.”35  At the very least, argues Janet M. Atwill, 
the bridge that Aristotle’s works built between philosophy and rhetoric called into 
question the proper home for invention:  “When Aristotle defined rhetoric as the art 
of observing the available means of persuasion, he placed the art in a particular place 
between theory and practice, subjectivism and empiricism, the aesthetic and 
utilitarian.  These binary oppositions have never served invention very well.”36  
Cicero, in his early treatise On Invention, mirrored Aristotle’s philosophical-
rhetoric connection:  
After long thought, I have been led by reason itself to hold this opinion first 
and foremost, that wisdom without eloquence does too little for the good of 
states, but that eloquence without wisdom is generally highly disadvantageous 
and is never helpful.  Therefore if anyone neglects the study of philosophy and 
moral conduct…his civic life is nurtured into something useless to himself 
and harmful to his country; but the man who equips himself with the weapons 
of eloquence…will be a citizen most helpful and most devoted both to his 
own interests and those of his community.37 




As a follow-up to his dialectic-focused Topics, Aristotle focused in the 
Rhetoric on how to construct public arguments in specific situations: namely, in 
political, legal, and ceremonial circumstances.  He did so, in part, by highlighting the 
common starting points of arguments in each genre, referred to as the rhetorical topoi.  
Aristotle differentiated between general topics, loci communes or “common places” 
and the special topics belonging to specific types of oratory or sciences, both 
“associated with a concern to help a speaker’s inventive efforts and involve the 
grouping of relevant material, so that it can be easily found again when required.”38  
Aristotle recommended that rhetors explore these topoi as a starting place of public 
arguments.  This belief was shared by other classical rhetoricians, who “knew that 
they must fully investigate and understand the facts of a case and the applicable law 
before arguments or an argumentative strategy could be chosen.”39 
When explaining the invention process for forensic discourse, Aristotle 
identified four main issues that became the basis for forensic argument for centuries.  
The first goal of the speaker in the forensic invention process was to figure out which 
of these issues was at the center of the dispute – the stasis of the issue.40  In arguing 
about written laws, the issues included whether or not the act occurred, whether or not 
the act caused harm, the extent of the harm, and the justifiability of the act.41  The 
proof used to support arguments for any of these issues take on two forms, according 
to Aristotle: “some are atechnic [‘nonartistic’], some entechnic [‘embodied in art, 
artistic’].  I call atechnic those that are not provided by ‘us’ [i.e., the potential 
speaker] but are preexisting: for example, witnesses, testimony of slaves taken under 




torture, contracts, and such like; and artistic whatever can be prepared by method and 
by ‘us’; thus, one must use the former and invent the latter.”42  
Forbes Hill observes that Aristotle’s approach to invention was relatively 
formulaic:  
Throughout the Rhetoric, Aristotle conceives of invention as a conscious 
choice from a fixed stock of alternatives.  He does not recognize creative 
imagination, or insight issuing from the unconscious in a dream, or inspiration 
from above.  His word for invention—heuresis—puts the emphasis on finding 
rather than creating.43 
Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca contrast Hill’s assertion with the 
argument that the classical loci have been misused and thus depreciated in value.44 
The consequence of this type of thinking for argumentation studies, argue Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca, includes “a tendency to forget that loci form an indispensable 
arsenal on which a person wishing to persuade another will have to draw, whether he 
likes it or not.”45  Eileen A. Scallen similarly argues that Greco-Roman rhetoricians 
offer nuance to contemporary legal scholars because of their “blend of the utilitarian 
use of rhetoric and the creative quality of rhetoric.”46  Jacob concludes that the very 
utility of topics come from their seeming simplicity:  “When we speak of topics, we 
are speaking of a collection of generalities that are definitely not organized into a 
system or under some single schema. Inadequacy of this sort permits one to focus on 
the actual problems.”47 
Hill’s observation can also be explained by considering the structure of the 
Greek legal system.  The intended audience for all of the rhetorical textbooks on 




judicial rhetoric was that of the male citizenry, with the goal of discovering, choosing, 
and delivering arguments to juries.  James Boyd White argues the lack of established 
precedents in Greece meant that the topoi were especially important, because to a 
certain extent “every question would be argued as an original matter, without the 
advantage of the collective experiences over time that the judicial opinion 
provides.”48 Michael Frost describes the function of the classical invention process:  
At the invention stage of the rhetorical process, [classical rhetoricians] simply 
wanted to ensure that important facts and arguments were not overlooked… 
Comprehensive as their analysis was, Greco-Roman rhetoricians never 
regarded their suggestions as anything more than starting points for 
discovering the available arguments in a given case.  Based on their own 
practical experience, they were acutely aware, and repeatedly reminded their 
readers, that advocates must be creative, resourceful, and flexible in devising 
arguments.49 
The transition from Greek to Roman periods brought with it a shift from 
citizens speaking on their own behalf to professional advocates paid by “clients” in 
court.50  A.H.J. Greenhidge described the primary differences between Greek and 
Roman law, delineated by the “growth of material law” and “growth of the forms by 
which it is asserted.”51  The Greek legal system lacked in material law, but 
compensated with the “cheerful simplicity of the infant state,” whereas the Roman 
legal system codified laws, but did so with “over-strained centralization 
and…indefinite stages of appeal.”52  James Boyd White uses the Greek legal system 
as an example of what the law would look like if it were something that judges just 




performed, and did not explain:  like in Athens, with no judges, juries of hundreds, no 
deliberation, no reliable way of evoking precedent, and no appeal.53   
Unlike the Greek system, the Roman legal system distinguished between the 
roles of judge and jury, and between questions of law and questions of fact.54  The 
Roman step of abstracting principles from the raw material of law opened those 
principles to criticism, manipulation, and change:  “This process of abstraction is 
important not merely for the simplicity of formulation which it makes possible, but 
also because principles, unlike rules, are fertile: a lawyer can by combining two or 
more principles create new principles and therefore new rules.”55  Along with the 
codification of laws came the codification of rhetorical invention: Roman rhetoricians 
made “a significant move away from topics as a set of alternative prompts across 
types of discourse to ones that were text bound to develop a type of discourse or a 
section of the text, i.e., to provide content.  This move blurred the distinction between 
special and common topics.”56  In Rhetorica ad Herennium, for example, topics 
became increasingly subsumed under types of discourses (judicial, deliberative, and 
epideictic) and to parts of the text (introduction, narration, division, distribution, 
proof, and conclusion).57   
Roman legal arguments began to focus on the dialectical features of argument 
as common laws became codified, and the principles behind them came into 
question.58  With the changes in the law courts came early judicial writing.  
According to Former U.S. Court of Appeals judge Patricia Wald: 
[Contemporary] judicial opinion writing has roots in both Roman and early 
English law… Roman adjudication was divided between the praetor, or 




magistrate, and the iudex, a lay arbitrator. Upon receiving the pleadings of 
parties to a lawsuit, the praetor would craft those pleadings into a formula, 
which instructed the iudex on how to decide the case. The formula was not 
unlike jury instructions, although it left both questions of law and fact to the 
iudex, who then decided the case without written record. The Roman jurists – 
learned statesmen with no official role – were the other main writers of the 
system. These jurists rendered advice to both litigants and praetors and 
published treatise-like commentaries describing the resolution of real and 
hypothetical problems.59  
As legal institutions changed, so did the legal questions under consideration.  
This, in turn, prompted an alternative exploration of different sources of discovery for 
arguments. For instance, Cicero’s early work entitled On Invention highlighted in 
meticulous detail the rhetorical forensic topoi.   Extending on Aristotle’s topoi and 
referring to Aristotle, Gorgias and Hermagoras throughout, Cicero identified four 
general starting places, or “controversies,” of legal argument:  the issue will always 
be either a question of fact, about a definition, about the nature of the act, or about 
legal processes. 60  Within this, however, Cicero focused in detail on the interpretation 
of texts, a focus influenced by the increasing codification of laws in Roman 
jurisprudence.  The five main issues involved in the interpretation of texts included an 
exploration of the relationship between the words and the intent of the author; the 
degree of conflict between two or more laws; ambiguities or multiple meanings in a 
text; questions regarding the meaning of a word, or a definitional argument; and 




finally, reasoning by analogy, or exploring the moments when, “from what has been 
written something is discovered which has not been written.”61   
Later in his life, a jurist friend requested Cicero’s advice on how to construct 
effective legal arguments.62  Cicero, at this time having filled the roles of Roman 
aedile and praetor – aediles were magistrates dealing with the public works and the 
marketplace and the praetors administered civil law – turned to the more 
philosophical, dialectical topoi set out by Aristotle’s Topics when he wrote to his 
friend.63  According to Hanns Hohmann, “the rhetorical topoi…would have been 
unsuitable for Cicero’s purposes…because Trebatius, as a Roman jurist…was 
interested first and foremost in questions of law, rather than questions of fact.”64  
Chaïm Perelman explains further that “the role of the Roman praetor was not to 
invent new law, but to apply the supposedly pre-existing one, even if the latter had 
not yet been officially enacted.”65  The praetor did so by looking for comparable 
situations, or “reasonable rules in accordance with the nature of things…when Roman 
law was not applicable, because the case to be settled had not been foreseen, the 
praetor had to discover rules that would be equitable.”66  Roman legal reasoning, 
then, was rooted in inductive reasoning, from which jurists examined specific real and 
hypothetical situations in order to form larger conclusions about the ways that laws 
should work.67  
Classical orators analyzed “with characteristic thoroughness” judicial 
audiences when crafting their legal arguments.68  Legal reasoning was also practical 
reasoning; rather than formulaic equations, classical rhetoricians encouraged in legal 
actors rhetorical thought “characterized by reasonableness and by the taking into 




consideration diverse aspirations and multiple interests, defined by Aristotle as 
phronesis or prudence, and…so brilliantly manifested in law, in Roman 
jurisprudentia.”69  Rather than using the rhetorical and dialectical topoi as tools to be 
pulled from a shelf, classical rhetorical scholars explored the ways that particular 
audiences and situations could be met by fundamental assumptions, and conversely 
how particular audiences and situations lent new meanings to traditional arguments.  
This, asserts Michael Leff, “is the difference between viewing rhetoric as an activity 
conducted in public and rhetoric as a subject to be learned in school.”70   
Topoi were part of the Roman educational process from at least the third 
century B.C.E., and the trivium of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic were used as 
staples of a liberal arts education in the early Middle Ages, even after the social 
structure that supported the public orator had evaporated.71  The pagan and political 
roots of rhetorical theory became burdens on the discipline, however, in the 
increasingly Christian beliefs of the fourth and fifth centuries. 72  The underlying 
bases for knowledge in antiquity rested on the reasoning of educated men, a secular 
source rather than the Scriptural basis of knowledge that had gained acceptance by 
the time of St. Augustine (354-430).73  Moreover, rhetorical tools could be used to 
turn people away from God, making it dangerous to the growing Christian 
orthodoxy.74  Augustine argued in De Doctrina Christina (396-426) that the rhetorical 
canon could be usefully put into the service of ministry, especially to combat those 
who would use eloquence to draw people away from the word of God.75  For 
Augustine, the rhetorical inventional process, as outlined in classical works, could 
still be used with scripture serving as the starting point of discourse.     




The ancient notions of rhetorical invention – as well as arrangement, style, 
and delivery – were similarly usurped throughout the Middle Ages to meet the 
evolving needs of oral and written discourse.  Portions of (largely Ciceronian) 
rhetorical treatises were used to offer suggestions for letter writing, for the art of 
preaching, and for grammar, under the “basic postulate of the medieval arts of 
discourse:  that the past should serve the particular needs of the present.”76  To the 
extent that secular oral discourse diminished in importance under the emerging feudal 
system, so too did its practice outside of elite schools.  In their place, letters became 
increasingly influential as the primary means of negotiating legal and social 
agreements, and the organizational and stylistic recommendations of classical works 
were incorporated into written form.77  According to Charles F. Briggs, the 
development of “more specialized rhetorical arts, like dictamen and preaching, also 
probably had an effect on the relative neglect of rhetoric in the university curriculum 
during these years.”78  The study of grammar, which in Roman times had been an 
introduction into the study of rhetoric and in Augustine’s time as an introduction to 
the study of scripture, became both more complex and foundational to discourse as 
the written form became a primary form of communication.79  In centuries following 
the collapse of the Roman Empire, surviving fragments of Roman law and Greek 
philosophy supplemented Christian beliefs to form local common and official law.80  
There was little synthesized law, and thus little need for the study for legal rhetoric, 
as politics, communication, law, and economies were almost entirely local; “prior to 
the late eleventh century, there was no body of law, no corpus juris…that was 
applicable throughout Europe, either in practice or in theory.”81   




In the eleventh century, however, three sources of law convened in Europe. 
The first source was the new system of canon law of the Roman Catholic Church, 
which applied throughout Roman Catholic Europe; co-emerging with canon law was 
the systemization of feudal law, which was local and variant.  The final source of law 
involved the eleventh century rediscovery of a digest of late Roman law compiled by 
sixth century Emperor Justinian.82  Justinian’s Digest covered three main areas: an 
introduction to Roman law written for first year law students, which explained 
general legal propositions in a systematic arrangement; a compilation of major 
imperial legislation, including his own; and a vast complication of writings from 
Roman jurists.83  Although the rediscovered Roman law digest had no directly 
positivist force on medieval Europe, it motivated the establishment of universities to 
study and teach their tenets, and “all the new legal systems, including especially the 
canon law and the law merchant, came under the strong influence of the new learning 
of the Romanist jurists.”84  Thus, the “vocabulary and structures of Roman and canon 
law shaped [medieval] academic and secular law.”85  Medieval jurists used Roman 
law as the foundations for their doctrine, modifying it largely within the existing 
strictures of the classical framework in order to meet their needs.86 
More importantly for the present study, the use of Roman laws and casebooks 
as sources for and a structure of legal knowledge, instead of using the particulars of 
the case to work to solutions as the classical rhetoricians had done, shifted the 
function of legal reasoning and divorced the study of legal discourse from the body of 
rhetoric.87  Until this time, “rhetoric was critical for law and the training of legal 
professionals throughout Europe. Indeed,” argues Theodor Viehweg, “only with the 




emergence of law as a university discipline in Bologna did law cease to be a 
subdivision of rhetoric and become a subject in its own right.”88  The study of law 
had become an educational goal and a profession of its own, and for the medieval 
Glossators who annotated newly found Roman texts, “the object of legal science 
became…not the factual situations thrown up by society but the texts of Roman law;” 
legal knowledge became “a matter of categorization, interpretation, and analysis.” 89  
The emerging university lecture format of legal education encouraged the gloss and 
efficiency evidenced in Justinian’s introduction to Roman law students, at the 
expense of the detailed search for practical solutions to everyday legal life evidenced 
in the classical jurists’ textbooks and digests.90  Students still learned rhetoric through 
glossaries and translations as part of their primary education, and the study of topics 
was central to rhetorical studies.91  
 A more general separation of argument invention from rhetorical studies took 
root in the sixteenth-to-eighteenth century academic tug-of-war between theological 
scholasticism, the humanist movement, and the preoccupation with method.92  The 
most representative, and widely produced, scholar endorsing this separation was 
Renaissance humanist and arts professor Peter Ramus.93  At the time Ramus was 
being educated, “the humanists were replacing the practical medieval rhetoric with a 
more elaborate art designed to teach perfect Latin expression as a literary and stylistic 
instrument.”94  Ramus furthered this emerging definition of rhetoric as ornament by 
endorsing a mathematical, diagrammic logic that divorces the inventional process 
from rhetoric altogether, placing invention under the category of dialectic, and 
dialectic within the field of philosophy:  “Ramist dialectic,” according to Walter J. 




Ong, “is constructed in the interests of a ‘simplification’ inspired by the topical logic 
tradition and the vague but powerful premathematicism connected with this 
tradition.”95  Because Ramus placed topoi exclusively under the purview of dialectic, 
he found it redundant to teach rhetorical invention, as well.  Thus, Ramus’ popular 
and widespread works relegated rhetoric to the study of style and delivery.96   
Ramus’ works are representative of “the rationalist traditions of medieval 
philosophy [wherein] rhetoric [is] stripped of any epistemological importance, its sole 
value understood as the means of influencing and persuading through the use of 
language.”97  Ong asserts that “when Ramus decrees that [dialectic and rhetoric] must 
be disengaged from one another once and for all in theory (but always united in 
practice), he engages some of the most powerful and obscure forces in intellectual 
history.”98  Corresponding to this is the wide circulation given the advent of movable 
type, out of which “an epistemology based on the notion of truth as ‘content’ begins 
to appear.”99  Copies of Ramus’ attack on Aristotle’s rhetoric and writings of his 
followers, explicating his dichotomized, diagrammatic logic, spread throughout 
central Europe and took root in seventeenth century New England universities such as 
Harvard.100 
Amid, and even preceding, these Ramistic studies, a political-theological 
battle was foraging over the underlying source of legal authority.  Martin Luther and 
his followers sought to supplant the primacy of Roman Catholic canon law with a 
more Protestant notion of law. It was therefore no coincidence, then that:  
a large number of sixteenth-century Protestant jurists, many of them closely 
associated with Luther himself, were deeply concerned to explore the nature 




of law and to find clues to its unity and integrity – and more than that, to 
establish its ‘method,’ by which they meant the scientific explication and 
systemization of the basic legal concepts and principles which give rise to 
specific legal rules.  It was not only a matter of jurisprudential concern, but 
also a matter of political concern, in the highest sense, to find a new objective 
basis for the legitimacy…of legal regulation.101 
Chief among these jurists was Luther’s friend, Philip Melanchthon, a 
Protestant Reformer.  Melanchthon’s interest was in topics; and while his general 
topics were well known, as they were pulled from Aristotle, Cicero, and fifteenth-
century philosopher Rudolphus Agricola, his novel contribution was the belief that 
particular branches of knowledge – including law – had within them basic topics of 
their own.102  Harold J. Berman and Charles J. Reid argue that the separation of law 
from the classical rhetorical tradition was strongly influenced by Melanchthon’s “new 
legal science…and especially by his ‘topical method.’…These loci communes, such 
as genus and species, causes and effects, similarities and contraries, are applicable not 
only to language and philosophy, as the rhetoricians and humanists had taught, but 
also, according to Melanchthon, to specific branches of knowledge such as theology 
and law.”103  By the end of the Middle Ages, the rhetorical basis of legal argument 
had given way to an idea of law as a science rather than an art.104 
Epistemological Bases of Rhetorical Invention 
Before the 1700s, Aristotle’s rhetorical theory, including the inventional 
process, “shaped the intellectual presuppositions of educated men, whether or not 
they were conscious of his influence.”105  As such, argues Stephen A. Siegel, “since 




jurisprudence was considered an epistemological problem, Aristotle, who until the 
scientific revolution supplied criteria for the rational resolution of such problems, 
logically would influence the jurisprudence of the period.”106  Whereas Greco-Roman 
rhetoricians privileged invention as a primary and central step in the rhetorical 
process, the exploration of rhetorical invention, and the level of nuance accorded to 
the invention process, have fluctuated in importance throughout rhetoric’s history. 107  
Sharon Crowley argues that “rhetorical invention goes in and out of fashion because 
it is intimately tied to current developments in ethics, politics, and the epistemology 
of whatever culture it serves. It has ties to ethics and politics because rhetoric is 
always situated within human affairs.”108  As Western culture turned to a more 
individualist political and ethical philosophy and to a scientific epistemology, so too 
did the notions of rhetorical invention.109   
American legal thought is heavily influenced by a scientific approach to 
decision-making:  within legal theory, this approach is called legal positivism, which 
rests the legitimacy of each legal decision upon its coherence with the written law.110  
Largely a product of the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the rise in legal 
positivism coincides with the increasing focus on science as the premier rational form 
of reasoning and shares its focus on ridding its systems of any “unscientific 
components.”111  Once the legal rules are formalized, then they can be applied “in a 
formal, quasi-mathematical manner,” thus “lending an air of inevitability to judicial 
decisions” because they assert that if a law is applied correctly to the facts of the case, 
will lead to the legally correct result.112   




 Frank J. D’Angelo posits that contemporary notions of invention mirror 
Cartesian logic.  He describes the contemporary idea of the invention process as “a 
solitary act in which the individual, drawing upon innate knowledge and mental 
structures, searches for the truth, using introspective self-examination and heuristic 
methods of various kinds.”113  This belief in internally derived truth, combined with 
the “persistence of the romantic myth of the inspired writer,” has resulted in a notion 
of invention “as a closed, one-way system; assumes and promotes the concept of the 
atomic self as inventor; abstracts the writer from society; neglects studies of writers in 
social contexts; and fails to acknowledge that invention is collaborative.”114  
 The fertility of new legal principles only occurs with a corresponding value of 
inventional playfulness and belief in the contingent nature of human values and 
knowledge.115  This, in part, is why Perelman laments the effects of formulaic 
approaches to reasoning on the invention process, and on argumentation theory as a 
whole.  Perelman traces the genesis of this tradition to a Cartesian epistemology, in 
which the individual rhetor has extremely limited reasoning agency, because in 
scientific systems, where knowledge is “provable,” “the will of the investigator can in 
no way modify the conclusions to which the examination of the system has led.”116 
Thus, argues Perelman, “the evolution of rhetoric and of the theory of argumentation 
follows the fate of the epistemological status of opinion as opposed to truth,” the 
result of which is that “the theory of argumentation was almost entirely neglected by 
post-Cartesian logic and philosophy.”117   
The primary consequence for legal argumentation is that, in this view, the 
ideal judge is “an infallible machine, giving the answer when furnished with the 




elements of the problem, without being concerned to know what is at stake or who 
might benefit from any possible error.”118  Other consequences include a move away 
from the intellectual exploration of ethics, according to Makau:  “Ironically, pursuing 
the path of logical positivism has a tendency to foster a sense of cynicism regarding 
the possibility of identifying (or developing) viable guidelines for ethical reflection 
and practice.”119   
In response to this positivist inventional shift, Karen Burke LeFevre offers a 
contrasting view of the invention process; one that reconceives of invention as a 
necessarily social act.  LeFevre argues that “invention often occurs through the 
socially learned process of an internal dialogue with an imagined other, and the 
invention process is enabled by an internal social construct of audience, which 
supplies premises and structures of beliefs that guide the writer.”120  Perelman and 
Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca name this internal construct the universal audience, a 
“universality and unanimity imagined by the speaker” of an ideal audience moved 
only by reasons “of a compelling character…[that] are self-evident, and possess an 
absolute and timeless validity, independent of local and historical contingencies.”121  
Even as a mental construct, “the notion of an ideal audience influences practical 
reasoning and ultimately behavior, and particularly on how it influences both the style 
and substance of legal reasoning and even actually constrains the behavior of judges 
and other officials.”122 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note the cultural-situatedness 
of such a construct: “each individual, each culture, has…its own conception of the 
universal audience,” and that readers could “learn from it what men, at different times 
in history, have regarded as real, true, and objectively valid.”123  Crowley asserts that 




rhetorical invention begins by envisioning the all-knowing, perfectly reasoned 
audience; thus, “theories of rhetorical invention must also be articulated with current 
thinking about how people change their minds or make discoveries—that is, with 
some currently accepted theory of knowledge.”124   
The act of self-deliberation endemic to the invention process can thus be seen 
as an extension of general argumentation, and “agreement with oneself” as “merely a 
particular case of agreement with others.”125  This is true, argues Perelman, because 
“human knowledge never begins at zero with a tabula rasa;” rather, “knowledge 
finds itself placed in the cultural milieu, in tradition and in discipline.”126  Francis J. 
Mootz III agrees, positing jurisprudential knowledge as “a social activity – a ground-
without-foundation upon which justice may be constructed – rather than the result of 
a purely contemplative undertaking. Under this view, justice is not a pristine concept 
requiring philosophical clarification, but rather is a practical engagement in politics 
that is historically conditioned and subject to the restrictions of human finitude.”127 
Mootz, among others, posits the underlying epistemology of the Supreme Court as 
rhetorical, and sees the contingent nature and cultural dependence of “rhetorical 
knowledge” as “a good starting point for thinking about legal practice and legal 
theory.”128   Rhetorical knowledge, according to Mootz, “is distinguished from habit 
or convention by its inventive representation and reinscription of the ‘prejudices’ of 
situatedness. Surveying accepted topics, norms, and opinions as resources for 
confronting the demands of the present, rhetorical actors continually conjoin these 
constitutive features of themselves and their society in unique ways.”129   




Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca accord a level of sincerity and rigor to self-
deliberation, making it “highly desirable to consider self-deliberation as a particular 
kind of argumentation,” without reaffirming a Cartesian search of inner truth via 
dispassionate demonstration.130  It is particularly useful to consider this deliberative 
process, they argue, because it casts a wider inventional net: 
when a person is thinking, his mind would not be concerned with pleading or 
with seeking only those arguments that support a particular point of view, but 
would strive to assemble all arguments that seem to it to have some value, 
without suppressing any, and then, after weighing the pros and cons, would 
decide on what, to the best of its knowledge and belief, appears to be the most 
satisfactory solution.131  
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca argue that a fundamental step in 
argumentation is to explore the broad scope of possibilities within the self, then add 
justification that meets the needs of the external audience.132  They speak directly to 
the judicial process when explicating this invention process:  “It is a common, and not 
necessarily regrettable, occurrence even for a magistrate who knows the law to 
formulate his judgment in two steps: the conclusions are first inspired by what 
conforms most closely with his sense of justice, the technical motivation being added 
on later.”133  Charles A. Miller concurs that critics of the Supreme Court are 
“certainly not wrong if they suggest that the reason for a decision might not be the 
same as the reasoning in the opinion.”134  In making this assertion, the authors 
admonish readers not to think that the post-hoc justification of a personal decision 
equates to arbitrariness.   “Must we conclude in this case that the decision was made 




without any preceding deliberation?”  ask Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.  “Not at 
all,” they continue, “as the pros and cons may have been weighed with the greatest 
care, though not within the frame of considerations based on legal technicalities… 
Strictly legal reasons are adduced only for the purpose of justifying the decision to 
another audience.”135  Makau extends Perelman’s focus on audience when she argues 
that “the interplay between a particular audience, the communicator’s own 
inclinations, and the ‘universal audience’ ‘makes the inventional process and the 
argumentation that flows from it rational.’”136 
According to John Rawls, “[legal] justification seeks to convince others, or 
ourselves, of the reasonableness of the principles upon which our claims and 
judgments are founded.”137  And it is rhetorical argument, argues Kurt M. Saunders, 
which motivates the legal justification, because “the judge must choose among 
probabilities, not certainties, while focusing on the societal audience.”138 
In practical argumentation, justification involves a heuristic search; that is, the 
arguer searches among the many available arguments to find those that will 
most likely persuade the audience to accept the claim.  Justification provides 
reasons for accepting the claim.  Similarly, a lawyer must justify a claim by 
generating arguments based on the evidence and available legal authority.139 
Public audiences expect justifications in Supreme Court decisions.  Yet: 
 our expectation that judges justify their decisions is only part of our more 
elaborate theory of the judicial process.  We expect judges to justify their 
decisions but to recognize also that the judicial decision is significant for more 
than just the arguments adduced…We distinguish between the holding of the 




case and the explanation for the holding.  Whether the deciding judge’s 
rationale is silly or cogent, the decision may serve as precedent for later 
judges.140 
  These justifications may have a persuasive effect on the author as well.  In the 
process of considering all arguments that could be used against the conclusion, and by 
searching for justifications that would best support the conclusion, “these new 
reasons may intensify his conviction, protect it against certain lines of attack he had 
not thought of originally, make its significance clearer.”141  Thus, Scallen asserts, 
“One cannot practically separate the moment of adjudication from the process of 
justification.”142  Whereas published opinions of the Court are written to suggest a 
formulaic reasoning process, a deeper investigation of the opinion writing process 
reveals highly contingent acts of self-deliberation, of open exploration of alternatives, 
and of active persuasion between justices. 
The Supreme Court and Rhetorical Invention 
The opinion writing process undertaken by Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. in the 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke decision reveals an inventional 
process of the rhetorical valence that LeFevre and Perelman describe. Supreme Court 
justices’ acts of invention are not those of the isolated authors pouring over 
documents and assessing validity based on brain power alone.  The published 
opinions often read as such, written as they are with a sense of textual inevitability 
that undermines the contingent nature of judicial argument.143  This seeming 
contradiction can be resolved by considering the rhetorical invention process 
undertaken by justices as they weigh the available tools and materials with which 




they can craft their final opinions. Marouf Hasian Jr. argues that judicial opinions are, 
by themselves, incomplete histories, because they contain only those artifacts that 
have survived internal struggles over their strengths and weaknesses.144  Similarly, 
James Boyd White asserts that:  
only the judge himself can tell you what facts counted for him, or did not 
count; what paradigm or template he applied to it; or how he resolved the 
tension, present in nearly every case, between the claims that can rationally be 
made on one side and those that can be made on the other. Of course you can 
guess at these things from the outside, for purposes of description and 
prediction, but your account can never have the authority of the judge’s 
own.145   
Justices must make their final opinions consonant with accepted forms of 
legal decision-making, but that does not mean that the reasons given in the opinions 
were the only factors considered when deciding how to vote in the first place.   
In appellate court decision-making, the place where self-deliberation meets 
justification is the written opinion.  Without it, self-deliberation could proceed to 
judgment without the need to justify through statute, precedent, and legal dogmatics 
why the decision is proper. Wald writes about the hermeneutic force of opinion 
writing when lamenting the move of some appellate judges away from written 
opinions.146  The process of opinion writing brings to the surface potential problems 
with the decision, asserts Wald.  The process of opinion writing,  
more than the vote at conference or the courtroom dialogue, puts the writer on 
the line, reminds her with each tap of the key that she will be held responsible 




for the logic and persuasiveness of the reasoning and its implications for the 
larger body of circuit or national law. Most judges feel that responsibility 
keenly; they literally agonize over their published opinions, which sometimes 
take weeks or even months to bring to term. It is not so unusual to modulate, 
transfer, or even switch an originally intended rationale or result in midstream 
because “it just won’t write.”147   
As seen from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the justification of the initial 
decision, constructed with audiences in mind, can also be a creative process.  Famed 
jurist Benjamin N. Cardozo argues that, “it is when the colors do not match…when 
there is no decisive precedent, that the serious business of the judge begins.”148   
When no precedent stands out as an ideal one, argues Warren E. Wright, “the judge’s 
freedom of choice begins, for now, like a legislator who chooses one political means 
over another, he must (1) determine a principle and (2) choose the path along which 
he will extend it.”149  Yet in order to maintain the credibility of the court, “the one 
thing a judge never admits in the moment of decision is freedom of choice.”150  That 
makes the choice no less significant, as the judge “must…determine the path or 
direction along which the principle is to move and develop, if it is not to wither and 
die.”151 
These choices are complicated by the fact that audiences to which the 
Supreme Court must appeal are multiple.  Makau explores the array of audiences to 
which the Supreme Court must speak, including other present and future justices, 
lower courts, legal administrators, legislators, litigants, and legal scholars.152   The 
possibility of disagreement by some of these audiences can have varying impacts, 




from “the possibility of constitutional or other structural changes,” to confusion when 
applying the decision with the lower courts, to general dissatisfaction with the 
Supreme Court amongst the general public.153  Moreover, George C. Christie argues 
that “judges are part of an elite profession and as such very conscious of the 
expectations of their co-professionals.  How a judge conceives of his profession and 
of his role within that profession will figure very prominently in the vision he has of 
the audience he is addressing.”154  
In addition to multiple audiences, justices must choose between multiple 
precedents, created at different times and reflecting different situational 
contingencies.  Makau argues that, “in these instances, Justices are forced to make 
choices, ‘often framed in competing political constructs’…In making these critical 
choices, the Justices face the challenge of generating new ideas within competing 
perceptual frameworks.  This challenge places judicial reasoning well within the 
domain of the rhetoric as epistemic movement.”155 
Exploring the justification process with consideration of these multiple 
audiences can bring to mind potential, previously unconsidered counter-arguments, 
strengthen support for the decision in the mind of the rhetor, and reframe the 
argument in a manner previously ignored:  all inventional goals.  Wald explains about 
the judicial writing process that: 
it is not uncommon, then, for our prose, even certain idiosyncratic 
expressions, often to become frozen, for writing styles to reveal personalized 
boilerplate. The same issues recur in cases over the years, and we tend to think 
about them in the same ways… A judge, recognizing a familiar fact pattern, 




goes into automatic pilot.  It takes a brand new issue about which one feels 
strongly or which excites one intellectually to provoke fresh new modes of 
expression.156 
Thus, Perelman asserts that a modern theory of argument must account for the 
written word, in contrast to the classical focus on the publicly spoken speech:  “It 
goes without saying, of course, that a modern study of argumentation would go far 
beyond the limits of certain aspects of the ancients’ rhetoric, while at the same time it 
would pass over certain aspects which held the attention of these masters of 
rhetoric.”157  He offers as an example the fact that the ancients limited their studies to 
spoken words in public settings:  “there is no need to limit oneself to the spoken word 
or to limit one’s audience to a crowd in the marketplace,” especially because “the 
modern role of printing makes it important to lay special stress today on printed 
texts.”158  Today, argues Perelman, “discussion between two individuals or even 
personal deliberation belongs to a general theory of argumentation.  The scope of 
modern rhetoric will go far beyond that of classical rhetoric.”159  Yet, 
what must be retained from traditional rhetoric is the idea of audience, which 
immediately comes to mind when we think of discourse.  Every discourse is 
directed to an audience; and too often we forget that the same is true of all 
writing.  A discourse is conceived of in terms of an audience.  But the material 
absence of readers can make a writer think he is all alone in the world, while 
as a matter of fact his text is always conditioned, consciously or 
unconsciously, by the persons whom he means to address.160 




It is through the interplay between amicus briefs, past cases, general 
knowledge of the world, self-deliberation, consideration of social consequences (as 
posited by self and others), interaction with law clerks who often draft the opinions, 
and arguments with the other justices that the inventional process occur.161  Invention, 
argues LeFevre, “is powerfully influenced by social collectives, such as institutions, 
bureaucracies, and governments, which transmit expectations and prohibitions, 
encouraging certain ideas and discouraging others.”162  For instance, Golden and 
Makau have concluded from studies of Supreme Court reasoning four general steps in 
the Supreme Court reasoning process:   
Justices employ the following pattern of reasoning: 1) examination of the facts 
in light of statutes, rules, and precedents; 2) analysis of attitudes, beliefs, 
values, and needs of the composite audience; 3) invention of arguments, 
including a critical assessment of their strength or relevance; and 4) 
justification of reasons utilized in rendering the decision.163  
The Supreme Court has institutional expectations and constraints that impose 
additional criteria on rhetorical invention and written justification.  These constraints 
include a specific interaction between author and a text that (s)he is interpreting, the 
issues of co-authorship, and judicial rules and expectations of interpretation.  Yet 
these habits do not alter the definition of invention posited by LeFevre, who argues 
that “invention becomes explicitly social when writers involve other people as 
collaborators, or as reviewers whose comments aid invention, or as ‘resonators’ who 
nourish the development of ideas.  To create discourses such as contracts, treaties, 
and business proposals, two or more writers must invent together.”164  The Supreme 




Court’s reliance on constitutional interpretation, precedent, and briefs explaining 
factual and historical contexts reveal its strong reliance on intertextuality, “the 
interdependence of texts as sources of their meaning.”165 
Hasian asserts that “this type of approach invites the scholar to examine how 
empowered judges, lawyers, and everyday citizens borrow their arguments from the 
discourse that is already circulating within the public sphere.”166  Legal authors 
“borrow their arguments” from public arguments as well as shared ideological 
frameworks that serve as the basis for shared belief.167  This is true because, as a form 
of rhetorical action, legal discourse “is a complex business that occurs at several 
levels simultaneously.  If [a concept] surfaces most clearly in specific discursive 
products, it also operates more broadly within the cultural and ideological formation 
that embeds these products.”168  Supreme Court justices, as members of the public 
culture, share the ideologies embedded within the larger communities.  
As a political institution, the Supreme Court is also reflective of society, as it 
embodies ideologies of the larger culture in its laws, policies, prohibitions, and 
practices.  Finally, at the Supreme Court level, the cases that garner public attention 
are often those that feature competing political ideologies.  Within the law, ideology 
“draws its power from its ability to connect and combine diverse mental elements 
(concepts, ideas, etc.) into combinations that influence and structure the perception 
and cognition of social agents.”169  As an authoritative source of judgment, it also 
points the audience(s) toward certain values and away from alternative world-
views.170 




Thus, Barry Nicholas argues that “no system of law can be fully understood in 
isolation from the history of the society which it serves and regulates.”171  As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, “judicial argumentation serves important epistemic 
functions.  That is, as the Court is influenced by the composite audience, so is the 
audience influenced by the Court’s reasoning.”172  Although Supreme Court justices 
work under strong institutional expectations, “an institutional order amounts to a 
shared framework of understanding and interpretation among persons in some social 
setting.  As a normative order, it is in continuous need of interpretation, and as a 
practical one, in continuous need of adaptation to current practical problems.”173  
Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote of this need in the introduction to his book The 
Common Law: 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.  The felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, institutions 
of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges 
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the 
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law 
embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it 
cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a 
book of mathematics.174 
The topics of Greco-Roman times reflected Greco-Roman culture through 
legal traditions, the intended audiences, and the parameters of acceptable speaker 
ethos.  As material, social, and philosophical features of cultures change, so do their 
laws; and with them change the commonplaces and forms of argument about those 




laws and the values they represent.175  Jack M. Balkin notes the following about 
contemporary inventional commonplaces: 
As common tools of legal understanding, topics offer us a glimpse into the 
background assumptions that we share in understanding and dealing with legal 
problems.  We can study changes in legal culture by noting the entry of new 
topics into legal discourse.  We can tell that our background culture is 
changing when the topics we use to formulate and discuss legal problems 
change.176 
Both classical and contemporary rhetorical scholars warn of using the general 
starting places of argument as an inclusive project on the limits of rhetorical 
invention.  Leff offers a reminder of Quintilian’s assertion that “the main resource for 
rhetorical invention arises from the specific case at hand, since ‘the majority of proofs 
are to be found in the special circumstances of individual cases and have no 
connection with any other dispute.’”177  The choices of where to search for starting 
places of successful arguments are guided by the circumstances of the case and by the 
experience of each judge. 178  The inventional starting places of legal arguments that 
become central to one Supreme Court justification can be unconvincing, irrelevant, or 
unsuitably vague for another case.   
The Starting Places of Supreme Court Arguments 
The Supreme Court inventional process, then, becomes the search for 
appropriate starting places on which to build an acceptable justification for the final 
opinions.   The starting places will vary in significance and applicability depending 
on the specifics of the case; that is, “a legal decision is based on associative 




reflections which ‘circle around’ every case, considering the viewpoints and 
arguments (topoi) usually connected with the situation in question – rather than on 
logical subsumptions.”179  Rawls explicates the process when he argues that “to 
justify a conception of justice…is to give him a proof of its principles from premises 
that we both accept, these principles having in turn consequences that match our 
considered judgments.”180  The proof alone is not justification; rather, “a proof simply 
displays logical relations between propositions. But proofs become justification once 
the starting points are mutually recognized, or the conclusion is so comprehensive 
and compelling as to persuade us of the soundness of the conception expressed by 
their premises.”181   
The starting points of legal justification, and thus the beginning of the 
inventional process, should focus on audiences.  Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call 
these starting points the premises of argumentation, asserting that “when a speaker 
selects and puts forward the premises that are to serve as foundation for his argument, 
he relies on his hearers’ adherence to the propositions from which he will start.”182  
Their descriptions of premises have been viewed as a contemporary legacy of 
classical commonplaces of argument.183  However, “whether viewed as Aristotle’s 
topics, Cicero’s commonplaces, Stephen E. Toulmin’s warrants, Perelman’s loci, or 
clusters of implicitly accepted norms, the particular audiences’ shared beliefs and 
expectations regarding the judicial function form a composite view reflective of the 
philosophy operating in the Supreme Court adjudicative context.”184  A successful 
rhetor considers those facts, theories, values, and preferences that are shared by the 
audiences.  These starting places are informed, or given meaning, by their contexts 




and justifications – they are not free-standing principles.185  To the extent that the 
situations are similar, the starting place may be shared:  for instance, in contemporary 
constitutional interpretation, similar starting places of argument as those outlined in 
Cicero’s On Invention can be discerned. 
Yet institutional factors influence the premises that rhetors are likely to rely 
on when researching, creating, and eliminating potential arguments.  There are certain 
beliefs “which the members of that society suppose to be shared by every reasonable 
being,” assert Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in reference the hypothetical ideal 
audience. “But, beside beliefs of this kind, there are agreements that are peculiar to 
the members of a particular discipline, whether it be of scientific or technical, 
juridical or theological nature,” and those agreements “may be the result of certain 
conventions or of adherence to certain texts, and they characterize certain 
audiences.”186  
These disciplinary particularities will limit the form, scope and number of 
premises that a rhetor can use.187  Robert Alexy explains the limited grounds that any 
legal rhetor can cover if (s)he wants the final argument to be accepted: “Legal 
discourse can be distinguished from general practical discourse in that the former is, 
in short, restricted in its scope by statute, precedent, legal dogmatics, and—in the case 
of actual judicial proceedings—by procedural legislation and regulations.”188  This 
means that, even when a judge finds during self-deliberation that a particular legal 
presumption keeps justice from occurring, “in law, the manner of contesting legal 
assumptions by the administration of counter-proof is rarely left entirely to the 
evaluation of the judge. The rules of evidence established by the law furnish 




assumptions of which the judge must take account, whatever his inner conviction.”189  
The very form and structure of the judicial opinion influences the inventional process 
of the content within: so much so that Cardozo argued that the form of a judicial 
opinion “makes it what it is.”190   
In legal texts, legal principles and particulars of the case must be worked 
against “a storehouse of arguments and strategies that generally are deemed 
acceptable and persuasive by the audiences to whom they speak,” and audiences of 
judicial opinions expect particular justifications, formulated in particular ways.191  
Moreover, final opinions a written in an institutionally specific form, first outlining 
the “facts” and questions of the case, then offering a judgment, then providing legal 
justifications for that judgment.  Yet Makau and David Lawrence argue these 
institutional constraints can – and have – motivated creative judicial arguments.192  
Judges may use the form of the legal opinion to confer institutional authority on new 
ideological formations; “although the judicial opinion is written with a foregone 
conclusion in mind, it is written in a carefully arranged order so that its arguments, 
separately and together, support the conclusion in a way that is natural to our ways of 
thinking about law.”193  This is true because of “the power of discourse to blend form 
and meaning into local unities that ‘textualize’ the public world and invite audiences 
to experience that world as the text represents it.194  What is seen during the 
inventional process of a case like Bakke, then, is Powell considering the institutional 
starting places of legal argument and using them to create a new framework through 
which to justify affirmative action. 




 “Facts” of the Case 
Former Chief Justice Burger’s opening comment on what he saw as the 
obvious factual underpinnings of Bakke make the importance of what Aristotle would 
call atechnic proofs clear.   In the legal inventional process, consideration of the 
“facts” of the case provides more than background; they form the bases for 
articulating the problem or question that is to be explored.  Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca define “facts” in rhetorical discourse as what has been previously agreed 
upon, and not all justices may agree on the “facts” of the case.  Nevertheless, final 
opinions generally begin with a description of the facts of the case, and court briefs 
always lay out the details in a manner that best suits them.  Thus, they serve as an 
inventional tool:   
Constructing the facts is a wholly legitimate element of the appellate judge's 
job. After all, one cannot simply reprint the record of the trial below, and the 
task of interpreting and condensing the record requires that the judge 
frequently dip his pen into the well of rhetoric…This is not just a matter of 
being selective about which facts to emphasize (or even to mention), but also 
a matter of characterization; the facts can—and indeed must—be retold to cast 
a party as an innocent victim or an undeserving malefactor, to tow the 
storyline into the safe harbor of whatever principles of law the author thinks 
should control the case…In virtually all cases, the judge shapes her raw 
material. She picks her rhetoric to foreshadow the result. Institutional 
constraints in the judging process require it.195 




In the memoranda and final opinions for Bakke, justices construct vastly 
different narratives from the same raw materials, as those characterizations support 
their conclusions.  They also reach the limits of certain lines of argument because 
they do not have the factual bases to support them.  For instance, in his notes Powell 
laments the failure of the amicus briefs to provide evidence of past racial bias within 
their admissions procedures.  Had that been evident, Powell wrote to his law clerk 
and to his fellow justices, then the UC-Davis dual track system would have been 
more easily justifiable. 
 Interpretation 
The needs for consistency and for deference to constitutional principles make 
adherence to important texts – namely the Constitution – a primary institutional goal 
in the Supreme Court.  The most pressing factor in legal arguments in general, argue 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, is the interpretation of texts: 
In disciplines in which texts form the connecting link, certain notions, such as 
those of self-evidence and fact, acquire a special meaning… 
Legal...argumentation has to be developed within a definite system; this 
brings certain problems to the foreground, namely those relating to the 
interpretation of texts… What is essential is that texts of positive 
law…regardless of their origin or basis…form the starting point of new 
reasonings.196 
At the same time, it is relatively rare that the legal question asked can be 
answered only by consulting a text.  Miller explains:  “If a legal document is 
supposed to control the outcome of a case and its unadorned text is perfectly plain, 




then legal interpretation stops right there.”197  But this is rare, because “although 
some causes of the Constitution are perfectly clear today, most have required 
considerable interpretation.  The constitutional text continues as a touchstone of 
interpretation, but it is not by itself sufficient as a principle of adjudication.”198  A 
more common starting place is with established doctrine, defined by Miller as 
“formulas extracted from a combination of the constitutional text and a series of 
related cases” that serve as “intermediaries between the Constitution and a case that 
may come before the Court.”199  In addition to doctrine guiding opinions, judges may 
alter their decisions or rationales in a particular case in order to protect what they 
consider to be important doctrine.200 
The temporal focus of textual interpretation has inventional utility, as well, 
and judges may choose to emphasize past, present, or future-looking aspects of texts.  
Scallen explains: “Modern debates have treated interpretation as a combined 
deliberative and judicial question, sometimes emphasizing a reading of a text that 
would provide the most useful effects in the future, and sometimes emphasizing a 
particular reading as the ‘historically’ accurate one, in the sense of the drafter's 
original intent or purpose.”201 
The roles of ambiguity in the law, of contradictory legal principles, and of 
differences between the letter and spirit of laws have been long highlighted by 
classical rhetoricians as starting points of successful arguments.202  The ambiguity of 
interpretive frameworks serves as a useful inventional tool.  As is necessary to get to 
their preferred conclusions, justices can explain their interpretive authority as 
expansive – one in which the constitution is dynamic, with an ability to meet 




contemporary needs – or restrictive, wherein they cannot depart from the established 
language or interpreted doctrine of the laws, the Constitution, or the Court.203 
Justice Powell both expanded and constricted the scope and utility of the 
Equal Protection Clause as he worked toward his final opinion in Bakke, and he 
pulled upon an interpretation of the First Amendment to include the protection of 
academic freedom.  Because varying interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause 
formed a major area of disagreement among the justices – the Brennan group read the 
Equal Protection Clause as allowing race conscious set-aside programs like the one at 
UC-Davis, whereas Powell was concerned about working specific racial 
considerations into the interpretation of the clause – he crafted a narrative of the 
Equal Protection Clause that began with growth, and ended with restrictions.  True, 
Powell argued, the Equal Protection Clause was written with African Americans in 
mind, but its growth in protections has expanded since its inception to such an extent 
that it can no longer be used to protect specifically chosen minority groups:  it must 
apply equally to everyone, all the time.204  
 Precedent 
Because precedents have become a primary source of justification in Supreme 
Court legal arguments, they are crucial to the inventional process.  As a basis for 
justification, precedents offer a sense of consistency, an authoritative foundation, and 
an implicit promise that justices are relying on long-upheld legal reasoning, not their 
own biases, in decision making.  Yet the interpretation of previous opinions serve an 
inventional purpose of “opening new possibilities of understanding without injuring 




old ones,” since new cases often derive from different contexts that provide new 
meanings to old opinions.205 
According to Perelman, “the law draws its authority from the sources whence 
it emanates, [and] the least contested source of moral and juridical norms is 
custom…A mode of behavior that has been adopted without protest creates a 
precedent, and no one will object to actions that conform to precedents.”206  Legal 
precedents are judicially equivalent to social traditions or customs, asserts Perelman:  
“When a given social arrangement has been accepted…and when people have 
conformed to it long enough to have made it customary or traditional, then it is 
regarded as normal and just to adhere to this arrangement and unjust to deviate from 
it.”207 Moreover, the “basic, shared expectations” that form a social basis for 
knowledge are often “best realized by judicial adherence to precedent,” according to 
Makau.  “It is not surprising, then, that to a large extent, precedent serves as a starting 
point from which all judicial reasoning proceeds.”208 
Whereas an appeal to common knowledge may be a strong starting point in 
general arguments, “what common sense accepts as a fact may be devoid of any legal 
consequence.”  Thus, a judge “has no authority to declare a fact established simply 
because he has acquired positive knowledge of it outside the proceeding.”209   Rather 
successful judges, like all arguers, often seek starting places of argument that are 
already agreed upon with their audiences; in the technical language of the law and 
amongst legal audiences, these premises are called precedent.  Legal philosopher 
H.L.A. Hart describes how the premise of precedent works: 




[There is] a connection between justice and one of the most salient features of 
argument in every field: namely, the primary role played by precedent.  No 
argument, least of all moral argument, takes place in a void; when the 
disputants approach each other they already owe allegiance to certain common 
principles of both thought and conduct and are eager to classify the instant 
case under familiar traditional general rubrics and then to treat it as other 
cases so classified in the past have been treated.210 
The heavy reliance on precedent as a justification of legal argument often 
results in assertions that uphold traditional modes of thought.  A judge must “make 
his decision in conformity with the relevant legal presumptions,” and “these 
presumptions safeguard the status quo.”211   Moreover, a reliance on past decisions 
can constrain rhetors from speaking to the nuances of the present.212 “In other words,” 
argues Eric Charles White, “the impulse to repeat, which ratifies the comfortable 
notion that knowledge is in principle finite, encourages us to speak not to the present 
occasion (the locus of genuine novelty) but from (in imitation of) the purely ideal 
constructs of our memories.”213 
Yet even as the reliance on precedent works against the potential to reject 
traditional presumptions, judges are also bound by a particular value: justice.  A 
particular judge’s idea of justice may be at odds with the law (s)he is considering.  
Thus, “legal reasoning shows all the tensions created by the desire to conciliate 
stability with change, the need for continuity with adaptation, and security with equity 
and the common good.  The essential value of legal security distinguished legal 
reasoning from other forms of practical reasoning.”214  And in the events where 




precedent conflict with progress, the pull of progress often wins:  “since 
constitutional law depends even more on its soundness than its firmness, in a conflict 
between precedent and progress, precedent will, more quickly than in other fields of 
law, yield to progress.”215 
While institutional factors influence the form of arguments offered and the 
types of reasoning considered acceptable, in cases where there is no clear precedent 
these starting places are choices that each judge makes.   Wright argues that, “in the 
absence of clear precedent, these methods become the stock from which the judge 
makes what amounts to legislative choices; his official opinion then is the rhetorical 
medium for defending his choices—even as the rhetoric of the speech on the 
legislative floor is designed to justify the congressman’s choices.”216  A judge can 
chooses a number of pathways along which to extend her argument, and she chooses 
different resources to support that extension: if the judge rests on the origins of the 
principle, then historical narratives and precedents become more important; if the 
principle has sociological import to the judge, then she will evoke the attitudes and 
needs of the community.  Judges are guided by the case specifics, by experience, and 
by institutional norms, argues Wright: “But there is a choice.”217 
Bakke was one such case, where no clear precedent spoke to the legal 
questions presented.  Yet precedent has become such an established tool for 
articulating the authority of decisions in particular, and the Court in general, that in 
cases of great controversy precedents need to be found.  In his search for a useable 
precedent, Powell found his support in a 1948 case that argued constitutional support 




for the notion of academic freedom:  this Powell tied to the goal of diversity as he 
crafted his final opinion. 
 Other Justices’ Arguments 
In appellate courts, judges often consider the leanings of their colleagues 
when considering where to guide their opinions.  In cases such as Bakke, where 
disagreement reigns from the beginning, other justices’ opinions become a crucial 
starting place in the inventional process.  This is true both for internal harmony and 
for external credibility.  Craig Allen Smith and Cathy B. Smith explain:  
Justices need to persuade their fellow justices to muster the majority vote.  
Coalitions have formed around similar judicial and ideological conceptions 
throughout the history of the Court, because the long tenure of the justices 
permits continuing working relationships….After reading the drafted opinions 
the justices bargain and compromise to work out a majority opinion.218  
The compromise is often worked out in the rationale, if enough justices can 
agree to the result.219  Otherwise, conflicting rationales can reveal the very ambiguity 
of the interpretive process that the opinion’s rhetoric often denies, as well as 
compromising the force of a majority opinion.220  Speaking of the rational 
compromise, Wald explains that:  “Her best lines are often left on the cutting room 
floor…If alternative rationales are available to support a result, the one that can 
garner a majority of judges will be chosen, even if it is not the writer's preferred 
one.”221   This compromise is often necessary because “the function of putting the 
Constitution effectively into practice is a necessarily collaborative one, which often 




requires compromise and accommodation.  It also emphasizes the practical, 
frequently strategic aspects of the Court’s work.”222   
Because Powell was aware early in the process that he would be writing the 
deciding opinion of the Court – one that needed to bridge the disparate opinions of his 
colleagues – his knowledge of other justices’ opinions was fundamental to Powell’s 
opinion writing process.  Powell needed to meet the concerns of each bloc of votes, 
finding a legal justification and appropriate language that would bridge the 
differences.  For instance, he and his law clerk, Bob Comfort, limited the repeated use 
of the term “strict scrutiny” in Powell’s opinion in hopes of coaxing Justice William 
Brennan to join in parts of the holding.223 
 Public Culture 
Justice Powell found the bridge between the disparate opinions in the pages of 
the amicus briefs.  The “diversity” justification written into the final opinion 
originated from sources outside the Court.  This feature of the opinion highlights that 
fact that, while the above-mentioned argumentative particularities exist with legal 
argumentation, they do not separate the practice in its entirety from general practices 
of argument; nor does the focus on legal audiences negate the need to consider more 
general audiences.  Walter R. Fisher asserts that “one establishes one’s rationality in 
specific fields by knowing and using the warrants indigenous to that field and 
adhering to the particular rules of advocacy followed in it.”224  Yet, even given the 
constraining features of legal justification, “the actual process of justification or 
deliberation should proceed (and in ideal cases does indeed proceed) according to the 




criteria of general practical discourse, and that legal justification only serves as a 
secondary legitimation of any conclusions arrived at in this way” Alexy argues. 225 
Although a judge [is] concerned with technicalities…he is not entirely 
immune to arguments addressed to him as a member of a particular, but not 
specialized, social group or as a member of the universal audience:  this 
appeal to his moral sense may lead him to discover new arguments that are 
valid in his conventional framework, or to see in a new light the arguments 
already before him.226 
This dynamic is especially true in appellate judicial arguments of importance, 
when authors must consider both public audiences and legal audiences.  Because an 
argument proceeds from “that which is accepted, that which is acknowledged as true, 
as normal and probable, as valid agreement,” it thereby “anchors itself in the social, 
the characterization of which will depend on the nature of the audience.”227  Studies 
on judicial reasoning have revealed that “Supreme Court inventional strategies both 
reflect and help create cultural norms, particularly those that govern institutional 
ethics and the ostensible grounds for institutional decision making.”228  Finally, “the 
composite audience expects the Court to balance the need for doctrinal consistency 
against…compelling social demands.  [T]he Court is also expected to protect interests 
that emerge historically.”229  This expectation lays the groundwork for new starting 
points of legal argument to emerge.230 
The Artifacts of Supreme Court Invention 
The singular goal of Supreme Court invention is not the written decision about 
a particular case.  Of the same inventional tools, the Supreme Court uses written 




opinions to construct and maintain its own authority, a legal culture, various publics, 
particular histories, and legal fictions that uphold the forms, authority, and logic of 
the legal culture.  These constructions are necessary to the internal logic of the 
opinions, as in the instance of legal fictions.  Moreover, they form the basis for public 
acceptance of legal opinions. 
 Authority 
Because the Supreme Court has no enforcement body, a key rhetorical feature 
for the Court is its need to motivate support for its decisions in lieu of forcibly 
imposing them.  Thus, opinions must continuously invest time explaining or 
constructing their sphere of authority within which justices can make legitimate their 
decisions.  Miller argues that “the public authority of the Supreme Court is one of the 
distinguishing features of American political life.  This authority is maintained 
through the general acceptance of the Court’s decisions and the reasons offered for 
these decisions.”231  The hermeneutic autonomy alone of a text “so ordered,” builds 
the authoritative force of the institution.232  Yet the Supreme Court must “establish its 
authority as being something less than naked power, but something more than 
advisory influence” in order for its decisions to be legitimated.233  Perelman notes 
that, in democratic societies, “the role of the judge, servant of existing laws, is to 
contribute to the acceptance of the system.  He shows that the decisions which he is 
led to take are not only legal, but are acceptable because they are reasonable.”234 
The Supreme Court builds its own power of judicial review by interpreting the 
Constitution’s construction of its authority with a rhetoric of inevitability.  Robert 
McCloskey observes the context-driven, interpretive quality of the Supreme Court’s 




authority: “we have seen that both the meaning of the Constitution and the nature of 
the Supreme Court’s authority were left in doubt by the framers, that circumstances 
nonetheless conspired to favor the early growth of both constitutionalism and judicial 
power, but that those same circumstances also helped to set the terms within which 
these institutions would develop.” 235   In Marbury v. Madison (1803), Chief Justice 
John Marshall’s opinion established both the primacy of the Constitution over 
legislative acts as “one of the fundamental principles of our society,” and that, in a 
conflict of laws, “the courts must decide on the operation of each…so if a law be in 
opposition to the Constitution…the court must determine which of these conflicting 
rules governs the case.  This is the very essence of judicial duty.”236 
 Yet once decision-making processes become institutionalized, “two problems 
almost automatically arise, the problem of identity and that of change.  The problem 
of identity concerns the possibility of settling at any moment in time whether any 
particular norm or normative proposition is relevant and binding for institutional 
adjudicators.”237  This notion of identity becomes complicated when the pressure for 
change occurs, and when it does “it is almost inevitable that an announcement of such 
a change will have to take the form of some kind of generally stated norm that is to be 
applied so as to override prior recognized reasons to the extent of any conflict.  
Again, this can become institutionalized.”238 
 History 
In the construction and maintenance of its authority, the Supreme Court 
invents, and makes use of, specific constructions of history.  “When the Court’s work 
is scrutinized in public, that is, when the Court’s authority is being confirmed or 




criticized, the use of history is also a matter of concern,” argues Miller.  “The 
Constitution itself is a product of the nation’s past, and the Supreme Court, as the 
accepted interpreter of the Constitution, has become the public interpreter of 
American political history.”239  This role of interpreter means that “the nature of law, 
particularly constitutional law, and the function of the Supreme Court in American 
society both contain a large element of viewing the present in terms of the past.”240  
As they write, judges choose views of the past that best support their 
conclusions.  Shifts in temporal orientation change the meaning and import of the 
histories described by the Court.  Miller describes two major uses of history within 
the Supreme Court:  “general history may be seen as both [1] the history which serves 
to explicate the meaning of the original Constitution (and the amendments) as drafted 
and ratified and [2] the history which serves to reveal conditions in the nation since 
the ratifications, conditions that the justices believe have a bearing on later 
interpretation of the Constitution.”241  One consequence of the different historical 
orientations is the continuing split between intentionalist and realist arguments.  “The 
problem of the Supreme Court’s use of history as a principle of adjudication in 
constitutional law is, in formal terms, a problem of legal theory,” argues Miller.242  
“Intentionalist arguments and controversies remain, despite glimmerings about their 
limitations,” asserts Ferguson, “precisely because the judicial rhetoric of inevitability 
cannot do without a directed or selective sense of history.”243 
The selective use of history to justify particular opinions serves more than a 
justificatory function:  it “affirms or denies the significance of past events for the 
activities of the present.”244  According to Hasian, the evaluative and temporal 




functions of this move mean that the Supreme Court is inventing more than a 
selective history:  it constructs public memories.  Legal memories, according to 
Hasian, “are even larger units of analysis because they build on both ‘mythic plot 
structures’ and ‘narratives.’  Memories are the rhetorical structures that influence the 
way entire generations selectively think about the relationship between the past, 
present, and future.”245   Whether called history or memories, it remains that when 
justices use stories of the past to justify their decisions, “the Court contributes to the 
public’s view of the American past as much as, and sometimes even more than, 
professional historians and other historical writers do.”246  
 Legal Culture 
Legal discourse is more than a discipline and a set of vocabulary:  it also 
constructs social norms, characters, standards of judgment, and particular 
worldviews.247  James Boyd White encourages the reading of judicial opinions “as 
cultural and rhetorical texts, that is, with an eye to the kind of political and ethical 
community they build with their readers and to the contribution they make to the 
discourse of the law.”248 This feature of law is constitutive in nature, “for through its 
forms of language and of life the law constitutes a world of meaning and action: it 
creates a set of actors and speakers and offers them possibilities for meaningful 
speech and action that would not otherwise exist; in so doing it establishes and 
maintains a community, defined by its practices of language.”249 
One characteristic of the constructed legal culture is the composition of 
particular characters within the framework, language, and logic of the legal culture. 
Glenda Conway explores “the ways in which rhetorical structures within the 




[Supreme Court] opinion texts serve to create—and rank—communities of competing 
voices” because, according to Conway, “…no textual representations of a person can 
be ‘real.’ People in texts necessarily are bound to be artificial constructions; indeed, 
all representations of people—whether they appear in written form or in any other 
avenue of communication—are constructed.”250  Conway argues, then, that one can 
never fully capture the people they attempt to represent.  Additionally, Conway 
asserts that Supreme Court justices use this creative license to support their arguments 
and to weaken counterarguments: “In a judicial opinion, significantly, how characters 
look and speak occurs within the context of the Court’s acceptance or rejection of 
their arguments.  That is, such characterizations happen both within the Court’s 
language and in the Court’s language.”251 
 Legal Fictions 
 
 Justices invent hypothetical situations, speculate as to framers’ intents, 
broaden and narrow the scope of the legal question, or broaden and narrow the 
authority of the Court to aid in the justification of their decisions.252  Perelman 
explains:  “The judge…especially if he is sitting in a court of final review, has 
recourse to a fiction.  The device of a fiction, which is expressly a refusal to apply the 
rule in certain situations, can realistically be considered as a modification of the field 
of application of the rule by an official who does not have the legal power to modify 
it expressly.”253  Another legal fiction available to judges occurs “when the facts can 
be viewed in different lights…A decision to view the facts of a case in a certain light 
amounts to fixing more precisely the field of application of a rule or the scope of a 
precedent.”254 




Justices also invent explanations of lawmakers’ and the framers’ intents in 
order to justify their opinions.  Miller describes one particular “use of history” within 
the Supreme Court as the construction of the framers’ intent, concluding that “the 
intent theory of constitutional interpretation is a miserable legal fiction.”255  Drucilla 
Cornell sees this legal fiction as less of a smokescreen than a consequence of the 
indeterminacy of texts and the rhetorical nature of judicial opinion writing: “Once we 
recognize that the process of recollection of legal principle is never mere exposition 
but involves the imagination and positing of the very ideals to be read into a legal 
text, we can no longer choose between competing interpretations on the basis of an 
appeal to what is just ‘there.’”256  Recognition of this fact need not result in 
relativistic despair, however: 
All interpretations entail an inevitable moment of fictionality.  As a result we 
cannot prove the truth of a particular…principle. We can only evoke its power 
and justify its rightness through argumentation.  This does not mean that all 
interpretations are equally effective in the synchronization of competing 
ideals.  It does mean that only through argument can we show that one 
interpretation is better than another.257 
Conclusion 
As he constructed his opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell explored the range of 
topics available to him.  He examined the jurisprudential commonplaces: precedents, 
legislative histories, the proper “standards” or guiding legal principles, and “facts” of 
the case.  He studied the opinions of those who held legal, personal, or public 
credibility to him, including amicus briefs from law professors, the Attorney 




General’s office, the NAACP, memoranda from other justices, and writings from his 
favorite legal scholar Alexander Bickel and his law clerk Bob Comfort.258  He 
considered large ideological issues of equality, colorblindness, race consciousness, 
retribution, and reverse discrimination as arguments about them manifested in the 
briefs, in editorials, in law articles, and in memoranda.  Finally, he considered how 
these arguments worked within the framework of acceptable constitutional 
interpretation, given the historical and legal contingencies brought to bear on the 
questions before him.  He did so because “rhetorical invention demands painstaking 
attention to the particular case and the unique circumstances associated with it,” and 
because “the goal is not mechanistic application of the theoretical apparatus to 
particular cases, but the cultivation of an ability to encounter cases as circumstances 
demand.”259   Circumstances, in turn, alter legal and popular notions of acceptable 
reasons:  “reasons considered good at one period of time and in one milieu are not in 
another; they are socially and culturally conditioned as are the convictions and the 
aspirations of the audience they must convince.  Any preliminary study of legal 
history and jurisprudence suffices to show this.”260  Thus, argues White: 
the study of the judicial opinion…is a moment at which the law is made real, a 
moment when the welter of statutes and precedents and maxims and other 
materials of the past are brought to bear with force and clarity upon an actual 
dispute…The great contribution of the judicial mind is not the vote but the 
judicial opinion, which gives meaning to the vote.261 




The Bakke decision has been variously maligned and celebrated, its rationales 
ignored and copied, and its demise predicted and time-stamped.262  Yet, Makau 
argues: 
what this decision did—carefully apply precedent as a tool to balance the 
politically volatile nature of the immediate case against the rigorous demands 
of the Court’s composite audience—is worth noting in legal history.  The 
decision demonstrates clearly how the Court uses its most powerful rhetorical 
tool, adherence to precedent, to fulfill the complex rhetorical demands of even 
the most controversial of Civil Liberties cases.263 
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Chapter Two:  
American Rhetorical Traditions about Racial Equality  
 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) represented the 
convergence of social, political, and legal struggles over which ideological principles 
should guide our thoughts and actions about racial inequities in the United States.  
Richard K. Sherwin notes that “notorious legal cases” such as Bakke “are social 
dramas that take place on a field of embattled discourse where contested stories, 
metaphors, and character types vie for dominance in the culture at large.”1  In Bakke, 
narratives about “the American dream,” the history of slavery, immigration and 
assimilation, and the role of higher education in social and economic progress 
comprised the field of discourse.  As these dimensions were reflected in law, the 
Supreme Court was asked to respond to conflicting arguments about which remedies 
would best resolve existing economic, social, and civil liberty disparities between 
races.   
This chapter examines the relationship between race and American law, the 
contextual factors surrounding the Bakke case, the rhetorical trajectories of the parties 
involved, and the public values that were manifested in the legal arguments.  In doing 
so, this chapter also explicates how various political actors, and ultimately Justice 
Lewis Powell in his decision, shifted the rhetorical grounds on which actions where 
justified to alleviate ongoing racial inequalities from the ideological commitment to 
“equality” to the commitment to “diversity” as a constitutionally laudatory – or, at 




least permissible – goal.  As Robert Post asserts, “Powell’s opinion…was designed to 
work as an ideological construct, not merely as a functional one.”2   
Although values such as equality might be appreciated as universal, when 
policies purporting to embody those principles into question one discovers that 
“criticism and justification are always found in a historically determined context.”3  
This chapter highlights that historical context, examining the discourses about 
colorblindness, race consciousness and racial pride, assimilation, diversity, and 
multiculturalism in order to trace the rhetorical history of affirmative action 
justifications.  Michael McGee outlined the mutually reinforcing dimensions of any 
ideology:  one being a “grammar” consisting of “a historically-defined diachronic 
structure of ideograph-meanings expanding and contracting from birth of the society 
to its ‘present,’” and the other a rhetorical architectonic consisting of “a situationally-
defined synchronic structure of ideograph clusters constantly reorganizing itself to 
accommodate specific circumstances while maintaining its fundamental consonance 
and unity.”4  This chapter traces the diachronic and synchronic dimensions of race as 
the ideological structure, because, as McGee argues, “both of these structures must be 
understood and described before one can claim to have constructed a theoretically 
precise explanation of a society’s ideology, of its repertoire of public motives.”5   
It does so because the Bakke decision cannot be read as separate from the social and 
political forces occurring at the time of the decision; likewise, the emergence and 
negotiation of the value of diversity pre-existed Powell’s particular iteration of it in 
relation to education. Affirmative action is but one framework under which diversity 
works, and it has not always been part of affirmative action’s mission.   




Ideological Foundations of the Bakke Case 
 
The arguments surrounding the Bakke case, both pre- and post-opinion, reveal 
the symbiotic relationship between public arguments and those arguments addressed 
to and through legal institutions.  Exploring how the various communities interested 
in the use of race as a consideration in college admissions justified their arguments to 
the Supreme Court, which ideological factors were at stake, how the justices wrestled 
with the arguments from these communities and with their own concerns, and how 
the opinions, once handed down, were presented to the public, as well as subsequent 
public usages of the arguments, can help to explicate this relationship. 
The Bakke decision is not only an answer to a question; it is a marker for a 
significant ideological shift from reliance on equality to the celebration of diversity in 
the consideration of racial inequities. Considering the widespread use of the term 
“diversity,” such an exploration can contribute to an understanding of shifting 
ideological commitments when motivated citizens attempt to alleviate disparities 
bearing the imprint of systematic racism.  What has been called the “diversity 
rationale” by legal scholars takes on broader public meaning after consideration of the 
rhetorical invention process that led to the conclusion.  The law articles begin and end 
the exploration at diversity’s constitutionality, with perhaps a stretch into its effects 
on law, at the expense of exploring how the commitment to diversity came to be 
considered in the first place.  
Instead, this chapter focuses on the emergence of diversity as a proposed 
nationwide ideological commitment sanctioned by the Supreme Court.  As with the 
Bakke case, most scholarship that examines the concept of diversity does it from a 




constitutional perspective, treating that document from a legal formalist perspective – 
it either does or does not allow for diversity, for instance, or it either is or is not color-
blind.6  Such studies provide little recognition of the constitutive function of the law 
in any way.7  Laws and their interpretations construct physical, moral, and ideological 
meanings of racial categories in ways that codify, manipulate, and sometimes 
contradict broader social conceptions of race.8    
Ideological critiques of rhetorical discourses have been a central effort for 
contemporary rhetorical critics.  Ideology is a collection of interrelated convictions, 
produced in political language and preserved in historical documents, that control and 
influence the beliefs and behaviors of the public, including both the ruler(s) and the 
ruled.9  It points the audience(s) toward certain values and away from alternative 
world-views.10  Ideology, defined in this way, is more of a social process than a 
deterministic force.  Ideology “draws its power from its ability to connect and 
combine diverse mental elements (concepts, ideas, etc.) into combinations that 
influence and structure the perception and cognition of social agents.”11  Thus, an 
ideological focus recognizes the naturalized political assumptions that work in and 
through texts, subject to change through confrontation with social exigencies and 
conflicting ideological beliefs.   
Ideological criticism shares the mission of rhetorical history because tracing 
ideological strains in arguments attempts “to describe human life from the perspective 
of history – from our knowledge that our values, judgments of preceding generations 
may function to constrain or liberate presently living generations.”12  Furthermore, 
ideological criticism focuses our minds on the competing tensions or contradictions 




of our society.13  The negotiation of these tensions is particularly well suited to the 
public address form, where leaders are primary actors in reifying political ideology, 
but must also negotiate the demands of various publics.   
This demand is as true for legal leaders as it is for political leaders.  For the 
same reasons, ideological criticism is well suited for addressing legal discourses as a 
form of public address.14  Laws do not merely impose the wills of those in power on 
the public: they introduce individual and collective subjectivities by making publics 
the bearers of particular rights and duties.15  By assuming particular needs and duties, 
and by casting itself as the giver and defender of those rights and duties, the legal 
process itself has ideological force.  Additionally, the subject matter of legal 
discourse – especially at the Supreme Court level – often carries ideological weight.  
The Bakke case is intriguing because it reflects the continuing struggle within civil 
rights movements and in institutional responses to these movements: an attempt to 
balance integrationist ideals with the need for reparations and the maintenance of an 
autonomous identity.16   
American Multiculturalism 
Despite belief that multiculturalism is a mid- to late-twentieth century 
enlightenment, it is the term, not the social phenomenon, which is new.17  A 
multiplicity of cultures has been a social reality for at least as long as colonies of 
various immigrants settled on land inhabited by native Americans, each with their 
own cultural habits.  Contemporary usages of the term “multiculturalism” evoke 19th 
and 20th century debates over assimilation and cultural pride; and because the term is 
relatively new, “many incorrectly conclude that multiculturalism is therefore a fairly 




new social phenomenon, the product of a changing world and of changing 
government policies.”18   
Vincent N. Parrillo argues that such an assumption stems from two fallacies.  
The first is a fallacy of cultural homogeneity, holding the idea that the thirteen 
colonies were “almost entirely populated by immigrants and their descendents from 
the British Isles” who largely shared cultural beliefs and habits, and thus either 
required no assimilation or quickly merged cultures.19  The extension of this 
misconception is the belief that “the cultural diversity that exists in America 
is…different, more widespread, and resistant to assimilation – something to be 
celebrated, respected and maintained, say its proponents – thus making it, in the eyes 
of alarmed others, not only a new construction but somehow also a threat to the 
cohesiveness of American society.”20 
However, early “white” colonial settlements had separate ethnic enclaves, and 
their names reflect their native ethnicities, including New England, New Belgium, 
New Netherland, New Sweden, New Iberia, New Orleans, and New Smyrna.21  Some 
enclaves became multicultural quickly – like Philadelphia and New Amsterdam 
(Manhattan) – while others, including Germans and Scots-Irish, maintained separate 
communities for quite some time.22 Additionally, the proportion of people whose 
ethnicities were not part of these traditionally-considered colonial ethnic groups was 
substantially higher than today’s numbers.  According to Parrillo: 
As the colonial period drew to a close, 53% of the population in the 13 
colonies belonged to racially and culturally distinct minorities, more than 
twice the proportion in 1990.  The 1990 census tabulations show Asians at 




3%, blacks at 12%, Hispanics at 9%, and Native Americans at 1% for a total 
of 25%.  In 1776, just African and Native Americans equaled that figure.  
Racial and ethnic outgroups thus comprised a greater portion of the total 
population than in the 1990s.23 
A second and related fallacy is “the erroneous assumption that what occurred 
in the past were fleeting moments of heterogeneity that yielded to fairly rapid 
assimilation.”24  The changing conceptualization of race, the variant values placed on 
racial, ethnic, and cultural groups, especially the broadening and constricting category 
of “white,” have contributed to the perception of homogeneity.  In the United States, 
the fluidity of racial categories is evidenced by the emergence or disappearance of 
certain categories as their social status was negotiated.25  Anti-miscegenation laws, 
the definition of slaves as property of whites, and appeals of various racial and ethnic 
groups to be considered white or, at least, not black, in order to receive better 
treatment indicate the simultaneously privileged and fluid status of whiteness.26  The 
classification of whiteness changes with the make-up of the nation, but the status of 
whiteness has remained at the top of the social hierarchy, conferring privileges of 
both the material and psychological sort.27  For members of racial or ethnic groups 
not considered “white,” the options have generally been a choice between attempts to 
assimilate or to argue for cultural pluralism.28 
Disparate treatment based on racial classification has been met with calls for 
“equality;” yet variant notions of equality, tied to the similarly abstract concept of 
justice, are central to the conflict about how to alleviate racial disparities. Chaїm 
Perelman’s Justice, Law, and Argument, discusses the idea of justice as a value 




foundational to legal rhetoric and synchronically linked to the idea of equality.  
Perelman describes at least six distinct conceptions of justice:  to each the same thing, 
to each according to his/her merits, to teach according to his/her works, to each 
according to his/her rank, and to each according to his/her legal entitlement.29  The 
rhetorical force of the term rests in its multiplicity, which allows different 
communities to value different conceptions of equality simultaneously, while 
allowing a unified theme for all.30  Yet its multiplicity makes it cumbersome to 
achieve in practice, because “to everyone the idea of justice inevitably suggests the 
notion of a certain equality…But this perfect equality, as everyone once realises, 
cannot be achieved in practice.”31   
Most parties interested in affirmative action profess to value “equality” in 
some sense, but the different iterations of equality, like the different iterations of 
justice outlined by Perelman, contribute to dramatically different outcomes in the 
conversation.  Opponents of affirmative action argue that the same standards must be 
applied equally, without regard to race, while proponents of affirmative action focus 
on the equality of results.  Some proponents of affirmative action have called the act 
“equalization,” with an attempt to resolve the conflict by tying the equality of 
opportunity to the equality of results via a timeline with a goal for when the results 
are reached.32  Terry Eastland and William J. Bennett note the centrality of equality to 
all parties in Bakke: 
For whatever disagreements the amici and other parties on both sides had 
among themselves in Bakke, they all agreed that equality as an ideal has a 




special status in American history, and that the meaning of equality as an ideal 
is what should govern interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.33 
These differences emerge from diachronic and synchronic linkages between equality 
and other historically determined and contextually-driven ideologies.  Justice 
Powell’s evocation of diversity as the primary principle justifying affirmative action 
can be better understood by examining its ideographic clusters, epistemological 
undercurrents and their rhetorical legacies, and situational exigencies.  
The most consistent appeals have been the rhetorics of assimilation and of 
race consciousness.  As Gary Peller argues, the collective memory of civil rights 
gains constructs “a sense of linear evolution [that] has lent an aura of inevitability to 
the story, as if progression from the racial caste system of American slavery to the 
widespread acceptance of integration and the transcendence of race consciousness as 
the unquestioned goals of social progress was historically determined.”34 Yet the 
struggle for racial justice “has been neither linear nor inevitable.”35 
Individualist Ideology 
 
Variant approaches to racial equality occur, in part, because the group-status 
of racial categories is read as onerous to individualism, a major tenet of liberal 
political ideology.36  Peller argues: 
the struggle against racism can be related in a way that follows the basic script 
of liberal progress more generally.  Race consciousness is associated with 
status-based social coercion, where individuals are treated in a particular way 
because of the arbitrary fact of membership in a social group they did not 




choose…Freedom from racial discrimination is but one instance of the 
historical move from status to contract, from case to individual liberty.37 
American individualism stems from a liberal humanist tradition that privileges 
the self as rational, discrete from the larger social world (s)he inhabits, and with the 
agency to pursue his or her goals at will.38  This combination of valuing individual 
hard work – especially in economic competition – with the belief that individual 
agency is the primary means and deciding factor of achievement discourages an 
understanding of collective disadvantage because of historical circumstances.39   
Because liberal ideology privileges individual agency as the source of power, 
the arguments in which it is embedded favor individualism over collective action, and 
critique appeals to group membership as the basis for rights.  Appeals to 
colorblindness as a goal or outcome of laws and policies, then, pull from notions of 
individualism and separation from the larger social world.  Race, according to 
colorblind belief, is a group category, and to categorize someone by race is to ignore 
his or her individual characteristics and agency.40  Carl Cohen offers a good example 
of this reasoning: “Bigots, of course, will draw distinctions by race in their private 
lives.  But private opinions, however detestable, are not public business.  Under rules 
to be enforced by our body politic, bigotry is forbidden.”41   
Questioning the legitimacy of race as a socially relevant category has been a 
consistent integrationist strategy.  Carrie Crenshaw defines the rhetoric of 
colorblindness as “a cultural ideal that circumscribes our moral imaginings of a 
modern world without color prejudice.”42  Similar to the multiple conceptions of 
equality, Bryan K. Fair points out that two different notions of colorblindness exist.  




The first was meant to eliminate a racial caste system that was entrenched in law – the 
elimination of laws that were intended to discriminate based on race will lead to racial 
equality.43  A well-noted example of this usage is Justice John Marshall Harlan’s 
dissent to the separate-but-equal doctrine established in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).44  
Far from denying the importance of race in culture or in law, Harlan was critiquing 
the fact that “the White race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country” and 
the majority opinion’s disregard for the fact that purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to protect African Americans.45  Contemporary uses of 
colorblindness, however, coalesce around “the refusal of legislators, jurists, and most 
of American society to acknowledge the causes” and restricting the use of racial 
classifications in order to eliminate the effects of racial discrimination.46 
Late nineteenth and early twentieth century arguments about racial disparities 
used appeals to individualism to mediate the charge of “special privileges” for group 
membership.  Soon after Congress established the Freedman’s Bureau, passed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, and ratified the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 
conferring upon African Americans citizenship, due process, and voting rights, these 
Reconstruction acts were met with contempt by the Supreme Court, which held in the 
1883 Civil Rights Cases that: 
when a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation 
has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some 
stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, 
and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws…47 




The persuasive value of individualism was embraced by Booker T. 
Washington, who saw it as step toward integration with white society.  For 
Washington, education was a key to credibility for black Americans, because 
assimilation would occur through proof of worth, and education a way to prove 
worth.  In his “Cotton States Exposition Address” delivered in September 1895, 
Washington argued for the need of education and hard work in order to be fully 
accepted into white society.  Speaking to an audience of both white and black 
members, Washington placed individual effort above group pressure, rejecting 
“sentimentalism” of writing a poem in favor of individual work ethic and other 
“manly virtues” as the key to liberation:   
No race can prosper till it learns that there is as much dignity in tilling a field 
as in writing a poem…The wisest among my race understand that the agitation 
of questions of social equality is the extremest folly, and that progress in the 
enjoyment of all the privileges that will come to us must be the result of 
severe and constant struggle rather than of artificial forcing.  No race that has 
anything to contribute to the markets of the world is long, in any degree, 
ostracized.  It is important and right that all privileges of the law be ours, but it 
is vastly more important that we be prepared for the exercise of those 
privileges.  The opportunity to earn a dollar in a factory just now is worth 
infinitely more than the opportunity to spend a dollar in an opera house.”48 
Washington’s speech was largely considered a success by white newspapers.49 
At the same time, W.E.B. Du Bois critiqued Washington for his desire to placate the 
white South, leading to a path based on adjustment and submission.  Group cohesion 




and group pressure mattered, argued Du Bois, because substantive change could not 
occur at the individual level and – perhaps more importantly – Washington’s rhetoric 
of accommodation assumed that the end goal was to mimic white America, a strategy 
that disvalued the worth of black Americans.  
Du Bois’s critique of Washington highlights the centrality of racial identity to 
the American tradition.  In contrast with the liberal sense of individualism, the 
construction of racial categories has been central to placement within American social 
hierarchies.  Even before the United States declared itself a sovereign nation, laws 
regulated the relationships between Europeans, Native Americans, and African 
Americans: “in those early years, the idea that race, instead of culture, determined an 
individual’s place in society became fixed.”50   At the same time, the fluidity of racial 
categories is evidenced by the emergence or disappearance of certain categories as 
their social status was negotiated.51  Thus, Ian F. Haney López notes, “races are not 
biologically differentiated groupings but rather social constructions,” more about 
social identity and value than any scientific heuristic.52   
Racial categories find their meaning through social relations, and because they 
exist largely through discourse, they change meanings through discourse.53  The fluid 
definition of race is especially salient when it comes to contemporary discussions of 
whiteness.  The assumption of white superiority has been evoked in legal discourses 
through many avenues over the history of the United States.  For example, Article I, 
Section 2 of the Constitution calculated representation and taxation by the number of 
free persons, excluded Native Americans, and counted all others into three fifths.  The 
racial make-up of “free persons” was cleared of doubt by the first definition of 




naturalized citizenship by Congress in 1790, which was limited to “free white 
person(s).”54   
The amorphous status of whiteness has increased, however, after egalitarian 
pushes for fair treatment of citizens of all races forced political and legal discourses to 
acknowledge and condemn such overt racial preferences.55  Not aligned with any 
particular cultural traditions, whiteness is defined by its margins, by what it is not.56  
T. Alexander Alienikoff asserts that “to be born white is to be free from confronting 
one's race on a daily, personal, interaction-by-interaction basis.”57  Yet Steven D. 
Farough points out that, as the nation’s racial and ethnic makeup diversifies and race 
consciousness becomes more accepted in our national culture, whiteness also 
becomes more visible.58  Its visibility opens it to critique, to change – and to the 
ability to demand equal treatment.  
Race Consciousness 
Critics of liberal colorblind ideology, such as Christopher Newfield, argue that 
such logic fails to recognize that “individual identity [is] simultaneously voluntary 
and involuntary,” and ignores “the history of racial progress in the United States 
derived at every point from race-conscious critiques of existing arrangements.”59  
Proponents of racial pluralism have claimed, not that individual identity and choice 
were irrelevant, but that:  
hybridity, mobility, and freedom coexisted with a group-based life that 
societies assigned to the members of groups, particularly those that were 
disfavored.  That meant that democracy depended on the recognition of the 




political and economic realities created by that group life—by systemic racial 
inequalities, by ongoing racial disparities, by racism past and present.60 
The appreciation of pluralism has been as central to American democracy as has the 
sense of individualism evidenced in liberal political theory.  In fact, contemporary 
political theorists assert that the combination of free association and multiple group 
associations form the “central elements of liberal and democratic aspects of 
[American] politics” by setting faction against faction in the free market of ideas that 
assured no single group total power.61   
Some twentieth century attacks on racial domination have rejected the value 
of colorblindness in favor of race-consciousness; an articulation of racial worth, 
embracing non-white racial identity and working within that identity to attain 
economic, rhetorical, and political power that was otherwise difficult to come by.  
Race-consciousness appears as both an identity-forming theme and as a call to the 
national community to acknowledge and resolve discriminatory practices.62  The push 
for the merits of race-consciousness as both rhetorical strategy and coordinating 
action gained traction amid frustration with the inability to get the nation past its 
discriminatory practices. Garvey was an early proponent of separation via the back-
to-Africa movement, using anti-assimilationist race-science arguments popular with 
white Americans of the early twentieth century as the foundation for his proposal: 
Men and women of the white race, do you know what is going to happen? 
You are either going to deceive and keep the Negro in your midst until you 
have perfectly completed your wonderful American civilization…your race 
pure and unmixed, [until you] cast him off to die in a whirlpool of economic 




starvation…or, you simply mean by the largeness of your hearts to assimilate 
fifteen million Negroes into the social fraternity of the American race, that 
will neither be white nor black. Don’t be alarmed!  We must prevent both 
consequences.  No real race loving white man wants to destroy the purity of 
his race, and no real Negro conscious of himself, wants to die, hence there is 
room for an understanding…The Negro must have a country, and a nation of 
his own….We have found a place, it is Africa and as black men for three 
centuries have helped white men build America, surely generous and grateful 
white men will help black men build Africa.63 
Race consciousness has taken various forms and is linked to divergent 
worldviews.64  For some, like Garvey, racial separation was the answer to the futility 
of assimilation.  Yet Black nationalism has taken different forms, including Booker T. 
Washington's separatist ideas of black advancement, among urban communities in 
response to Garvey’s organizing efforts in the 1930s, in the Black Muslim movement, 
and among the middle class following Du Bois’s critique of the NAACP’s 
integrationist policy advocacy.65  Martin Luther King Jr., a leader generally seen as 
the spokesperson for an idealistic integrated society based on colorblind legal 
practices, explained the logic of Black Power in his 1967 book: “for centuries the 
Negro has been caught in the tentacles of white power.  Many Negroes have given up 
faith in the white majority because ‘white power’ with total control has left them 
empty-handed.  So in reality the call for Black Power is a reaction to the failure of 
white power.”66 




For some, the need for racial integrity was met through appeals to racial 
pluralism, an end-goal in itself; advocates for racial pluralism – including Du Bois, 
Angela Davis, Stuart Hall and Patricia Williams – saw racial identity “as a fluctuating 
sociocultural phenomenon that both acknowledged settled historical patterns of 
differentiation and…multiple identities” and found the solution to racial domination 
in mutual appreciation for multiple cultural identities.67   
For others, race consciousness was a needed step toward the goal of 
integration.68   A belief in race-conscious solutions does not mean that all advocates 
of race consciousness eschew colorblind integration as a goal.  King consistently 
galvanized the African American community behind an integrationist vision “fused 
with images of religious and moral transcendence” that appealed to central features of 
the African American community as the vehicle for national change.69  A number of 
affirmative action proponents base their arguments of race consciousness on the goal 
of a fully integrated, colorblind society.70  These arguments usually come from two 
directions: first, that current workplaces and universities have few enough minorities 
to foster a tokenism mentality, and that continued affirmative action efforts will 
accustom our eyes, so to speak, to color; and second, that affirmative action is needed 
until the economic and social effects of past discrimination are substantively 
overcome, after which America can live by colorblindness doctrine.   
As an official arbiter of conflict, legal discourse has been a central scene of 
contested meanings of race and a gateway in attempts to eliminate racial injustice.  
Crenshaw asserts that “court decisions have historically bestowed or undermined the 
symbolic and material legitimacy of [conceptions of race and racism], often 




maintaining and protecting white privilege.”71  To argue that the law contributes to 
the construction of race in certain ways is not to assert that the legal construction of 
race is a coherent or totalizing act.  As James Boyd White suggests, the law is but one 
discursive community among many that contribute to our national understanding of 
race.72  Not only is it influenced by political and social discourses, but there is rarely a 
unified definition of race that emerges from any single legal discourse.  Instead, 
argues López, “the legal construction of race pushes in many different directions on a 
multitude of levels, sometimes along mutually reinforcing lines but more often along 
divergent vectors, occasionally entrenching existing notions of race but also at other 
times or even simultaneously fabricating new conceptions of racial difference.”73  
Messages that the public receives from the Supreme Court about the importance of 
race as a category may sometimes be contradictory; for instance, “court decisions 
might appear to negate certain social patterns…while being essentially compatible 
with socioeconomic conditions that continue racial discriminatory practices.”74 
Rhetorics of Assimilation and Race Consciousness in 20th Century Public Discourse 
As the epistemological traditions of societies change, so too do the authorities 
who are marshaled to uphold and restructure racial categories, including science, 
religion, government, or law.75  Paul Rego asserts that:  “Many economists, 
sociologists, political scientists, and historians, from 1865 to 1901, had applied 
Darwin’s theories of adaptability and change to their own disciplines and…made 
‘survival of the fittest’ not just the law of nature but also the law of society.”76  For 
race scientists, “all moral, mental, physical, social, and cultural abilities were 
inherited from one’s parents,” and they argued that different races were either 




“sexually repelled by one another,” or a best “extremely biologically undesirable.”77 
Because race was defined as a biologically predetermined state, under which morals 
and culture were engrained, not only were interracial families considered undesirable; 
similarly improbable was the possibility of social or cultural assimilation.   
Abolitionists such as former slave and renowned orator Frederick Douglass 
addressed this biological construction of ethnocultural worth, combating the assertion 
that African Americans were less “human” than European Americans to white 
audiences – one of many fallacious arguments that had been used to justify slavery 
and Jim Crow.78  In Douglass’s commencement address to mostly white audience of 
the Western Reserve College, entitled “The Claims of the Negro, Ethnologically 
Considered,” he methodically countered the ethnological claims that blacks were not 
human, using geographical, historical, and ethnological evidence.79  Marcus Garvey, 
another leading orator with  more separationist goals than the mostly assimilationist 
arguments of Douglass, similarly met these claims of biological inferiority, pleading 
with white audiences to recognize the humanity of African Americans, or, if not, to 
let African Americans return to Africa: “Negroes are human beings – the peculiar and 
strange opinions of writers, ethnologists, philosophers, scientists, and anthropologists 
notwithstanding…Let the white race stop thinking that all black men are dogs and not 
to be considered as human beings.”80 
Dennis J. Downey argues that the late nineteenth to early twentieth century 
advocacy of assimilation “was initially a liberal response to exclusionist arguments 
that suggested the impossibility of assimilating non-‘Nordic’ races into American 
society and reflected changing ideas about human social differences.”81  James 




Golden and Richard Rieke consider the rhetoric of assimilation to be the most 
“durable or universal” rhetorical strategy with which to achieve freedom, equality, 
and dignity, because its appeals to Christianity, its basis in the liberal ideology of 
personal worth through education and hard work, and its advocacy for slow-working 
legislative and judicial action to ensure equality and freedom through law were all 
conservative enough to be relatively non-threatening to resistant white audiences and 
accommodating enough embrace multiple audiences.82   
Angela Ray complicates this summary of the rhetoric of assimilation, arguing 
that although “we customarily think of cultural assimilation as a means by which 
individuals are changed through absorption in the traditions and practices of a group,” 
such an assumption “presupposes the free choice of the individual to join the group, 
the acceptance of the individual by the group, and relative parity in power among 
group members, old and new.”83  This model does not explain how assimilation is to 
occur when one group has been oppressed by a dominant group; thus, “it does not 
explain the purposes and goals of those U.S. abolitionist and early civil rights 
advocates who assumed an assimilationist-integrationist position.”84  Ray observes 
that Douglass “both enacted and argued for social change that did not merely adapt 
African Americans to the norms of a fixed white American culture but rather 
challenged cultural fixedness itself, promoting an ‘American’ culture encompassing 
differences, in which biological variation did not determine cultural hierarchies.”85  
The promotion of an American culture which encompassed differences was a 
shared mission at the turn of the century, evidenced by the huge popularity of a play 
entitled “The Melting Pot,” which ran in the United States from 1908 to 1909.  British 




author and political activist Isreal Zangwill penned the script, which he eventually 
dedicated to Theodore Roosevelt, who was a big fan of the play.86  Zangwill, the child 
of Jewish parents who emigrated to England from Russia, based the play on the 
metaphor of a crucible: a fairly violent process of melting down metals to extract their 
pure essence, to mix metals, and to pour them into molds.  Zangwill’s play 
dramatized what he saw as God’s mission of removing the “barbarian” features of 
fifty European “tribes” that he identified, thus forging a new “American mold” 
devoid of any lingering ethnic or cultural habits from immigrants’ pre-American 
homelands.87  This metaphor was critiqued, first for suggesting that metallurgy mixes 
different metals – it in fact purifies each metal and blends purer versions – and 
second, for advocating such a mix.  A 1918 report in the New York Times on the 
dinner of the Intercollegiate Menorah Association quoted Jewish community leader 
Louis Marshall as saying that Zangwill’s vision is a faulty one; the melting pot 
“produces mongrelism,” an effect contrary to the nation’s goals because “our struggle 
should be not to create a hybrid civilization, but to preserve the best elements that 
constitute the civilization we are all seeking, the civilization of universal 
brotherhood.”88   
The discourse of Theodore Roosevelt reflects the tension between the belief in 
race science and the want for a civic nationalism of unified culture.89  Unlike the 
strongest proponents of racial purity, Roosevelt embraced Zangwill’s melting pot 
metaphor of racial and religious hybridity – assuming that the races to be mixed were 
of European origin.90  Roosevelt’s melting pots “always, and deliberately, excluded 




one or more races—usually blacks, often Asians and American Indians.”91  Roosevelt 
explained the line drawn between acceptance and rejection in an editorial: 
I have no sympathy with mere dislike of immigrants; there are classes and 
even nationalities of them which stand at least on an equality with the citizens 
of native birth, as the last election showed. But in the interest of our 
workingmen we must in the end keep out laborers who are ignorant, vicious, 
and with low standards of life and comfort, just as we have shut out the 
Chinese [1883 Chinese Exclusion Act].92 
Immigrants from acceptable backgrounds were expected to leave their 
homeland allegiances at Ellis Island, according to Roosevelt: 
The mighty tide of immigration to our shores has brought in its train much of 
good much of evil; and whether the good or the evil shall predominate 
depends mainly on whether these newcomers do or do not throw themselves 
heartily into our national life, cease to be Europeans, and become Americans 
like the rest of us…where immigrants do not heartily and in good faith throw 
in their lot with us, but cling to the speech, the customs, the ways of life, and 
the habits of thought of the Old World which they have left, they thereby 
harm both themselves and us.  If they remain alien elements, unassimilated, 
and with interests separate from ours, they are mere obstructions.93  
Similarly, Woodrow Wilson criticized the idea of “hyphenated Americans”:  “Some 
Americans need hyphens in their names, because only part of them has come over; 
but when the whole man has come over, heart and thought and all, the hyphen drops 




of its own weight out of his name.  This man was not an Irish-American; he was an 
Irishman who became an American.”94 
   For Roosevelt and Wilson, the integration of new immigrants into a unified 
American culture was integral to the goals of nationhood.  Vanessa Beasley argues 
that this has been a defining feature of presidential discourse: “If the stresses of living 
in a highly pluralistic democracy have convinced the American people that they share 
no common ties, then U.S. presidents, as symbolic guardians of the common good, 
may be in a unique position to reassure citizens that there is in fact a ‘national reason 
and rationality,’ and that they, too, are part of it.”95  For this reason, both Roosevelt 
and Wilson rejected some of the more blatant separationist arguments that come from 
various American publics.  For Roosevelt, the anti-Japanese sentiments that led to the 
“Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1907, which barred further immigration of Japanese 
workers, were based on ignorant class struggles, even as he supported the Chinese 
Exclusion Act and endorsed racist constructions of Chinese Americans.96  Wilson, as 
well as Presidents Cleveland and Taft, vetoed immigration restriction laws until 
Congress gained enough votes to override Wilson’s veto.97 
At the same time that African American leaders and white Presidents were 
arguing for assimilation, the rapid increase in immigration rates, especially from 
Southern and Eastern Europe, was met with an uprise in nativist feelings, paired with 
scientific methodologies that were evoked to support the separation of lesser-valued 
racial and ethnic group members.98  The late nineteenth to early twentieth century 
advocacy of assimilation was largely targeted at these southern and eastern European 
immigrants, as well as Asian immigrants, and eventually embodied in the symbol of 




‘Americanization’ articulated by Roosevelt.  The Americanization movement, asserts 
Downey, began as a settlement movement seeking to assist large number of 
immigrants with adjusting to American society, especially to the poor industrial 
conditions into which many immigrants found work.  Institutionalized under the 
North American Civic League in 1907, “Americanization” reformers brought in 
business and industry interests because of their associations with immigrant labor.99 
This merger meant that “initial motivations to assist immigrants were joined by 
motivations to rationalize labor supply,” a motivation further complicated by World 
War I, when war preparedness became a central focus.100   With the wartime focus 
came increased nationalism and xenophobia, paired with the continuing need for 
immigrant labor, the new Americanization meant assimilating as rapidly as possible, 
while removing all traces of ‘foreignness’.101   
Protestant missionaries were a large part of the assimilation movement, and 
worked both in conjunction with and at odds with the race science/eugenics 
movements.  Both race scientists and missionaries held as their primary goals a 
“cure” for racial and cultural differences.  For missionaries, the cure was conversion 
to Christianity, whereas race scientists promoted the separation or elimination of 
“lesser” races and cultures.  Yet whereas earlier missionary discourses had focused on 
Western cultural superiority as assimilation, “the new missionary racial project which 
emerged by the 1920s placed theological value upon diversity and mutuality between 
racial and religious groups, and struggled…with the competing, and much more 
popular, racial project of exclusion, domination, and aggression.”102  Jennifer Snow 
explains: 




Long years of experiencing a much greater and more complex world had a 
cumulative, transformative effect on missionary discourse.  Where 
missionaries had once emphasized homogeneity through conversion, 
missionary theorists in the first decades of the twentieth century began, 
instead, to explore the virtues of diversity in race, religion, and culture.103 
In a rhetorical shift criticized as mere “sentimentalism” by proponents of 
eugenics, early twentieth century missionaries began to move from older 
assimilationist “melting pot” ideal, toward “a view of the world as a mosaic of many 
colors and cultures.”104  Protestant minister Robert E. Speer was at the forefront of 
this liberal assimilationist movement, writing pamphlets criticizing the anti-Japanese 
Alien Land Law of 1917, giving speeches advocating the benefits of racial and 
cultural assimilation, including intermarriage between races, and writing two books 
addressing American misconceptions of race, in which he cited sources including 
W.E.B. Du Bois, Confucius, Booker T. Washington, Mirza Saeed Kahn, John Dewey, 
Franz Boas, Sir Narayan Charnavarkar, Cicero, and Marcus Garvey.105  Pulling on his 
global travels, Speer concluded that race “was not an easily definable reality, perhaps 
not a reality at all.  Race was perhaps simply an ‘obsession’ for some people, who 
assigned colors and characteristics of superiority and inferiority to ‘blood’ and 
believed that it assured hereditary status.”106 
Because the United States’ clearest racial obsession, with all of its status 
ramifications, had been the line drawn between black and white, citizens whose racial 
makeup fell somewhere in between were left to push for legal and social recognition 
of their individual and group identities.107  For instance, the foundation for the Plessy 




v. Ferguson (1896) case came from the frustration of a group of Louisiana natives 
with which Homer Plessy identified, called Comite des Citoyens.  The Comite des 
Citoyens, a Creole group of mixed African, European, and Indian descent, considered 
themselves neither black nor white.  The state of Louisiana enacted the Separate Car 
Act in 1890 requiring railroads to provide equal but separate cars for whites 
(European Americans) and blacks (African Americans), and the Comite des Citoyens 
objected to the black/white segregations that denied their separate identity.108  They 
joined with several railroad companies (objecting to the economic burden of the act) 
that decided to test the constitutionality of the statute by choosing Plessy, a man with 
one-eighth black heritage and light-colored skin, to board the white car, announce that 
he was black, and refuse to move to the seats designated for blacks.   
The Supreme Court’s eight-to-one decision affirmed the states’ rights to 
segregate based on race (leaving up to the states the method of determining what is 
considered “colored,”) and further asserted that the practice of segregated railcars did 
not equate to a “badge of slavery” for the races, and was thus constitutional.109  
Justice Henry Billings Brown, who authored the opinion, articulated the race-science 
anti-assimilationist argument that the races did not want to mix, and that so long as 
each race had equal access, they were not required to.110  Justice Harlan’s famous 
1896 dissent to the separate-but-equal doctrine legitimized in Plessy v. Ferguson 
reveals integrationist arguments circulating at the turn of the century: “our 
Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”  
Harlan also appealed to popular knowledge of the rhetorical motivations – the 
assumption of and protection of white superiority – behind the evocation of separate-




but-equal policies: “Everyone knows that the statute in question had its origin in the 
purpose not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks 
as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white 
persons.”111 
In contrast with this colorblind argument, Speer and others argued not that 
race was irrelevant, but that there is much to be gained by an appreciation for multiple 
cultures.  The turn toward non-Western cultures for potential answers to urban 
industrial malaise was “crystallized in the philosophy of cultural relativism, 
popularized by Ruth Benedict in her widely read Patterns of Culture ([1934] 
1959).”112  Benedict argued as Speer did, “that relativism was demanded by the age in 
which they lived.”113  Seen this way, arguments for cultural assimilation devalued – 
or abolished – unique and valuable cultural identities.  The influence of this pluralist 
mindset can be seen in the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934, initiated by the 
commissioner for the Bureau of Indian Affairs as an “assault on assimilation,” with 
the goal of ending “the federal government’s official policy promoting assimilation of 
Native Americans and [seeking] to reinvigorate the communal societies and cultures 
that had been a target for extirpation for the previous century.” 114    
In the early twentieth century, this appreciation of cultural diversity and 
disdain for race science was met by a tide of rising race hatred, stemming from 
popularized race science and the belief that foreigners were communist radicals 
aiming for an American equivalent of the Bolshevik Revolution.115  Pluralist 
arguments were met with an increasing national obsession with the idea of 
“mongrelism,” a eugenics-centered belief in the debilitating capacity of interracial 




mixing, especially between Protestant whites (at this time still western and northern 
Europeans, and excluding southern and eastern Europeans) and Jews or any non-
whites (as defined by region of origin above).116  The Immigration Restriction Act of 
1924 made permanent through strict quotas several temporary attempts to keep out 
unwanted immigrant groups (Jews and Italians, in particular) by eliminating 
immigration from Asia and restricting immigration from Southern and Eastern 
Europe to a pre-influx period of 1890.117  Prominent eugenicist Harry H. Laughlin 
testified before the committee drafting the Act, where he argued: “We in this country 
have been so imbued with the idea of democracy, or the equality of all men, that we 
have left out of consideration the matter of blood or natural inborn hereditary mental 
and moral differences.  No man who breeds pedigreed plants and animals can afford 
to neglect this thing, as you know.”118  During these immigration debates, African 
Americans “constituted the invisible racial other,” largely unmentioned except as a 
point of measurement about assimilability: by pro-restrictionists to prove the lack of 
worth for immigrants in question, or by anti-restrictionists to show that southern-
eastern Europeans “were capable—unlike blacks—of assimilating to American values 
and institutions.”119 
Thus, when Martha Lum, an American-born child of Chinese ancestry, was in 
1924 denied entrance to the Mississippi public school of her choosing and told that 
she needed to attend a “colored” school because, according to the school 
superintendent, she was not white, the family sued, claiming they were not “colored.” 
Their arguments used the color black as a fault line, asserting that in Mississippi 
“colored” meant black: thus, the family argued, “that she is not a member of the 




colored race, nor is she of mixed blood, but that she is pure Chinese; [and] that she is, 
by the action of the board of trustees and the state superintendent, discriminated 
against directly.”120  In an opinion written by former President and then-Justice 
William Howard Taft, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision that she 
was not white, based on precedent set by cases dealing with segregation between 
white and black Americans.  Citing Plessy v Ferguson as precedent, Taft wrote: 
Most of the cases cited arose, it is true, over the establishment of separate 
schools as between white pupils and black pupils, but we cannot think that the 
question is any different, or that any different result can be reached, assuming 
the cases above cited to be rightly decided, where the issue is as between 
white pupils and the pupils of the yellow races. The decision is within the 
discretion of the state in regulating its public schools, and does not conflict 
with the Fourteenth Amendment.121 
Given the use of racial categories to subjugate those not classified as white, 
early twentieth century appeals to integration were evoked less for their goals of 
individual liberty than they were in eliminating legally-endorsed group barriers to 
equal treatment.  Peller speaks to the radical roots of integration as a method for 
eliminating racial domination, in hopes that color blindness would alleviate racial 
domination: “for [early integrationists], the ideology of integrationism was not 
experienced as simply the working out of a liberal theory of enlightenment; instead, 
integrationism provided a frame for articulating their more deeply rooted, existential 
revulsion to racial domination.”122  For instance, Booker T. Washington privileged 
education as the key to integrating African Americans into American society:  he 




lamented the lack of schools for black children and began the Tuskegee Institute as a 
means of insuring quality education for African American men, and thus their 
increased ability to succeed as American citizens.  This persisting belief has made 
legal challenges to educational policies about race a key strategy in attempts at social 
change.    
Thus, when the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
launched a campaign in the 1930s to break Plessy v. Ferguson’s separate-but-equal 
doctrine and its segregationist legacies, the organization did so by using integrationist 
arguments and by concentrating on access to schools.123  Culminating in Brown v. 
Board of Education (1954), a series of Supreme Court cases adopted these arguments.  
One large victory came with Missouri Ex Rel. Gaines v. Canada (1938) and the 
successful argument that aspiring African American student Lloyd Gaines should be 
admitted into the state law school because there was no black equivalent to that 
school. This opinion was reaffirmed by Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University 
of Oklahoma (1948), which applied the same reasoning to an Oklahoma law school.  
In response to the Sipuel decision, universities intent on keeping their students 
segregated quickly set up black law schools or segregated classrooms within existing 
schools.  Two years later, Chief Justice Fred Vinson wrote for a unanimous Court in 
Sweatt v. Painter (1950), a case challenging this practice:  
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be 
effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law 
interacts.  Few students and no one who has practiced law would choose to 
study in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the 




exchange of views with which the law is concerned.124 
In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents of Higher Education, also in 1950, 
Vinson reiterated the full court’s belief in the educational value of racial integration.  
McLaurin disputed the constitutionality of restricting African American graduate 
students’ use of libraries, classrooms, and the cafeteria, and Vinson argued that, in 
addition to the tangible differences of educational materials deprived of students in 
Sweatt, segregation violated African American students’ rights to “engage in 
discussions and exchange views with others students.”125  By “prohibiting the 
intellectual commingling of students, the restrictions handicapped [the appellant] in 
his pursuit of effective graduate instruction.”126 
What is particularly important about these precursors to Brown v. Board, 
according to Goodwin Liu, is that: 
they acknowledged the value of integration in educational terms.  The Court 
understood that one of the most important educational resources available to a 
student is the opportunity to interact with other students.  If this fact provides 
a reason why public universities may not segregate on a racial basis, then it 
also provides a reason why public universities may voluntarily take race into 
account in deciding whom to admit.127 
At the same time that the legal push for school integration was occurring, 
public sentiment was shifting from the strict “Americanism” assimilationist 
perspective of the turn of the century to a more pluralist perspective. Claude S. 
Fischer and Michael Hout argue that:  




Something…changed in the United States between the end of World War II 
and the turn of the century.  We label it an appreciation of differences, but we 
have no direct measures of it beyond the survey questions we used to 
document its arrival.  By the end of the century, great majorities of Americans 
were telling poll-takers that racial and ethnic diversity strengthened their 
communities and was a major reason for America’s success.128 
World War II also issued a significant change in conception of racial and 
ethnic pluralism because of the global critiques of colonialism that brought into high 
relief the disparate treatment of racial and ethnic minority groups within the United 
States: 
It was not until after World War II that the tension between coercive 
assimilation and democracy become widely accepted, as nationalism 
increasingly lent support to the concept of racial/ethnic democracy—due first 
to the war against fascism and then to international scrutiny during the cold 
war…It was only in the postwar era that ‘cultural pluralism’ became a term 
and a concept which worked its way into the vocabulary and imagery of … 
leaders of ethnic communal groups.129 
This vision, according to Newfield, was a product of the “economic ‘golden 
age’ that followed the global chaos and destruction of the Great Depression and 
World War II…It was propelled by widespread social activism and the various civil 
rights movements that sought universal access to its ideals of social development.”130  
Post-World War II civil rights movements played on this contradiction between 
democratic idealism and de jure segregation.131  These various civil rights movements 




included both colorblind and race-conscious ideologies.  The legacy of Douglass’s 
arguments for political and legal equality as the tools for racial integration was 
embraced by Du Bois and served as the mission for the NAACP.  At the same time 
the NAACP was putting forth the legal and political strategies evidenced in the 
above-mentioned school cases, the separationist arguments evoked in Black 
Nationalist discourse, grew a strong base under the leadership and legacy of Marcus 
Garvey. 132 
Political leaders who were hesitant to support legal and political promises of 
equal treatment had to overcome both social pressures to acknowledge substantive 
inequities, and political pressures in the form of votes and other political needs.  For 
instance, in a post-World War II United States still focused on the military, various 
social and political pressures led President Harry Truman to act.  At the same time 
that A. Philip Randolph was threatening African American draft resistance, political 
pressure increased to win African American votes in the upcoming election.133  As a 
response, Truman drafted Executive Orders 9980 and 9981, establishing a federal 
review board to review cases of alleged discrimination in federal government 
employment and calling for equal opportunity in the armed forces.134  Truman’s 
Justice Department arguments for ending segregation in the amicus brief submitted 
for Brown v. Board included the international implications of segregation in 
“Communist propaganda mills” and its effects on foreign visitors who were mistaken 
for blacks and denied food and lodging.135    
In Brown v. Board, the questions went well beyond the constitutionality of 
school desegregation; rather, Mark Tushnet argues, “the fundamental question was 




this: What does the equal protection clause protect against or, even more broadly, 
what notion of equality are Americans committed to?”136  According to Tushnet, two 
versions of equality lay at the center of Brown v. Board II (1955), the goal of which 
was to determine the remedy for segregation practices held unconstitutional in Brown 
v. Board (1954).   One version of equality – the principle of nondiscrimination that is 
evoked in desegregation arguments – demanded that policies intended to adversely 
affect racial minorities be done away with.  Another version – the principle of anti-
subordination evoked in integrationist policies – “required the elimination of practices 
that contributed to the subordination of racial and other minorities, whether intended 
or not.”137   
Supreme Court opinions have fluctuated on which version of equality they 
found to be constitutionally justifiable; more often than not, they conflate the two.  
For instance, the Brown decision blurred the distinctions by conflating the 
unconstitutionality of de jure segregation with the decision’s articulation of 
segregation’s main harmful impact:  that segregation “has a tendency to [retard] the 
educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some 
of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated system.”138  Tushnet notes 
that “the loss was measured not against what children would learn in schools to which 
they were assigned without regard to race but rather against what they would learn in 
integrated schools.”139  In this reasoning, the positive value on racial pluralism 
becomes the justification, rather than the colorblind principle of nondiscrimination. 
By the time President Dwight D. Eisenhower was inaugurated, organized civil 
rights protests were on a rapid upswing.  Civil rights organizations including the 




NAACP chose Rosa Parks to serve as the public face of the 1955 Montgomery bus 
boycott, escalating the movement into mass protests and organized pressure on 
federal and local governments and labor unions.  This pressure, in part, encouraged a 
recalcitrant Eisenhower to continue pushing through the desegregation of the armed 
forces.  The energy of the movement built throughout the last four years of 
Eisenhower’s term and into Kennedy’s presidency with an “agitation designed to 
break down the abstract notion that discrimination was just another political issue.”140  
Yet even amidst the growing social and political pressure, presidents like Eisenhower 
were reluctant to use the presidential platform to implement civil rights policy.  For 
Eisenhower, issues such as school desegregation were inappropriate uses of executive 
power because he found the problems to be local and state ones.141  Of course, since 
state and local governments have “proven to be the most unresponsive and 
recalcitrant, particularly in the South,” civil rights leaders could not accept this as a 
solution and were forced to pressure for change at the federal level.142    
The 1960s saw remarkable gains in legislation forbidding discrimination and 
calling for equal treatment based on race, color, or national origin, including the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights and Immigration Acts of 1965, and the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968.  The limits of race-neutral promises began to be realized, 
however, as the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and continuing poverty and 
discrimination lent greater credence to proponents of race-conscious policies that 
would provide concrete help to groups who disparately affected.  The Kerner report 
from the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, commissioned by 
President Johnson in 1967 and released one month before widespread riots following 




King’s assassination, pointed to the African American frustrations, not just with overt 
discrimination but also disproportionate poverty, unemployment, poor education and 
housing, and systematic police bias.  It became clear to some that abandonment of 
discriminatory practices does not erase the legacy of those practices.  The 
recommendations of the Kerner commission included fostering programs that carried 
an immediate impact “in order to close the gap between promise and performance” 
for all minority groups, although the focus on the report was on African Americans 
living in urban ghettos.143   
These events lent credence to arguments that race-conscious steps would need 
to be taken in order for discriminated-against groups to be able to enter the 
mainstream successfully.144  Marouf A. Hasian Jr. and Thomas K. Nakayama argue 
that, “in place of classical liberal notions of neutrality and color blindness…many 
critics claim that radical social change can only come from ‘race consciousness’ and a 
recognition of the institutional nature of racism.”145  Supporters of race consciousness 
argued that it is “a perverse description” that race-conscious policies, such as 
affirmative action, aim at achieving a racially conscious society, because “American 
society is currently a racially conscious society.”146  Colorblindness in policy does 
not save us from racism in practice, argue proponents, and so we must have race-
conscious policies to alleviate racism.   
Affirmative action became one policy manifestation of this ideological shift, 
as, “after years of civil rights policies that created equal opportunity on paper but left 
the basic structures of inequality virtually untouched, the law required policies strong 
enough to actually change the outcomes.”147  John F. Kennedy’s Executive Order 




10925 mandated that government contractors should not only “not discriminate 
against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or 
national origin,” but also that each contractor “will take affirmative action to ensure 
that applicants are employed.”148  Several days after Medgar Evers was shot to death, 
Kennedy sent his Civil Rights Act of 1963 to Congress, which called for a 
Presidential Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.  Frustrated by continued 
discrimination from labor unions, the NAACP organized protests against the building 
trade unions in Philadelphia.149  Kennedy implored his newly created Presidential 
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity to investigate and monitor the hiring 
practices of the Philadelphia building trade unions.150  His assassination kept him 
from knowing the outcome of the investigation. 
Former vice president and newly sworn-in President Lyndon B. Johnson 
immediately assured civil rights leaders that headway with civil rights would 
continue.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is one of the most important pieces of 
congressional legislation in the twentieth century.151  The sections most often cited 
for civil rights policy are Titles VI and VII, which insure equal employment 
opportunities for Federal employees, and equal opportunities for programs supported 
by Federal funds, “without discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”152  Titles VI and VII have been used both as support for and 
evidence against race-conscious policies such as affirmative action.  The language has 
been used to support various affirmative action policies – such as Nixon’s 
Philadelphia Plan and various university admissions policies – and has given 
constitutional grounding for lawsuits against discriminatory employment and 




acceptance practices.153  However, the enactment of such policies has drawn lawsuits 
from white Americans, including Allan Bakke, who feel that minority set-asides, 
preferences, or affirmative hiring of minorities discriminate against them on the basis 
of race.154   
Johnson took federal measures to encourage growth from seeds of affirmative 
action approaches planted in the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  He did so in the form of 
Executive Order 11246, which expressed the government’s commitment to promote 
“equal employment opportunity” in agencies receiving federal government 
contracts.155  Although order did not endorse numerical goals or timetables 
specifically, the Labor Department’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), 
began in 1965 requiring bidders for federal contracts to submit affirmative action 
plans.156  Further testing the line of the “no quota” section of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, the OFCC in 1967 developed a series of numerical goals for construction 
contractors in several cities, including Philadelphia.  Experiments with city-based 
affirmative action plans never left the ground or quickly died.  However, the proposal 
for the Philadelphia Plan held clearer goals and strict enforcement, including the 
withholding of contracts until minority hiring was guaranteed, and was later revived 
under President Nixon as an early success at race-conscious policy.157   
Lyndon Johnson also justified race conscious action in his commencement 
address at Howard University entitled “To Fulfill These Rights.”  Working within the 
accepted ideology of individualized competition providing for the American dream 
by evoking a metaphor of a competition – a race – Johnson articulated the 
justification for affirmative action: 




You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and 
liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, “you are 
free to compete with all the others,” and still justly believe that you have been 
completely fair…To this end equal opportunity is essential, but not enough, 
not enough. Men and women of all races are born with the same range of 
abilities. But ability is not just the product of birth. Ability is stretched or 
stunted by the family that you live with, and the neighborhood you live in—by 
the school you go to and the poverty or the richness of your surroundings. It is 
the product of a hundred unseen forces playing upon the little infant, the child, 
and finally the man.158 
Several Supreme Court cases during the 1960s-70s reflected this push toward 
race-conscious measures. According to Tushnet, “The Court’s long abstention from 
school desegregation cases meant that the Court confronted the choice between the 
anti-discrimination and anti-subordination approaches in a new political 
environment.”159  School districts continued to delay and stifle integration, and in 
Green v. County School Board (1968), the Supreme Court ran out of patience with the 
passivity of school boards’ integration steps, seemingly in direct defiance of Brown v. 
Board II’s mandate to “determine admission to public schools on a nonracial basis” 
and with “all deliberate speed.”160 After a decade of abstention from school 
desegregation cases, the Supreme Court took on Green, a case dealing with a popular 
desegregation plan called the “freedom-of-choice” plan because it allowed students to 
choose which school they would like to attend.161  The Supreme Court concluded that 




the plan perpetuated a dual system, as not a single white student enrolled in the black 
school, and only 15% of black students had chosen the white school.162   
 However, more active steps, such as mandatory busing, “were met with 
hostility and white flight to more rural and suburban neighborhoods.”163  President 
Richard M. Nixon was a vocal opponent of busing, and the White House threatened 
to fire federal officials who continued to urge busing.164  The Supreme Court was 
inconsistent on its support for such direct action, as well.  In Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971), a unanimous Supreme Court decision 
declared that busing was acceptable when the school district’s history revealed 
segregation.165  In addition to the Swann decision, Tushnet asserts that:  
Green in 1968 and Griggs in 1971 were the high points of the Court’s 
commitment to an integrationist or anti-subordination view of equality.  
Analytical difficulties associated with the anti-subordination approach, and a 
political backlash against the more expansive claims of the civil rights 
movement, pushed the Supreme Court, with a new set of members appointed 
by more conservative presidents, to move fairly rapidly to—or back to—the 
anti-discrimination principle.166 
Just three years later, in a 5-4 decision of Milliken v. Bradley (1974), the 
Supreme Court limited busing between districts by invalidating plans to bus students 
between largely black Detroit and its neighboring white suburbs.  Chief Justice 
Warren E. Burger’s opinion argued that, because discrimination within Detroit was 
not the responsibility of the outer districts, those outer districts should not be 
subjected to busing.  In doing so, J. Harvie Wilkinson argues, the Supreme Court 




motivated white flight to the suburbs and, more importantly for affirmative action 
policies, “began to lift from white America responsibility for the ghetto.  Milliken v. 
Bradley was an act of absolution.  Segregated Detroit schools were not the suburbs’ 
creation and thus not their burden.”167 
Integrationist strategies found their limits in non-legal arguments, as well, 
stemming from the increasingly vocal critique of the underlying assumptions that 
supported integrationist arguments.  Peller notes the importance of recognizing not 
only the rhetorical strategy of integrationist arguments, but also their ideological 
functions:  “Integrationist assumptions do not manifest themselves solely in self-
conscious legal and political arguments about race, but instead provide the filter for 
how we experience, perceive, and construct a broad range of social relations and 
institutional practices.”168  Some assumptions about the merits of integration – 
including the idea that non-integrated cultures would be saved or improved by their 
proximity to an idealized white culture – were a target of critiques by proponents of 
race consciousness as the basis for sound educational policy.169  Thus, race-
consciousness also came as a reaction to the culture-deficiency model of social-
scientific educational research forwarded in the 1950s, tainted with the underlying 
assumptions that black culture was detrimental to black children, and that increased 
interaction with white culture would save them.170  Stokely Carmichael targeted this 
assumption, proclaiming that “‘integration’ also means that black people must give up 
their identity, deny their heritage. . . .  The fact is that integration, as traditionally 
articulated, would abolish the black community.”171  In his “Black Power” speech 
delivered at Berkeley, he offered a critique of the focus on universities as the source 




of racial uplift: 
Are we willing to be concerned about the black people who will never get to 
Berkeley, who will never get to Harvard, and cannot get an education, so 
you’ll never get a chance to rub shoulders with them and say, “Well, he’s 
almost as good as we are; he’s not like the others?” The question is, “How can 
white society begin to move to see black people as human beings?”  I am 
black, therefore I am; not that I am black and I must go to college to prove 
myself. I am black, therefore I am.172 
 The widest liberal response to the legal limits of colorblind ideology to 
abolish discrimination has been a return to the merits of cultural pluralism, 
contemporarily seen in the appreciation of diversity. Nathan Glazer has called 
attention to “the ways in which all Americans—regardless of race, religion, political 
affiliation, lifestyle, or moral orientation—have come to speak the language of 
tolerance and respect for cultural diversity in the contemporary, post-civil rights 
era.”173  Parrillo argues that late-twentieth century advocacy for multiculturalism, 
formerly cultural pluralism, is a positively connotated term “publicly cloaked in the 
romanticism of the melting pot myth by assimilationists…depicted in 20th-century 
analysis as a temporary social phenomenon involving convergent ethnic 
subcultures.”174   
The justificatory roots of diversity are both complimentary and at odds with 
integrationist arguments.  Integrationist arguments rely on recognition of 
discrimination as the reason for segregation and the disparate effects of segregation 
on the groups considered “inferior,” whereas diversity arguments confer the positive 




effects of racial integration in schools on whites and on American society as a whole.  
Unlike integrationist arguments, the value of diversity comes from its race-
consciousness and the values that different world-views and life experiences might 
bring to the communal table.  Yet diversity confers only an individual benefit, not a 
collective one.  Deprived of its justification in the history of group discrimination, 
Peller’s notion of the simultaneously voluntary and involuntary aspects of group 
membership is lost in the race-as-one-factor approach. 
The Brown decision validated arguments that combined the rejection of 
segregation as a discriminatory practice with the potential for educational benefits for 
all.  In fact, Liu argues that the “conception of student diversity as an educational 
resource [found in Brown v. Board] clearly animates Justice Powell’s articulation of 
the diversity rationale in Bakke.”175  Powell had a history of combining the two before 
Bakke, as well, as is seen in his concurring opinion in a 1973 desegregation case, 
affirming the school boards’ right to “exceed minimal constitutional standards” with a 
goal of “promoting the values of an integrated school experience.”176  Yet, in legal 
policy and doctrine:  
there are few moments when diversity for diversity sake, the protection of 
difference, has been the overriding goal.  Generally, color blindness, gender 
blindness, blindness to differences of sexual preference—these have been the 
beacons of our law.  Law has been unable or unwilling to foster activity a 
society in which cultural pluralism and identity politics could flourish.177   
Rather than relying on an integrationist ideal recognizing the legacy of and 
continuing effects of racism, Powell’s articulation of diversity in Bakke limited the 




consideration of race to an educational benefit.178  Some argue that abandoning 
integration as an argument may a strategic, as opposed to ideological, shift on 
Powell’s part:  because the Court continued to uphold the de jure/de facto segregation 
categories, continuing the need to prove active segregationist policies or intents, 
Powell made the move to diversity, with integrationist motives warranting his 
claim.179  This point notwithstanding, the diversity argument Powell set forth in 
Bakke limit the scope of considering race while extending the beneficiaries to whites 
as well as those who have been discriminated against, and making diversity as much 
more about utilitarian goals than moral obligation.180  As Anderson notes, “Powell's 
detachment of the diversity argument from explicit concerns of racial justice had 
enormous cultural consequences.”181 
Indeed, critics of the turn toward diversity argue that it has all of the agency-
centered arguments on individual rights and their correlative assumptions – that we 
are free to choose our group identities – which early twentieth century assimilationist 
discourses carried.  An appreciation of diverse cultures as an end goal “has diverted 
attention away from more fundamental structural problems of racism and social 
inequality that have landed disproportionately and unjustly on African Americans.”182  
A century removed from the institution of slavery, with the legal protection of equal 
rights written into the Constitution and supported by the Civil Rights Acts of the 
1960s, the naturalized assumptions of individual agency paired with liberal political 
ideology encourage a line of reasoning concluding that racial discrimination must 
occur on the conscious level, rather than the result of systematic social institutional 
privilege.183  If an individual does not feel overtly racist sentiments, then (s)he 




concludes that (s)he is not part of a racist system, and thus should not be punished for 
the misfortunes of others.  A focus on appreciation, rather than existing inequities, 
removes the group orientation that has often led to social change, and equalizes all 
cultures – again, ignoring historical, institutional, or structural disparities between 
groups. 
Critics of race consciousness are equally as adamant, and arguments about the 
merits of assimilation and concerns about the divisive effects of celebrating cultural 
differences are central to these critiques.  The founders celebrated the democratic 
qualities of setting faction against faction in the free market of ideas, and yet were 
concerned about the possibility of excessive infighting and group affiliations that 
overshadowed a sense of national community.184  Thus, Beasley argues, “the founders 
did not choose to embrace pluralism as much as they decided to try to control its 
excesses.”185  Similarly, some opponents of affirmative action do so under the 
argument that the focus on race balkanizes the country, forces its citizens to focus on 
difference rather than similarities, and becomes problematic when we must decide 
which races should be given preferential treatment.  David A. Hollinger’s book 
Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism exemplifies this argument when he 
frames multiculturalism as move entrenching a “rigid, fixed idea of identity” and 
argues for favoring “voluntary over involuntary affiliations.”186  In a similar vein, the 
Supreme Court has adopted the policy of treating with a high level of suspicion any 
law or policy that employs race as a category – a treatment that regards race 
consciousness as inherently problematic, and sets a high bar for justifying its use.187  
Race-conscious measures also evoke the argument of “reverse discrimination,” 




charging that affirmative action takes the same discriminatory practices used against 
African Americans, Asian Americans, Native Americans, Jews, and others in the past 
and now discriminates against Whites.188   
These series of assumptions are recurrent in discourses surrounding Bakke. 
Philip F. Rubio asserts that “the notion of ‘individual versus group rights’ has become 
the cornerstone of conservative arguments against affirmative action.”189  The 
lawsuit’s justificatory grounding in the denial of equal opportunity assumes that 
individual equality and opportunity pre-existed the application process, thus making 
affirmative action programs such as that of UC-Davis violative of individual rights.  
The affirmation of such an argument by the courts on the grounds that UC-Davis had 
never been shown to be overtly discriminatory toward the groups they had targeted 
validates the value of conscious agency at the expense of larger socially instantiated 
and lingering discrimination.  Additionally, some opponents of affirmative action 
claim that such programs abandon individualism as the unit of concern, and replace it 
with groups of people organized by stereotype.190  As Morris B. Abram remarks, 
meritocracy “rewards the individual for attainment and avoids patronage and spoils 
systems.”191 
Another structural problem masked in educational diversity arguments 
includes the focus on Ivy League universities as the model for educational diversity; 
as Carmichael pointed out, one should not have to attend Harvard in order to prove 
oneself worthy.  Moreover, Marcia G. Synnott argues that affirmative action policies 
have “proved to be a boon for the recruitment of black and other minority students at 
many of the nation’s most prestigious private and flagship state universities,” who 




can achieve a diversity of ethnic and racial backgrounds without the diversity of 
economic incomes that has been the most consistent signal of institutional racism.192  
Harvard, for instance, “can devote considerable resources to admissions decisions and 
can plausibly argue that it compares each applicant against every other applicant from 
a number of perspectives.”193  Justice Powell’s diversity rationale heavily relied on 
the arguments offered in the amici curiae brief submitted by Columbia, Harvard, 
Stanford, and the University of Pennsylvania, institutions which, because of their 
prestige, high standards, and coffers, can pull the highest score earners from all racial, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, and economic backgrounds without having to consider the 
structural differences that constrain the full academic potential of economically and 
socially disadvantaged groups.194  
Moreover, the differences between the nationalist and integrationist 
approaches to race relations, which during the late 1960s and early 1970s were 
coming to a crucial juncture.195 “At that time,” argues Peller, “black nationalism 
arguably had overtaken integrationism as the dominant ideology of racial liberation 
among African-Americans, while virtually all liberal and progressive whites 
embraced a theory of integration as the ultimate definition of racial justice.”196 
Integration became part of a larger ideological structure committed to impersonality 
and objectivity, justified through a meritocratic “narrative of legitimation, a language 
for concluding that particular social practices are fair because they are objective and 
unbiased.”197  This meritocratic legitimation helped to bring about the increasing 
professionalization of education, wherein “graduate schools teaching expertly tested 




methods of instruction replace traditional training of teachers through contact with 
older faculty.”198 According to Peller: 
Centralism and professionalism became responsive images to the liberal 
perception of the previous problems with education – the idea that localism 
and parochialism compromised neutrality and objectivity.  And the underlying 
assumption was that once public education eradicated the influences of 
locality and bias, it would achieve a neutral, acultural form that, precisely 
because of its impersonality, would treat everyone alike.199 
The binding of integration to professional objectivity and meritocracy 
provided a strong argument against special admissions policies such as the one at UC-
Davis.  If race was an irrelevant category, then how could it be used to choose some 
students over others? An additional problem involved applying integration arguments 
– which had long been the successful argument for diversifying schools – to higher 
education.  Integrationists had not previously needed to tackle counter-arguments 
about the scarcity of resources that became central to discussions about affirmative 
action policies in graduate-level professional schools, most recently in Justice 
Douglas’s dissent from the DeFunis v. Odegaard opinion, Bakke’s predecessor.200  
Moreover, the integrationist arguments that had been radical at the turn of the 
century, and progressive in the 1950s, was becoming a conservative platform, 
dissociated with an understanding of the historical notions of race that justified race-
consciousness. Placed against meritocratic arguments about individual hard work and 
test scores, proponents of race consciousness not only faced the principle of scarcity: 
they also faced an epistemology that privileged quantitative tests – with the scientific 




neutrality that they evoked – over qualitative, or even historical, factors.  As with all 
Supreme Court rhetoric, these ideological tensions are worked against the particular 
“facts” and circumstances of the individual case at hand, although the rhetorical 
implications extend well beyond the case, both into longer-standing legal precedents 
and into public discourse about race, merit, and educational goals. 
Early Legal Challenges to Affirmative Action Policies 
The Supreme Court took a long break from issues of race and education after 
the landmark Brown v. Board of Education (1954), and its implementation-oriented 
partner, Brown II (1955). When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bakke, both 
the Court and the political landscape had changed. 201  Organized pressure such as the 
legal campaigns launched by the NAACP saw a confluence of governmental, legal, 
and constitutional efforts to remedy the effects of discrimination on minority groups 
in the 1960s.  These efforts included the Civil Rights Act of 1964, invigorated 
readings of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and executive orders and the 
agencies that implemented them, including the Department of Labor, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW).  The documents most directly under question in 
Bakke were the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fourteenth Amendment, but they 
were by no means the exclusive focus of the amicus briefs.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment had become a touchstone for equal rights litigation, both in efforts to 
integrate schools and businesses and efforts to combat the race-conscious policies 
intended to make integration a reality.  President Johnson’s Executive Order 11246, 
the Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance, the Department of 




Health, Education, and Welfare, the Fourteenth Amendment (and occasionally the 
Thirteenth Amendment), as well was previous Supreme Court and circuit court 
decisions were referenced repeatedly in the Bakke briefs. 
As would be noted by the Regents in their briefs for Bakke, circuit courts had 
on several occasions affirmed the voluntary use of affirmative action policies, and 
each of these cases had been denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court as recently 
as 1971, with the 8th Circuit Court’s decision in Carter v. Gallagher.202  In US v. 
Jefferson Country Board of Education (1966), the 5th Circuit condemned the 
bifurcation of desegregation and integration arguments, holding that race-neutral 
freedom-of-choice school desegregation plans did not equal desegregation.  Rather, 
schools must go beyond neutrality and take affirmative steps to mix students of 
different races, the outcome of which “is a high priority educational goal.”203 
Furthermore, Judge John Minor Wisdom argued against the “narrow reading” of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that construed it solely as an individual right, a dictum first 
articulated in Briggs v. Elliott (1952):  
Segregation is a group phenomenon. Although the effects of discrimination 
are felt by each member of the group, any discriminatory practice is directed 
against the group as a unit and against individuals only as their connection 
with the group involves anti-group action…[As] a group-wrong…the mode of 
redress must be group-wide to be adequate.204    
In Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency (1968), the 2nd Circuit Court of 
Appeals concluded that:  




classification by race…is something which the Constitution usually forbids, 
not because it is inevitably an impermissible classification, but because it is 
one which…has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial inequality. 
Where it is drawn for the purpose of achieving equality it will be allowed, and 
to the extent that it is necessary to avoid unequal treatment by race, it will be 
required.205  
The immediate predecessor to the Bakke case was DeFunis v. Odegaard 
(1974), and it was the first Supreme Court case to address the practice of affirmative 
action in higher education.206  Marco DeFunis was twice rejected to the University of 
Washington law school, which at that time had a policy of considering separately 
African American, Hispanic American, Native American, and Filipino American 
applications.  The school placed different weights on undergraduate grades and 
compared the minority applicants to each other rather than the entire pool, with the 
goal of between 15 to 20 percent minority student admittees.207  DeFunis filed suit, 
claiming that the law school’s racial preference system violated his rights under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and constituted “reverse 
discrimination.”  During this time, however, a lower court had ordered the law school 
to admit DeFunis, and he planned to graduate in 1974.  Amid both interest in the case 
and concern that they would appear avoidant if they did not take it, the Supreme 
Court granted the case and heard oral arguments.208  However, by the time oral 
arguments were made, DeFunis was in his last semester of law school.  A majority of 
the court declared the case moot, amid strong dissents from four of its members, who 




argued that DeFunis’ situation was not specific to him, but reflected a larger 
constitutional issue that would need to be addressed at some point. 
In 1973 Allan Bakke, a 32-year-old white male Vietnam veteran and 
mechanical engineer, was rejected to the eleven medical schools to which he applied.  
He applied again to University of California at Davis (UC-Davis) in 1974.  UC-Davis 
interviewed him both years, but rejected him both times.  Bakke’s test scores and 
grade point average fell within the range of those accepted to UC-Davis, although his 
interview scores put him out of the upper range.  At the time that Bakke was 
applying, the UC-Davis medical school had decided that the best way to increase the 
number of minority students admitted was to reserve sixteen of the 100 available 
seats for economically or educationally disadvantaged students.  Their stated policy 
was that economically disadvantaged whites met this category, although none of the 
272 whites who applied under the program was admitted during the time the dual-
admission program existed.  Both white and minority applicants with better and 
worse scores than Bakke were admitted to the university.209   
After Bakke appealed unsuccessfully to the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare – the preliminary process for alleging discrimination at the time – 
Bakke’s lawyer Reynold Colvin brought suit in the summer of 1974 with the Yolo 
County Superior Court.  In his complaint to the Yolo County Superior court, Bakke 
claimed that he “was and is in all respects duly qualified for admission to said 
Medical School and the sole reason his applications were rejected was on account of 
his race, to-wit, Caucasian or white, and not for reasons applicable to persons of 
every race.”210  The suit requested that Bakke be admitted to the UC-Davis medical 




school because the dual-admission program was in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, article I, section 21 of the California 
Constitution, and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; in simpler terms, the special 
admissions program denied him equal protection under law.  
UC-Davis was defended by the general counsel for the University of 
California, a man named Donald L. Reidhaar whom had previously expressed doubt 
about the constitutionality of the program.211  On behalf of the Regents, Reidhaar 
argued in a brief to the Yolo County Superior Court that “the special admissions 
program does not violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and, indeed, the 
regulations issued under that Act specifically permit giving special consideration to 
minority group members in admissions for the purpose of increasing their 
participation in educational programs.”212  
The Yolo County Superior Court found that the UC-Davis admissions 
program constituted a racial quota and was thus violated state and U.S. constitutions 
and of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.  The judgment fell short of ordering Bakke 
admitted, however.   For this reason, both Bakke and the Regents appealed the ruling 
to the California Supreme Court.  In September 1976, the state Supreme Court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision six-to-one, citing the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause, which the majority found to apply to any person, regardless 
of color.  They also ordered the UC-Davis prove that Bakke would not have been 
admitted without the special program: otherwise, they were required to admit him.  
The Regents stipulated that they could not prove that Bakke would not have been 
admitted had there been no special admissions program, although they had offered 




pages of deposition testimony from the trial court arguing otherwise.  They claim to 
have stipulated this so that, if they lost, they would not have to go back to trial court – 
instead, they could take the case directly to the Supreme Court, where the 
constitutionality of the program altogether would be decided.213  
Writing for the majority opinion, Justice Stanley Mosk argued that the 
Regents had set up a false dichotomy in its defense of the UC-Davis program instead 
of working to coming up with a nuanced solution to the racial disparities seen in the 
admissions system; that any special program should be based on race-neutral 
disadvantage, unless the university had a history of discrimination, which UC-Davis 
did not attempt to prove; and finally, that the precedents offered by UC-Davis were 
not persuasive, because they were based on cases wherein prior discrimination had 
been an issue. Wrote Mosk, “the University is not required to choose between a 
racially neutral admission standard applied strictly according to grade point averages 
and test scores, and a standard which accords preferences to minorities because of 
their race.”214  Moreover, argued Mosk, there was nothing constraining UC-Davis to 
use the quantitative measures that were keeping minority group members out; they 
can set their own definition of “qualified”: 
While minority applicants may have lower grade point averages and test 
scores than others, we are aware of no rule of law which requires the 
University to afford determinative weight in admissions to these quantitative 
factors.  In practice, colleges and universities generally consider matters other 
than strict numerical ranking in admission decisions.215 




However, an applicant, no matter what his race, “had a constitutional right to have his 
application considered on its individual merits in a racially neutral manner,” 
concluded Mosk, citing language from DeFunis.216  
 The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Mathew Tobriner, also serves as an 
effective summary of most amicus brief arguments supporting the Regents.  In his 
dissent, Tobriner evoked the difference between invidious and benign racial 
classifications, arguing that while institutions found guilty of past discrimination 
might be required to adopt benign remedial programs based on racial classifications, 
there is nothing preventing an institution from voluntarily doing so in the absence of 
such proof.217  The majority’s argument that the UC-Davis program is constitutionally 
suspect is “is not supported by (1) existing case law, (2) the history and purpose of 
the Fourteenth Amendment or (3) the jurisprudential rationale justifying strict judicial 
review,” summarized Tobriner.218  
 Moreover, the educational goals of a diverse student body benefiting society 
carried more weight for Justice Tobriner than did a colorblind – and thus white – 
student body with the highest test scores: 
In implementing the special admission program at issue here, the medical 
school determined that in light of the contemporary needs of the medical 
profession and of society generally, the attainment of a racially integrated, 
diverse medical school student body, made up of qualified students of all 
races, is more important than the perpetuation of a segregated medical school 
composed of students with the highest objective academic credentials.219 




Tobriner also pointed out the irony of drawing the line on preferential 
admissions at race, a line that in his interpretation the Fourteenth Amendment had 
attempted to erase: 
To date, courts have always respected a college or professional school’s 
determination that the educational benefits of a diverse student body justify a 
departure from adherence to strict objective academic credentials for a 
particular group of applicants; such ‘preferential’ policies have perhaps most 
commonly been adopted to promote geographic diversity, but similar 
admission preferences have regularly been employed to serve less compelling 
interests, for example to give preference to an applicant’s athletic ability or to 
his relationship to an alumnus or institutional benefactor…There is, indeed, a 
very sad irony to the fact that the first admission program aimed at promoting 
diversity ever to be struck down under the Fourteenth Amendment is the 
program most consonant with the underlying purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.220  
Tobriner cited Supreme Court decisions recognizing the legacy of 
discrimination on the disadvantage minority students face in standardized educational 
tests, concluding that such findings show the active discrimination by the institution 
implementing the program is unnecessary.221  Finally, Tobriner argued that, by 
stretching beyond the question of what is constitutionally permissible into judgment 
about whether or not the judges thought the policy would be effective, the majority 
had overstepped its bounds.  In the early strains of what would become the “academic 
freedom” foundation of Powell’s argument, Tobriner found that “it is the educational 




authorities, not the courts, that are empowered to render policy judgments. The very 
difference of opinion among fair-minded and responsible educators and scholars 
suggests that policy decisions in this area should be left to the discretion of individual 
educational institutions.”222 
 The Board of Regents of the University of California appealed the ruling to 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  Their question offered to the Supreme Court was whether 
the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution forbids universities from creating 
limited admissions programs to help those minorities groups whom the university 
considered to be affected by decades of discrimination in an attempt to remedy said 
discrimination.  Bakke’s lawyer petitioned the Court to deny certiorari, claiming that 
it was of no interest to them because the lower court had decided correctly, because 
the alleged conflict between the California Supreme Court and other state Courts did 
not warrant Supreme Court attention, and because no one was denied their 
constitutional rights under the California Supreme Court’s decision.223  Meanwhile, 
the laws, precedents, amendments, and policies referenced in the early stages of 
Bakke became crucial sources of authority for those appealing to the Supreme Court, 
and provided a labyrinth of potential avenues down which the amici and justices 
could wander. 
President Johnson’s Executive Order 11246, for instance, was “conceived in 
the belief that positive (‘affirmative’) actions were needed, in addition to 
nondiscrimination, in order to prevent indefinite perpetuation of inequalities caused 
by past discrimination” by requiring equal employment opportunity in agencies 
receiving federal government contracts.224  This was a crucial shift in the justification 




of race conscious policies, because it moved from assurances and enforcement of 
non-discrimination – with specific remedies tailored to provable acts of 
discrimination – to attempts to remedy the structural effects of discrimination by 
affirmatively recruiting and hiring minority group members.  Although the order did 
not endorse numerical goals or timetables specifically, the Labor Department’s Office 
of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) began in 1965 requiring bidders for federal 
contracts to submit affirmative action plans.225  The Department of Labor’s Revised 
Order Number 4 governed employment practices in industry and higher education. 
A ruling upholding an accusation of reverse discrimination would have 
broader ramifications on other affirmative action programs.  It was with this concern 
in mind that the Equal Employment Advisory Council (EEAC) asked that the 
Supreme Court in their amicus brief to give guidance for those “who must reconcile 
affirmative action requirements with potential reverse discrimination liability.”226 A 
non-profit organization established in 1976 to aid private employers and trade and 
industry associations in negotiating governmental non-discrimination regulations and 
to build affirmative action plans, the EEAC also serves as a liaison between private 
organizations, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (established by 
requirement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), and the Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance.  The EEAC argued that court decisions and federal regulations, 
including Executive Order 11246, compel affirmative action programs where 
underrepesentation exists, regardless of the cause. Moreover, specific goals and 
timetables of the sort maligned by Bakke were required in order to avoid severe 
sanctions.  In their brief, the EEAC requested that: 




the Court…annunciate in its decision in the case a rule that, as a general 
matter, a defendant in a ‘reverse discrimination’ suit will not be held liable to 
nonminority or male claimants if: a) its affirmative action plan was adopted in 
a good faith attempt to comply with the requirements of Title VII, Executive 
Order 11246, a consent decree or other court of agency requirements, or b) its 
actions in implementing the plan were reasonably related to these good faith 
objectives.227  
Indeed, as the Bakke case was being considered by the Supreme Court, the EEOC 
proposed new rules in 1977 that would “give employers protection from reverse 
discrimination charges filed with EEOC, if they had Affirmative Action plans that 
passed the agency’s criteria for reasonability.”228  
In his dissent from the California Supreme Court’s decision in Bakke, Judge 
Tobriner agreed that Executive Order 11246 permits the use of affirmative action 
without a history of discrimination at that institution, and that precedent supports this 
interpretation:  “…the “Executive Order’ cases upholding federally compelled 
‘affirmative action’ employment programs for government contractors, courts have 
sanctioned the coercive implementation of benign racial classification schemes in the 
absence of any showing that a particular employer has engaged in racial 
discrimination in the past.”229  
A more direct overseer of affirmative action in higher education was the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the original body to which 
Bakke appealed after his rejections from UC-Davis.  HEW had previously issued 
regulations on how to implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the section 




in question in Bakke. The section under question reads: “No person in the United 
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under ay 
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.”230  However, as the 
Regents argued to the Yolo County Superior Court: “implementing regulations 
issued….by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare provide that recipients 
of federal financial assistance, such as the University of California, ‘may properly 
give special consideration to race, color or national origin to make the benefits of its 
program more widely available…’.”231 The regulations stated that “even in the 
absence of such prior discrimination a recipient in administering a program may take 
affirmative action to overcome the effects and conditions which resulted in limiting 
participation by persons of a particular race, color, or national origin.”232  More 
importantly, argued the Regents, HEW’s regulations specifically stated that:  
the assurance required by this section shall extend to admission 
practices…with respect to an institution of higher education, hospital, or any 
other institution, insofar as the assurance relates to the institution's practices 
with respect to admission or other treatment of individuals as students…of the 
institution or to the opportunity to participate in the provision of services or 
other benefits to such individuals.233  
In the few years between the DeFunis and Bakke cases, other contextual and 
legal factors worked in Bakke’s favor.  Worsening economic conditions made 
graduate schools more appealing, which in turn made competition fiercer.234  
Between 1968 and 1976, the unemployment rate for young, college-educated 




Americans rose from one to three percent.235  The middle class felt poorer, making 
arguments about white privilege less sympathetic.  Amidst the economic downturn, 
federal funds to higher education were increasing – as were race conscious 
admissions programs.  At the time of DeFunis, the Supreme Court had yet to decide 
the question of whether whites were protected by antidiscrimination laws under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  But in 1976, they held in McDonald v. Sante Fe 
Trail Transportation Co. – an employment case not directly challenging affirmative 
action policies – that all victims of racial discrimination were protected, including 
whites.236  Thus, affirmative action programs were finding federal support at the same 
time that professional job markets became more unstable, and when courts were more 
receptive to discrimination claims made by whites.   
Conclusion 
 
Although the educational value of diversity was first legitimated by the 
Supreme Court in the twentieth century, educators in the nineteenth century began 
reaching out to children of new immigrants, members of religious minorities, and, in 
smaller numbers, African Americans.237  Because immigration has been both a 
necessity and a commitment that the United States has made, a corollary appreciation 
of cultural diversity has long been a strategic and ideological response.  Likewise, 
because pluralism has long been a part of the American political system, working 
against class systems in order to protect multiple interests, pluralist arguments carry 
strong ideological weight.  At the same time, the primacy of individual rights has 
been seen both as a promise to achieve gains with hard work, and as a protection 
against disparate group treatment, especially when those group associations are 




involuntary.  For instance, Justice Brennan argued in his opinion against Bakke that 
“we cannot let color blindness become myopia that masks the reality that many 
‘created equal’ have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and 
by their fellow citizens.”238   
Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny argue that “creative political action is 
required to transform a segmented and disunited population into a coherent 
nationality, and though potential communities of this kind may clearly precede such 
interventions (so that they are rarely interventions in a vacuum), the interventions 
remain responsible for combining the materials into a larger collectivity.”239  The 
Supreme Court, thus, intervenes when called upon to creatively combine the nation’s 
multiple interests, such as colorblindness and race consciousness, individualism and 
collectivity.  As Paul A. Freund argues: 
It is an awesome mission, reflecting the concern for the Framers and the 
members of the first Congress for maintaining the rule of law and the 
supremacy of the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it, and manifesting 
a faith that, as a multiplicity of interests would diffuse the conflicts bound to 
persist in the Union, structured institutions and procedures for adjudication 
would domesticate them.240  
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Chapter Three:  
The Rhetorical Environments of Bakke 
 
While law functions on one level to reconcile differences among competing 
interests in society, its form and content are influenced, on another, by social 
demands made on the legal system by various interest groups.  The prevailing 
form of legal thought, then, reflects the interplay between the legal system and 
the broader institutional order.1 
In the same year as Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the Supreme Court 
voted on a rule that increased the difficulty for submitting amicus curiae, or “friends 
of the court,” briefs.  The number of amicus briefs had increased dramatically in the 
early twentieth century, as organized interest groups – both private and governmental 
– increasingly pursued social change through the legal process.2  The habit, combined 
with an increased workload, had come to annoy some of the justices, and in 1949 they 
implemented a rule, formalized in the 1954 vote, that required either the consent of 
the parties to the case or an appeal to the Supreme Court in order to file a brief.  To 
this rule, Justice Black dissented: “I have never favored the almost insuperable 
obstacle of rules put in the way of briefs sought to be filed by persons other than the 
actual litigants.  Most of the cases before this Court involve matters that affect far 
more than the immediate record parties. I think the public interest and judicial 
administration would be better served by relaxing rather than tightening the rule 
against the amicus curiae briefs.”3  




If the public interest is served by the submission of amicus briefs, then the 
Bakke case served the public well, with a record-breaking 58 briefs filed.  By 1977, 
when Bakke reached the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General had relaxed the 1954 
rules on granting access via amicus briefs.  The number and length of briefs reveals a 
pattern that Samuel Krislov claims that “mirrors the change in tactics and structure of 
interest articulation in American politics as a whole that occurred during the latter 
quarter of the nineteenth century.”4  The late nineteenth century, argues Krislov, 
“…saw a transformation of dominant modes of interest activity.  The emphasis 
shifted from personal, face-to-face contacts…to impersonal, organized, and 
systematic, bureaucratically undertaken and oriented activity.”5 
Many disparate interests were involved in Bakke, in part because the central 
issue – voluntary affirmative action programs in higher education – the Supreme 
Court had thus far avoided.  Given the prevalence of the practice, mandated by 
executive orders and federal contracting guidelines for federal employees, the social 
and political pressures for racial equality of the 1960s and 1970s, the drastically 
increasing applications to graduate schools, and conservative backlash against race-
conscious policies, Bakke symbolized a convergence of questions about scarcity, 
fairness, qualifications, competition and representation. Allan P. Sindler summarizes 
the interest in the case: 
Lacking any solid or reliable body of precedent for its justification, 
affirmative action was, as one observer aptly put it, ‘a fragile commodity’ that 
had ‘a sort of tenuous existence between the lines of the Constitution.’ Its 
programs had expanded so rapidly within a decade that authoritative judicial 




resolution of the several disputes it provoked inevitably had lagged well 
behind. Few definitive lines had been established between what was 
constitutionally permissible in the generic name of affirmative action and 
what was impermissible.  As a consequence, Bakke acted as a magnet for all 
disputants in the larger controversy, who took the opportunity to press on the 
Court widely divergent views of where those lines should be drawn.6 
Justice Powell’s evocation of diversity as the primary principle justifying 
affirmative action can be better understood by examining its inventional topoi, the 
materials and arguments at his disposal as he crafted the final opinion.  Discourse 
about racial justice has oscillated between the rhetorics of integration and of race 
consciousness, and the discourse of the 1950s and 1960s had been among the most 
heated.  The conundrum befalling the Supreme Court, then, was to reconcile 
government led and sometimes required affirmative action policies with the publicly 
re-emerging conservative focus on individual competition, a value consistently 
privileged by the Supreme Court. 
The particular subject around which the Bakke case centered – graduate 
school admissions – brought into high relief those tensions.  First, education had long 
been the battle ground for racial equality for proponents of both colorblindness and 
race consciousness.  The legal system had been a primary scene of that battle, and the 
Supreme Court had often acknowledged the special role of education in the United 
States.  Yet in Bakke, the education under question was specialized, highly 
competitive professional education, a circumstance that brought arguments about 
scarcity and competition to the forefront.  Graduate schools were increasingly seen as 




the ticket to an upper middle-class life in an increasingly professionalized American 
workforce, and the results-oriented degree worked against the idealistic educating-
for-citizenry arguments of the desegregation cases. Third, the health disparities 
between white and racial minority communities, and correlationally between affluent-
to-middle class and poor communities, made the structural inequities discussed in the 
1968 Kerner report from the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 
painfully clear.7  Structural inequities are not easily rectified, however, and are hard 
to “prove” using the individual discrimination standards set up by anti-discrimination 
policies.  Moreover, the results-oriented policies that had been the main 
counterweight to these structural inequalities were losing favor against an economic 
downturn, wherein middle-class whites saw the “results” of affirmative action 
policies in increased competition for jobs and college admissions.  
 The amicus briefs in Bakke were textual products of this larger rhetorical 
environment, reflecting institutional and individual, insider and outsider, legal and 
political perspectives on the fairness of affirmative action.  The dominant issues of 
the Bakke case brought forth conflicts much broader and older than the 
constitutionality of affirmative action in higher education: it confronted the tension 
between the rights of the individual and the state’s pursuit of the common good.  
Using the particulars of the UC-Davis program as a starting point, these briefs spoke 
from particular subjectivities in the language of the law, performing the democratic 
problem within the contextual specifics of the case and in the argumentative forms of 
the law.   




This chapter traces the arguments offered in these briefs, detailing the 
rhetorical environment in which Powell’s particular articulation of the meaning and 
value of race developed.  It examines how the social conditions and ideologies 
comprising the rhetorical environment were reflected in the legal arguments of the 
amicus briefs from various parties of interest.  As John Lucaites argues, “The 
problem of legal interpretation is not…a matter of searching for the theoretical 
foundations of meaning, but is instead a matter of observing the way(s) in which 
meaning is negotiated by socially, politically, and ideologically interested speakers 
and audiences in particular and contingent circumstances.”8  As such, this chapter 
frames the major arguments with the social, political, and ideological forces that the 
arguments rely upon. 
Because legal opinions, as with other forms of public address, occur as texts-
in-context, their meanings are drawn from – or even comprised of – their 
surroundings, Marouf Hasian Jr. argues that scholars should “should treat legal 
formations as ‘fragments’ that allow critics to trace discursive reconfigurations that 
are adapted to changing social conditions…constitutional artifacts are simply 
containers of meaning, that can have either expansive or restrictive readings.”9  Thus, 
as the amici forward legalistic arguments about the appropriate statutory and 
constitutional bases for decisions, the level of scrutiny that race-conscious policies 
merit, the right to compete for public university spaces, and the freedoms and 
responsibilities that university administrators have in deciding the make-up of their 
student bodies, they are doing more than applying different legal theories to the same 




information:  they are reading acceptable legal justifications through competing 
lenses of social realities. 
Ideologies are reflected in legal arguments via linguistic manifestations in 
legal doctrine, constructions of race, articulations of the relationship between state 
and institutions, and the construction of the individual in his/her relationship to 
society.10  Alan Hunt argues that the power of ideology is drawn from “its ability to 
connect and combine diverse mental elements (concepts, ideas, etc.) into 
combinations that influence and structure the perception and cognition of social 
agents.”11  The legal positions forwarded by the amici are “containers of meaning,” 
filled with pre-existing beliefs about the relationship between individuals, groups and 
the courts, about the role of race in American society, the value of individual agency, 
and the role of education in social progress.  As Barry Nicholas argues, “no system of 
law can be fully understood in isolation from the history of the society which it serves 
and regulates.”12  
Chapter Two traced several links to equality, including those of liberal 
individualist ideology and race-conscious multiculturalism.  The amicus briefs in 
Bakke reveal further links, within a triad of three overlapping ideological frameworks 
on each side, each giving meaning to their interpretations of laws, policies, and 
precedents.  For those supporting Bakke and opposing the UC-Davis program, the 
appeals to individualism, merit, and colorblindness framed their choices of legal 
authorities, their views of the nature of education, and the unimportance – or harm – 
of racial considerations.  For those supporting the Regents and affirmative action 
programs, the practical and philosophical needs for race-consciousness, the 




educational value of diversity, and the progressive social needs of integrated graduate 
schools enjoined for a historically-oriented conception of race, either seeking to 
remedy racial inequities or extolling the cultural benefits of group categories. 13  The 
focus on individualism and hard work – both consistent with twentieth century 
epistemology and liberal ideology – was met head on with the value of cultural 
pluralism, a value that had waxed and waned in nineteenth-to-twentieth century 
America, amid the particulars of a mid-thirties white male who wanted to be a doctor 
and a medical school looking to keep its student body from being de facto segregated 
due to a flood of medical school applicants.  
Functions of Amicus Briefs 
Amicus briefs have become a valuable step in the Supreme Court justices’ 
rhetorical invention process.  The function of these briefs also serves as a complement 
to the primary concerns of the Bakke case, because they highlight the complexities of 
judicial review under a federal system: a review process that mediates conflicting 
state and national interests as well as conflicting private suits with constitutional 
ramifications. According to Krislov, “the creation of a complex federal system meant 
not only that state and national interests were potentially in conflict, but also that an 
even greater number of conflicting public interests were potentially unrepresented in 
the course of private suits.”14  It has become increasingly important under a federal 
system of judicial review that third parties be able to voice their concerns, because 
constitutional disputes often take the form of litigation between private citizens, the 
specifics of which may in turn “shape the constitutional contours of the federal 
system.”15  The ability of such arguments to be submitted to the Supreme Court is one 




of the primary functions of the briefs – to assure that individuals or organizations with 
a stake in the case, but not represented by either party, will be heard.   
Amicus curiae briefs – or “friends of the court” briefs – are an ancient 
practice, traditionally used by neutral third parties to inform judges about issues not 
offered by the two parties.  The Deans of the University of California Law Schools 
took this traditional approach in their brief: 
It is not our purpose to adduce arguments on the merits of the constitutional 
issue presented…that is, we believe, appropriately left to the parties…It is our 
purpose to provide information to the Court, which we believe will be useful 
to it, as to the potential impact of the decision below…We fear that [those 
arguing against certiorari] may not have fully grasped the potential impact of 
the decision below on the admission of minority students to professional 
schools, and in particular, to law schools. As deans of our representative 
schools, we are keenly aware of the potential consequences and we think it is 
our duty to inform the court as best we can.16 
In an attempt to keep within the tradition of neutrality – at least the appearance of 
neutrality – amicus briefs were “authored” by lawyers, with organizational 
“sponsors” supporting the brief.  However, by the 1930s, “the open identification of 
an amicus brief with an organizational sponsor was quite commonplace.”17  Krislov 
concluded about the significance of the move: 
The attribution of a brief to an organization belies the supposedly lawyerlike 
role of the amicus, but realistically embraces and ratified the transformation of 
the actual pattern of behavior and its new function. The amicus is no longer a 




neutral, amorphous embodiment of justice, but an active participant in the 
interest group struggle.18  
Just as collective interests became more commonplace before the Supreme 
Court, so too did more extra-legal arguments within the briefs themselves become 
more frequent.  Briefs grew in length, and offered a variety of social-scientific and 
statistical evidence, as well as articulating the political and social implications of the 
cases.  Briefs were increasingly written in the “Brandeis brief” style.  Named after 
Louis D. Brandeis, who crafted the style in his brief supporting a ten-hour work-day 
limit for women in Oregon in Muller v. Oregon (1908) in his pre-associate justice 
days, his brief was jurisprudentially significant because it offered a host of social and 
economic data as well as official reports in order to justify the law.  Lucius J. Barker 
notes that, “By filing this ‘brief of one hundred and thirteen pages, of which only two 
pages could be construed as strictly legal argument,’ Brandeis wrought significant 
changes in American jurisprudence relative to the kinds of data appropriate for 
judicial decisionmaking.”19 
In keeping with the Brandeis brief style, Michael Selmi notes that one of the 
most striking features of the Bakke briefs is the relative lack of legal argument, 
compared to the overtly political and effects-oriented arguments put forth.20  The 
amicus brief of the Queens Jewish Community Council and the Jewish Rights 
Council lamented this trend when it argued that “current affirmative action programs 
are essentially an outgrowth of some of the curious reasoning indulged by the Court 
in its rational in Brown v. Board of Education,” a decision notable for its use of 
sociological evidence about student self-concept to justify the desegregation of 




schools.21  Such a reliance on sociological and psychological evidence, instead of a 
direct condemnation of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), has led us to the possibility of 
having “our fundamental rights rise, fall, or change along with the latest fashions of 
psychological literature,” argued the Queens Jewish Community Council.22  
Despite the concern about extra-legal arguments, the ability for third parties to 
file their arguments to the Supreme Court is crucial, because as Robert Post asserts, in 
the absence of “an institutional form of agency empowered to speak on behalf of the 
group…the group interests protected by the right must thus be articulated by 
individual members of the ethnic group.  In such circumstances, the absence of 
authoritative institutional presence renders the formulation of group interests highly 
susceptible to official interpretations of the state.” 23 
Ideological Alignments in Bakke 
Several social, political, and legal shifts had occurred in the brief years 
between DeFunis, the earliest higher education case granted certiorari by the Supreme 
Court, and Bakke.  The economic recession worsened, increasing competition in 
graduate schools and making economic arguments about scarcity more prominent and 
more sympathetic.24  The claim of “reverse discrimination” issued by DeFunis and 
unaddressed by the Supreme Court, “hardened opposing positions due to the 
economic recession, the dearth of federal funds for higher education, the questionable 
results of special admissions programs utilizing preferential racial criteria, and the 
increasing realization among white applicants that they too have a right not to be 
discriminated against,” according to Larry Lavinsky.25   




Thus, the Bakke case occurred at a moment in American history where the 
themes most readily embraced by the civil rights movements of the 1960s – those of 
equal opportunity – met with strong obstacles in its enactment in policy and in law.  
The complex social influences of economic downturn, race-conscious legislation and 
policies, increased competition in schools, progressive educational goals, and 
conservative backlash worked within larger ideological frameworks of individualism 
and multiculturalism to form the main arguments about the Bakke case. Those amici 
who argued in favor of Bakke did so using three main arguments, all centering around 
the liberal political ideology privileging the individual as an agent-centered force:  
those of individual rights, of colorblindness (guided by definitions of race that deny 
historical and cultural meanings), and of meritocracy based on quantitative standards.  
Briefs articulating these ideologies read affirmative action and university goals of 
diversity as markers for liberal excess that demean white America and the principle of 
individual agency.  They invoke scientific values of neutrality and testability as 
standards for education, and finds social goals to be onerous to the educational 
process.  To the extent that race need be considered, argue pro-Bakke briefs, all races 
should be treated the same way, and any treatment of individuals with consideration 
of race is discriminatory.  Steeped in a liberal political ideology that pairs a protestant 
work ethic with a strong belief in individual agency, opponents of the Davis program 
believed that individual characteristics constituted the single deciding factor in 
achievement – a belief that discouraged an understanding of collective disadvantage 
because of historical circumstances.26  Race is an irrelevant factor for this mindset, 




because it is a group category, diminishing the primacy of individual agency as the 
motivating factor.27 
Individual, Colorblind Competition   
Three underlying assumptions exist in pro-Bakke arguments, according to 
James F. Scott, including: 1) desegregated schools have led to equal access in the 
educational qualification process; 2) entrance tests are objective and “internally and 
pragmatically valid”; and 3) “societal norms defining ascriptive criteria of mobility 
and intergroup competition have given way to those of achievement and merit.”28  
Taken together, these assumptions comprise the three ideologies that run across most 
pro-Bakke briefs: those of colorblindness, of individualism, and of meritocracy. 
These three ideologies can be unified under what James C. Foster has called 
“proprietary equality,” a concept based on the idea of possessive individualism and 
functioning ideologically because it “unites a ‘realistic’ acceptance of inequality 
based upon the [Hobbesian] equality of human avarice with an ‘idealistic’ blindness 
to inequality resulting from [Lockean] formally equal rights.  These two dimensions 
of liberal-capitalism coexist in ways which, if seldom harmonious, are functionally 
complementary.”29 
 Race-Neutral Treatment.  Many supporters of the California Supreme Court’s 
decision argued the dangers of racial classifications as an affront to individual rights. 
According to colorblind or “race-neutral” proponents, racial classifications are 
irrelevant, foster identity politics at the expense of individualism, engender 
continuing racial animosities, and commit the same errors as past discrimination 
against racial minorities by discriminating against whites.  While some amici evoked 




a direct reading of the “colorblind” metaphor – that justice is blind to race – others 
evoked a more complicated metaphor of a mosaic of colors, each special and 
unidentifiable as a “special” color.  For instance, the amicus brief of the Polish 
American Congress et al. questioned the ability to distinguish between the many 
discriminated-against groups in American history, given the “great mosaic that makes 
up America,” filled with “all kinds of people: farmers, actors, retired persons, 
youngsters, adventurers, settlers, Italian Americans, Mexican Americans, Polish 
Americans, Blacks, White, Orientals and on and on.”30  The justices need not be 
colorblind, argued the amici: for good eyesight sees more than black and white, but 
recognizes nuance. They went on to ask the Supreme Court to provide a historical 
distinction “between a Black being called a ‘Nigger’ and a Polish American being 
called a ‘Pollack’, whether telling a Black or Mexican American he cannot qualify is 
substantially more degrading than telling a Polish American the same thing,” and that 
Polish Americans have no greater stake on the “special categories” claim than “Italian 
Americans, Arab Americans, [and] Jewish Americans just to name a few.”31  If 
justices could not provide a method for differentiating between claims, argued the 
Polish American Congress et al., then they should affirm the lower court’s decision. 
Colorblind proponents also asserted that universities could achieve similar 
social goals through race-neutral admissions measures such as increasing the number 
of student seats and considering the economic disadvantage of the applicants, without 
regard to their race.  The California Supreme Court argued from this premise, 
asserting that the UC-Davis program failed because it was not a necessary and 
exclusive solution to the lack of diversity in schools.32  The university might increase 




the flexibility of its quantitative admissions standards, argued California Supreme 
Court Justice Stanley Mosk, or might “increase minority enrollment by instituting 
aggressive programs to identify, recruit, and provide remedial schooling for 
disadvantaged students of all races who are interests in pursuing a medial career and 
have an evident talent in doing so.”33 
Articulating a notion of race that separates it from any meaningful social 
attributes, the American Federation of Teachers offered similar solutions to Justice 
Mosk’s decision, favoring economically or educationally disadvantaged applicants 
regardless of race, and remedial programs, recruitment, waiving admission fees, and 
increasing student enrollments.  They noted that “racial neutrality does not require 
racial blindness, although it does not permit racial preference.”34  Law school 
applicant Ralph Galliano affirmed non-racial solutions to social goals, conceding that 
“the existence of a properly administered special admissions program is highly 
justified and equally desirable,” while arguing that “its purpose should be to admit 
those promising individuals whose background is of cultural, economic and 
educational difference rather than those members of specific minority groups solely 
because they are members of certain groups regardless of background factors.”35   
Different conceptions of race framed the extent to which amici read both the 
goals of the UC-Davis special admissions program and the laws and amendments 
aimed at regulating the use of race in policy. Legal scholar Ronald Dworkin posits 
that varying interpretations of “legality” come from different ideological ties to other 
values; to the extent that judges synchronically link legality with these different 
values, then differing legal philosophies emerge.36  For colorblind proponents – 




generally those filing pro-Bakke briefs, but also those who see affirmative action as a 
temporarily necessary solution – race is a category that is irrelevant at best and 
discriminatory at worst, at least at a social level.  This belief translated into specific 
choices in precedents and legal doctrine read from a legal formalist, textually-bound 
perspective.  Legal artifacts include Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
the “individual rights” interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
application of the “strict scrutiny” standard to any racial classification.  Neil Gotanda 
identifies several distinct meanings of race in legal discourse that entrench these 
different perspectives, moving along a spectrum from biological to cultural, as well as 
a spectrum of increasing social importance.  These conceptions of race are not 
mutually exclusive; one can see race as having cultural implications which are 
explained in part by historical events and which thus demand special status in the 
eyes of the law. Variant approaches to racial equality occur, in part, because the 
group-status of racial categories is read as onerous to individualism, a major tenet of 
liberal political ideology.37  
One conception of race uses physical or geographical descriptions such as 
skin color or country of ancestral origin to categorize, but considers race “unrelated to 
ability, disadvantage, or moral culpability” or social attributes such as “culture, 
education, wealth, or language.”38  Gotanda argues that the “unconnectedness to 
social attributes” is the defining characteristic of what he labels “formal-race.”39  This 
conception of race is the one evoked by proponents of colorblind policies.  For 
instance, the American Federation of Teachers argued that, whereas individual merit 
is “one of society’s key concepts,” race is an “accident of birth” that does not matter 




and should not be considered.40  The Committee on Academic Non-Discrimination 
and Integrity argued that, because all races are the same, then all treatment must be 
the same, as did Bakke:  “If the Constitution prohibits exclusion of blacks and other 
minorities on racial grounds it cannot permit the exclusion of whites on racial 
grounds.”41  Peller asserts that this notion of race is a key feature of the integrationist 
perspective, wherein racism is rooted in “the cognitive process that attributes social 
significance to the arbitrary fact of skin color…The key image here is of 
irrationalism.”42  The specter of irrationalism was evoked in Bakke’s brief, 
characterizing the problem of classifying races as having “grave” and “evil” 
consequences consistent with formal-race categories alone.  Bakke questioned which 
minority groups will be favored, and how their authenticity should be certified, a 
series of questions mirrored in several amicus briefs, and which Justice Powell would 
mimic in his final opinion: 
There…arises the question of numerous groups not covered by petitioner’s 
quota: Filipinos? Samoans? Hawaiians? Moroccans? Lebanese? There are also 
a wide variety of ethnic sub-groups contained within the so-called ‘majority,’ 
who themselves have been disadvantaged or discriminated against in the 
past…And who is a member of a racial group? Need one be a ‘full-blooded’ 
American Indian to qualify? Or is one grandparent sufficient? Or one great-
grandparent? Are we to become involved in the testing of legal rights 
according to bloodlines?43   
Amici Timothy Hoy employed the same notion of race by question how 
various racial or ethnic groups are defined, with subtitles including “Who is Black?”, 




“Who is an American Indian?” and “Defining Other Classifications” before working 
to the conclusion that these irrelevant and indefinable categories are subject to 
fraudulent claims because they students self-designate.44 
Historical notions of race conceive of race in relation to its past treatment of 
members of that racial group.  Because of the historical use of race to embody racial 
subordination, the Supreme Court regards the use of race to confer status as highly 
suspect, and subject to “strict scrutiny,” especially when used in “prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities.”45  A good number of amici do, as well: as the 
American Federation of Teachers argued, “Once we conclude that there is ‘good’ 
discrimination and ‘bad’ discrimination, we have ceased to become true to our 
principles.”46 Gotanda notes, “The state's use of racial categories is regarded as so 
closely linked to illegitimate racial subordination that it is automatically judicially 
suspect.”47  This presumption has worked against laws and policies that, like 
affirmative action, have used racial classifications as the basis for improving 
disparities caused by discrimination unless they can prove a clear history of that 
discrimination.  Some briefs argued that, because UC-Davis did not prove that their 
institution had discriminated against minorities in the past, they could not now 
privilege these groups.48  The Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Polish American 
Congress, the National Advocates Society, and the National Medical and Dental 
Association critiqued the “special favorite minority status” of black, Hispanic, and 
Asian groups and questioning the basis for those choices because, they claimed, most 
minority groups had been discriminated against in the past.  




A third conception of race “is the traditional notion of race as an indicator of 
social status,” a concept contemporarily disfavored but nevertheless used in legal 
arguments during “efforts aimed at eradicating intentional forms of racial 
subordination with their implication of racial inferiority.”49  Because status is often 
entrenched in law, as was certainly the case with de jure racial discrimination, the 
Supreme Court has both legal doctrine and legal vocabulary addressing status-race. In 
the Bakke case, the terms “invidious” and “benign” reflected the concerns about 
status-race; the former using race to confer social status, and the latter to eliminate 
social hierarchies, or at least those used in ways that seem not to confer status or 
judgment upon racial differences.  Several briefs argued that the program either did or 
did not stigmatize the groups benefiting from the UC-Davis program. Amicus briefs 
from Congressman Harry Waxman and from the Committee on Academic 
Nondiscrimination and Integrity argued that one effect of the “quota” programs 
would be the stigmatizing effects on the beneficiaries of the programs.  The 
Cleveland State University Chapter of the Black American Law Student Association 
argued that, as students who have benefited from an affirmative action program, they 
can personally attest to the lack of stigmatizing effects due to the program’s 
categorization of them based on race. The Black Law Students Union of Yale 
University Law argued that the program was neither invidious to whites nor 
stigmatizing to racial minority members, as did the amicus brief for the National 
Medical Association, National Bar Association, and National Association for Equal 
Opportunity in Higher Education and the amicus brief for the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Northern California and Southern California.  




Under the same logic, however, the lack of historical discrimination against 
whites meant that they did not need the same level of protection than did subjugated 
groups.  Supporters of the UC-Davis program argued that the program was 
constitutionally permissible because its classifications were benign in intent: they do 
not stigmatize whites, and their classifications of minority groups were benign in 
intent.50  The amicus brief for the Board of Governors at Rutgers et al. asserts as 
much, arguing first that any individual right Bakke held in the Fourteenth 
Amendment was overridden by the promise of “eradication of all badges and 
incidents of servitude” in the Thirteenth Amendment, and second that because whites 
are not part of a “discrete and insular minority,” Bakke has not been deprived of any 
constitutionally protected rights.51  
Arguments of “reverse discrimination” evoke status-race, however, as they 
assert that special admissions programs like the UC-Davis program invidiously 
discriminate against whites, stigmatizing them and placing them at a disadvantage 
solely on the basis of race.  Several pro-Bakke briefs evoked the charge of reverse 
discrimination by arguing that consideration of race – at least of minority status as a 
factor – actively constitutes discrimination against whites. Bakke briefs never 
mentioned the phrase “reverse discrimination,” but many other pro-Bakke briefs did.  
The charge of reverse discrimination from Bakke’s supporters places whiteness as a 
special category, one increasingly under attack as its benefits were being challenged 
from multiple fronts.   Thomas Nakayama and Robert Krizek describe a defining 
feature of whiteness as its privilege of invisibility: aligned with any particular cultural 
traditions, whiteness is defined by its margins, by what it is not.52  Alexander 




Alienikoff asserts that “to be born white is to be free from confronting one's race on a 
daily, personal, interaction-by-interaction basis.”53  However, decades of fighting for 
fair treatment of citizens of all races forced political and legal discourses to 
acknowledge and condemn overt racial preferences, and in doing so drew attention to 
this area of invisibility, and the power that came with it.54  Affirmative action policies 
allowed whites to confront race in a way they had seldom had to consider, especially 
policies such as the UC-Davis program that held separate admissions programs for 
targeted minority groups, thereby making whites the “other.”  In this environment of 
rhetorical negotiation of race, wherein public discussions of group identity and 
historical treatment were increasingly common amidst the legal, political, grassroots, 
and cultural movements, different articulations of race emerged, each negotiating the 
role of race to the individual and society.  These sometimes conflicting articulations 
became major points of disagreement as they manifested in the amicus briefs in 
Bakke. 
Richard L. Plaut wrote in 1967 of the origins of affirmative action policies as 
a form of “reverse discrimination” and its connotative shift from a legitimate response 
favoring historically disadvantaged minority groups (as in, reversing the act of 
discrimination against African Americans by favoring them in recruitment) to an 
illegitimate attack on whites (reversing the object of discrimination from African 
Americans to Caucasians): 
New programs have mostly been established for ‘disadvantaged’ students, 
usually with the Negro student primarily in mind, because Negroes are the 
largest and most easily identified among the disadvantaged but, at the same 




time including many non-Negroes.  With the entrance of the Federal 
Government into this area, ‘reverse discrimination’ (in favor of minority 
groups) practices during most of these years, particularly by the colleges, 
quietly but with pride, is now starting, unfortunately I believe, to become 
almost the same ‘dirty’ word as discrimination in the conventional sense 
(against minority groups).55   
Vice President Spiro Agnew evidenced this definitional shift when he 
condemned preferential admissions policies in two speeches in 1970:  “For each 
youth unprepared for college curriculum who is brought in under a quota system, 
some better-prepared student is denied entrance. Admitting the obligation to 
compensate for past deprivation and discrimination, it just does not make sense to 
atone by discriminating against and depriving someone else.”56  Academic and 
professional sources also described concern with affirmative action policies, and they 
too were cited in briefs, including Bakke’s.57  Lavinsky lamented the failure of 
universities to heed Justice Douglas’s plea to choose applicants “on an individual 
basis, rather than according to racial classifications” in circumstances where the 
schools had not been proven to discriminate against nonwhites.58  Although legal 
scholar John Hart Ely supported race-conscious solutions to racial disparities, he was 
frank about the consequences, including the fact that some white students would be 
rejected from scarce graduate school spots because they were born white.59  Fellow 
legal scholar Richard A. Posner argued, to Bakke-supporters’ delight, that race-
conscious programs’ justification of diversity has racist origins in itself, because it 
stereotypes members of minority races by assuming that specific cultural 




characteristics are held amongst all members of a race, instead of treating each person 
as an individual.60 
The rhetoric of legal backfire was a consistent strategy when arguing against 
race-conscious programs, providing a spatial metaphorical symmetry with the 
“reverse discrimination” claims.  Robert A. Hillman describes the rhetoric of legal 
backfire as “constitut[ing] the position that a law produces or will produce results 
directly contrary to one or more of those intended,” a common argument because “the 
multiplicity of goals of a law allows critics to seize upon at least one goal difficult or 
impossible to measure instrumentally and therefore a prime candidate for a backfire 
claim.”61  Evoking the notion of race as a dangerous category, the Order of the Sons 
of Italy in America, as well as a brief from Congressman Henry Waxman, argued that 
race-conscious programs themselves perpetuate racism.  Their characterizations of 
race were a bit different – the Sons of Italy thought that any use of race was onerous, 
and that “racial tests for admissions…have deleterious effects on society,”62 whereas 
the university could accomplish similar goals by race neutral means.  Similarly, the 
Queens Jewish Community Council argued that group preferences would “engender 
racial tensions and prejudice.”63  Waxman, on the other hand, argued that the use of 
this particular special admissions program would have stigmatizing effects because it 
treats all members of the targeted minority groups as equally disadvantaged.64  
Individual Rights.  Because race should not be a defining feature to American 
identity, then special treatment incurred because of a racial category is necessarily 
violative of individual rights, argued pro-Bakke briefs.  The value and primacy of 
individual rights has been a central concern of the Supreme Court, lending strength to 




one the most common arguments in the briefs: the claim that rights conferred by the 
Fourteenth Amendment are individually held – as opposed to group – rights.  Non-
racial individual identity is the central theme around which the briefs focused.  In his 
party brief to the Supreme Court, Bakke relied heavily on this argument:  namely, that 
his individual equal protection, guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment, was 
violated.  The brief presents this as the central question before the Supreme Court, 
arguing that the case: 
…presents a constitutional conflict in which this Court must decide whether 
the right of equal protection, granted by the Fourteenth Amendment to ‘any 
person,’ does indeed extend to individuals such as Allan Bakke or, instead, 
applies only to certain racial and ethnic groups…To cast aside a long history 
of individual freedom and replace it with a system of privileges based upon 
ancestry would mark a radical departure from the previous decisions of this 
Court.65 
If they find for the latter, argues the brief, then the Court would be supporting a 
practice which “uproots individual constitutional freedoms and replaces them with a 
destructive system of group rights.”66   
Disparate groups and individuals warned against the dangers of replacing 
individualism with group identity, including rejected Florida law school candidate 
Ralph Galliano, Young Americans for Freedom, the American Federation of 
Teachers, and college senior and law school hopeful Timothy J. Hoy, who said that 
the “very root of American beliefs in the primacy of rights of the individual.”67  The 
Queens Jewish Community Council and the Jewish Rights Council argued similarly 




in their brief supporting Bakke and the California Supreme Court decision.  This brief 
evoked a particularly authoritative claim, as it argued that “this concept of group 
statistical rights…is precisely the kind of system which for so many centuries was 
used to disadvantages members of the group we represent—the Jewish people.”68 
They warned of the danger of:  
submerging the rights of the human individual which are sacred to our social 
system in favor of the interests of an amorphous group…It is a disturbing sign 
of our times that the newly rising preference for group over individual rights 
has so confounded the approach of some of our courts and governmental 
agencies to due process and Equal Protection questions that the rights of the 
individual, so long considered sacred and central to our Anglo-American 
heritage, stand in serious danger of becoming lost.69    
The allegation that the UC-Davis special admissions program was a quota was a 
consistent argument, as well, and was similarly onerous from two ideological 
perspectives: it violated individual treatment, and it failed to uphold meritocratic 
admissions based purely on “objective” grade point averages and test scores.  
Opponents claimed that they could not “compete” for a set number of seats because 
of a single factor – race. Thus, quotas privilege particular groups over others, and 
disadvantages those not in the “favored” groups.70  This argument hinges on the 
primacy of individual agency, although particular arguments varied in their 
acceptance of race as a factor at all.  Bakke’s brief, for instance, argued that there was 
a difference between affirmative action programs and quota systems; the former 
being acceptable, but the latter being unconstitutional.  Affirmative action programs 




allow competition for all spots, so individuals are not deprived of an opportunity to 
compete. On the other hand, the Queens Jewish Community Council and the Jewish 
Rights Council pointed out that Harvard, which submitted their affirmative action 
plan for consideration as an appropriate use of race toward the ends of a diverse 
student body, had proposed in the 1920s using quotas to limit the number of Jews 
who could attend Harvard.71  In 1922, Harvard President Abbott Lawrence Lowell 
attempted to limit the admission numbers of Jewish students, justifying his decision 
by arguing that the university would lose the ability to pass on the “Harvard flavor” 
that was its greatest draw if more than 15% of its student population “whose parents 
have come to this country without our background,” and who worked and socialized 
together instead of with the “traditional” Harvard student body.72  In response, Judge 
Julian Mack expressed concern about the “nature and character of the tests, and the 
limitations…to be placed upon any one or more groups, however differentiated from 
other groups in American life,” a concern which was “fundamentally a consideration 
of the place and the obligations of Harvard College and Harvard University in the life 
of the American people and in the future.”73   
Quantitative Meritocracy.  In addition to arguments about the violation of 
individual rights, pro-Bakke briefs argued that affirmative action programs violated 
meritocratic principles by subverting the competitive process.  Amid the economic 
recession, competition for graduate school spots was already fierce, making the set-
aside seats that much more coveted and economic arguments of scarcity more 
prominent and more sympathetic.74  Between 1968 and 1976, the unemployment rate 
for young, college-educated Americans rose from one to three percent.75  Affirmative 




action programs were finding legal support at the same time that professional job 
markets became more unstable, making competition for jobs and the need for 
advanced education more salient.  Unlike in the post-World War II era, job growth 
and employment possibilities did not seem endless.76  Paul R. Spikard notes that, “in 
the 1960s, when the economy was expanding, affirmative action seemed painless.  
But in the middle 1970s we realized that if some were to gain then others must 
lose.”77  Thus, one of the central issues in Bakke became the question of the 
appropriate goals and values of higher education in a capitalist democracy:  how 
should universities decide how to allocate resources, and toward what ends? 
Bakke and his supporters considered competition between students to be the 
appropriate standard.  The ability to compete for all seats to the university is an 
individual right, argued Bakke, and thus the UC-Davis affirmative action program 
“implies that rights of education, training and consequent career opportunities, ideally 
open to all on an equal opportunity basis, will now be officially categorized by group 
membership.”78  In his party brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, Bakke’s lawyer 
explained Bakke’s working-class roots, strong work ethic, and veteran status before 
arguing that:  
…under normal circumstances, Allan Bakke would be eligible to compete for 
all of those spaces.  In this case, however, petitioner has formally adopted a 
preferential racial quota and has set aside 16 of the places for members of 
designated racial and ethnic minority groups.  In so doing, petition has 
prevented Bakke, solely because of his race, from competing for the 16 quota 
spaces.79 




Alfred Slocum, a constitutional law scholar, asserts that the scarcity of medical school 
slots made an emerging habit of the Supreme Court to read the Fourteenth 
Amendment as an individual right – one which would protect any individual against 
the tyranny of group categorization – that much more likely, and he summarized the 
effects here: 
it is argued by Bakke proponents that the ‘protection’ of the Fourteenth 
Amendment when it imposes a ‘preference’ on the basis of race, particularly 
when the sought-after objective is scarce or limited, collides with the 
individual rights of Whites who, it is felt, have earned the right to be included 
by virtue of individual merit. The California Supreme Court agreed and saw 
the question as a limitation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s elasticity.80  
The rhetoric of scarcity became central to both the supporters and opponents 
of affirmative action policies in higher education, and, as James Arnt Aune notes, 
“there is nothing new about the connection between rhetoric and economics.”81  The 
same is true of the relationship between law and economics, wherein proponents of 
the Law and Economics movement have advanced the theory that “jurists and lawyers 
[do and should] treat the law as a mirror of the economic ‘marketplace’ of life,” a 
rhetoric which, like the law itself, gains much of its persuasive power from its “anti-
rhetorical” posture.82  The appeal to scarcity works within the marketplace metaphor, 
and is “persuasive in that it seems to offer a means of settling complex disputes by 
appealing to an impersonal marketplace that need not listen to the voices of the 
disempowered” by divorcing issues from questions of abstract rights and replacing 
them “with more ‘pragmatic’ vocabularies that remind us of the limits of resources 




(and rights).”83  The scarcity principle was not the solely a pro-Bakke concern: 
limited resources were felt by both parties by virtue of the fact that the case took 
place in the state of California, where the population size made the highly prestiged 
public university system very competitive.  Robert O’Neil speculates that, had Bakke 
been living in Montana instead of California, the Bakke case never would have 
happened.84  Like most states, California universities held a percentage of their slots 
for California residents.  For Bakke, the allocation of 16 spaces out of 100 made an 
already scarce resource that much more out of reach.  O’Neil discusses in a 1971 
review of preferential admissions policies the conundrum of higher education policy 
makers:  “…the pressure for expansion of minority enrollments collides directly with 
the rising academic aspirations and expectations of many lower middle class whites 
for whom college has for the first time in generations become a serious prospect.”85   
That some people of color would receive special consideration due to hardship 
seemed unjust to whites who perceived personal hardship, as well; especially when 
that hardship was paired with the ideals of quantitative judgment.  The Committee on 
Academic Non-Discrimination and Integrity combined the argument of job scarcity 
with the arbitrariness of race and the importance of test scores, asserting that “many 
thousands of talented students who have worked hard to develop their talents are 
being cruelly denied their rights of self-fulfillment and to meaningful careers by 
admissions decisions that favor far less qualified members of arbitrarily selected 
minority groups.”86  Similarly, the brief representing a number of police officer 
organizations, including the Fraternal Order of Police, argued that the “quota” system 




implemented by UC-Davis was particularly egregious because of the scarcity of 
resources available to medical school applicants.87   
The combination of a strong belief in individual agency and meritocracy 
meant that racial considerations stood out amongst other, more entrenched, inequities 
in the competitive process.  George Lipsitz describes other meritocratic omissions by 
Bakke: “Bakke did not challenge the legitimacy of the thirty-six white students with 
GPAs lower than his who secured acceptance to the UC-Davis medical school the 
year he applied, nor did he challenge the enrollment of five students admitted because 
their parents had attended or given money to the school.”88  The established practices 
of nepotism and privilege, long a part of the system, did not strike Bakke – or others 
arguing against affirmative action policies – as unfair, or at least too established to 
confront.  Cheryl Harris notes that Bakke’s case rested upon the expectation “that he 
would never be disfavored when competing with minority candidates, although he 
might be disfavored with respect to other more privileged whites.”89  For instance, 
legacy admits account for twenty percent of Harvard undergraduate students, and a 
study by the Department of Education revealed that, between 1981 and 1988, legacy 
admits had “significantly lower grades and scores on standardized tests than the 
average nonlegacy candidate admitted to that institution.”90  
A second component of the meritocratic principle evident in the pro-Bakke 
briefs was that of quantitative judgment, tied to a Cartesian epistemology that views 
the path to knowledge as a scientific process and the ideal judge “an infallible 
machine, giving the answer when furnished with the elements of the problem, without 
being concerned to know what is at stake or who might benefit from any possible 




error.”91  Given the quantitative standards of the primary university admissions 
criteria – grade point averages and test scores – the meritocratic logic followed that 
the higher numerical score meant that the individual was better qualified.  That 
someone with lower numbers would be admitted, especially for non-quantitative 
factors such as race, was offensive to this standard of judgment.   
A consistent argument from Bakke and his supporters included the assertion 
that Bakke was more qualified for admission to the medical school than were some of 
the special program admittees. By the time the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the Regents has stipulated that they could not reach the burden of proof required by 
the California Supreme Court, that Bakke would not have been admitted had there 
been no special program.  Hence, this argument was not central to Bakke’s briefs to 
the Supreme Court.  For the amici, however, this “fact” was crucial to the issue of 
affirmative action, and both sides staked strong claims on two systems of judgment: 
either colorblind, quantitative meritocracy, or qualitative, contextual, and profession-
driven factors.  Those arguing for quantitative meritocracy forged strong moral claims 
in its defense; for instance, the American Federation of Teachers asserted that “one of 
society’s key moral concepts [was] that an individual’s success is a product solely of 
his merit and that accidents of birth such as race are irrelevant to successful 
performance.”92  Rejected law student Timothy Hoy quoted Thomas Jefferson when 
describing the ideal of merit as “natural aristocracy among men” before stating that 
“amicus asks no more than to let his and the applications of every other applicant who 
cannot prove disadvantage stand or fall on their merits—grade-point average…LSAT 




or…MCAT score, recommendations from their professors, and other criteria which 
the schools themselves have empirically established…”93 
Because many professional schools in addition to UC-Davis implemented 
affirmative action programs, a large number of amicus briefs came from law and 
medical school admissions officers, faculty, administrators, and students.  There were 
far more – nineteen in total –  amicus briefs representing law school interests (either 
law school, law students, law faculty, or in one case a soon-to-be-applicant to law 
school) than medical schools, at a paltry five briefs.   This deluge may have been 
counterproductive, argues Selmi, because “the law school admission process 
appeared to be considerably more quantitative in nature than the medical school 
admissions process.”94  Medical schools regularly interviewed applicants and rated 
the interviews on a wide range of qualities, including maturity, analytical reasoning, 
and enthusiasm, making race one of many influences on their decisions.  For law 
schools, on the other hand, “race seemed to be one of approximately three factors – 
grades and LSAT scores being the other two – that were actually considered.”95  On 
the other hand, the similarities between the professional schools in the drastic 
increase of applicants, as well as the growing interest in increasing minority group 
student numbers, made their briefs relevant. 
Until the early 1960s, competition for professional schools (law and medical 
schools) was sparse. A law school applicant in the 1950s, holding a college degree 
and a C-plus grade average, “was virtually assured of entry into some American Bar 
Association-approved law school.”96  At Berkeley’s law school, named Boalt, an 
undergraduate grade point average of a B earned a student an automatic admission in 




1960, and only those applicants with less than a B average were required to take the 
Law School Aptitude Test (LSAT).97  Furthermore, “the LSAT was developed as a 
tool for aiding predictions as to whether an applicant, if admitted, would be able to 
meet a school’s minimum level of performance;” it was not developed to determine a 
competitive maximum edge.98 
Similarly, some medical schools had a shortage of applicants in the mid-
1950s, and the MCAT served only to establish a minimum bar, above which students 
were expected successfully to complete medical school.  A 1964 study measuring the 
predictive qualities of successful physicians showed no predictive value in successful 
completion of medical school or in professional success above the minimum MCAT 
score.99  However, in the decade between 1966 and 1976, applicants more than 
doubled in number while the number of openings only increased by two-thirds, and 
professional schools began using test scores as competitive measurements instead of 
minimum disqualifications.100   
The increased reliance on test scores as competitive tools, especially in law 
schools, offered a more stark contrast between quantitative and subjective measures 
in graduate school applications.  Targeting on the “empirical” nature of merit as a 
more valid standard of judgment, Hoy and several pro-Bakke briefs argued the 
insufficiency of non-quantitative standards.  Both Ralph Galliano and the Committee 
on Academic Non-Discrimination and Integrity submitted amici briefs arguing for the 
use of test scores only.  The Committee on Academic Non-Discrimination and 
Integrity argued that the effect of non-empirical admissions policies “lowers 
professional standards,” an argument which the brief of the Young Americans for 




Freedom furthered by asserting that the lower standards were particularly dangerous 
in the medical profession, when graduates would be responsible for human lives.101  
The Queens Jewish Community Council and the Jewish Rights Council contrasted 
empirical tests with the university’s larger goals:  “even standards of individual 
excellence…have virtually been scrapped in favor of sociological goals.”102 
This argument from the Queens Jewish Community Council highlights the 
duality of the backlash against race-conscious policies and suspicion of the 
underlying vision of universities as civic and political educators.  Christopher 
Newfield notes that the critique began “just as the American middle class was starting 
to become multiracial, and as public universities were moving with increasing speed 
toward meaningful racial integration.”103  The progressive ideology underlining this 
idea, combined with the rapid increase in numbers of students attending college, 
troubled free-market conservatives, who argued that “the traditions of the Left are 
being absorbed into the agenda of ‘progressive reform,’ and the structure of American 
society is being radically, if discreetly, altered.”104  That universities were embracing 
multiculturalism and incorporating pluralistic values into courses and majors was also 
seen as a turn from the individual competition enshrined in the “American dream” 
narrative to a group-oriented ideology wherein group identity, especially ethnic and 
racial identity, became a source of pride rivaling that of national pride.105 
The progressive movement about which conservatives worried was quite 
visible in California, where universities like Berkeley were frequent sites of 
community and student protests, and the left-leaning orientation of the gatherings had 
drawn the attention of conservatives.  Ronald Reagan’s gubernatorial campaign 




targeted the protests at the California universities, and one of his first acts upon 
election was to fire the president of the University of California, Clark Kerr, who 
Reagan felt did not have proper control of the protests and free speech rallies at UC-
Berkeley.106  The affirmative action program that University of Washington president 
Charles Odegaard had promised to student protesters resulting in him being named 
directly in a lawsuit that became the immediate predecessor to Bakke: DeFunis v. 
Odegaard.  Marco DeFunis himself joined on an amicus brief of the Young 
Americans for Freedom in Bakke.107  And in August of 1971, a Virginia corporate 
lawyer named Lewis F. Powell wrote a long confidential memo entitled “Attack on 
the American Free Enterprise System” to the Chair of the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce Education Committee lamenting the anti-conservative and anti-capitalist 
arguments coming, not from “revolutionaries who would destroy the entire system,” 
but from “perfectly respectable elements of society,” including the college campus 
and academic journals.108  Powell, concerned about the declining influence of 
business in politics, academia, and the media, pointed out that “the campuses from 
which much of the criticism emanates are supported by tax funds generated largely 
from American business,” and the “boards of trustees of our universities 
overwhelmingly are composed of men and women who are leaders in the system.”109  
Two months after penning the memorandum, Powell was nominated by President 
Nixon to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Race Consciousness as a Social and Educational Good 
Briefs articulating support for the Regents, UC-Davis, or affirmative action in 
general ask the Court to read this case as a university, bestowed with the authority to 




determine the needs of its student body, carrying out its mission by striving to meet 
the goals of social justice by embracing race consciousness as a necessary and 
valuable feature of American life and advocating diversity as a valid educational 
objective.  Although particular justifications differ in the pro-Regents briefs, the 
primary assumption bringing them together is the need for race consciousness in 
policy decisions. The primary justification for allowing race as a consideration was 
that of academic freedom, in pursuit of the goals of remediating social racism and 
toward the academic end of diversity.   
Many briefs supporting UC-Davis touched upon a primary twentieth-century 
goal of high education – the promotion of effective citizenship.  After the Civil War, 
an increase in national wealth and a competitive eye toward a university-rich Europe 
increased interest in the university’s role in three areas: offering vocational skills, 
expanding research, and increasing liberal culture, the latter defined by Robert K. 
Fullinwider and Judith Lichtenberg as emphasizing “aesthetic and intellectual 
appreciation and the development of character.”110  From the beginning of this uneasy 
triumvirate, there was tension between the three; if one of the end goals was to 
provide students with specialized skills for a workforce, then what purpose did a 
literature class serve?  The movement from a rather aristocratic conception of liberal 
culture in its pre-twentieth century iteration to its contemporary justification – its 
service to civic and political ends – was one response to this tension.111  Today, 
“universities have multiple missions, deriving from and aiming at multiple goods,” 
based upon varying weights given to three general purposes: education for work, 
education for citizenship, and education for living.112 




 Newfield argues that this trilogy became an important part of the middle class 
ideal, especially in a hopeful post-Great Depression and post-World War II era facing 
economic upturn and renewed commitment to multiculturalism, fostered by various 
civil rights movements, as foundational to the American narrative.  In his book about 
the changing nature of the public university, Newfield describes the middle class as:  
the numerical majority of the population whose contact with college was 
interwoven with the mainstream and politically powerful ideal that this 
majority was to have interesting work, economic security, and the ability to 
lead satisfying and insightful lives in which personal and collective social 
development advanced side by side….This vision was of a full political, 
economic, and cultural capability.113 
Rather than being aristocratic in nature, the twentieth century public research 
university “sought to combine nearly universal access with the highest quality in 
teaching and research, and saw access and quality as not only compatible but, in a 
profound way, as mutually reinforcing.”114   
 The U.S. Supreme Court had affirmed this view of education as central, not 
only to economic upward mobility, but also to effective and enlightened citizenry.  
The most publicly known articulation of this value came from Chief Justice Earl 
Warren in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), when he opined: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments...It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing 
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 




environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. 
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right 
which must be made available to all on equal terms.115 
In 1971, the Supreme Court affirmed the need to take race-conscious 
affirmative steps to integrate schools in order to ready them for a multicultural 
American life, arguing in Swann v. Charlotte: “School authorities are traditionally 
charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy and might 
well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic 
society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students 
reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole.”116  They also affirmed the special 
role of education in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez (1973), as the Regents 
reminded the Supreme Court by citing it in their brief: “The reminder [that schools 
need freedom to make admissions decisions] has special pertinence in dealing with 
the ‘myriad of intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems’ which 
education presents.”117  
Academic Freedom.  Briefs supporting the Regents relied on the presumption 
offered in San Antonio v. Rodriguez to assert the university system’s continuing need 
for the freedom to define the academic factors most beneficial to its students. Within 
the University of California system, a fair amount of freedom was already given, as 
each campus’s faculty could decide how to best construct and run its admissions 
process. This independence was central to the arguments in Bakke.  The University of 
California system was decentralized when it came to admissions decisions and 




policies (especially at the professional schools).  Thus, each school made a decision 
about whether to have a special admissions program, and how the program would 
work.118  UC-Davis chose to offer a special admissions program for economically or 
educationally disadvantaged minority students.   
In keeping with the progressive ideals of public universities articulated by 
Newfield, the Regents, along with briefs from several other universities, argued that 
this freedom was essential to meeting the needs of its student population and the 
needs of society at large.  Citing precedents such as Swann v. Charlotte and the 
Supreme Court of Washington in DeFunis v. Odegaard, which found “the state 
interest in eliminating racial imbalance within public legal education to be 
compelling,” the Regents’ brief argued that such decisions “leave the states free, 
either to set the admissions criteria for state institutions by legislative action or else to 
allow each public institution to set its own criteria according to the faculty’s choice of 
educational objectives.”119 “Liberty,” continued the Regents, “is still a major element 
of every constitutional equation” and “the Constitution does not charge the federal 
courts with detailed supervision of the admissions policies and practices of state 
colleges and universities,” which practice affirmative action programs for reasons, 
with different goals and degrees of flexibility.120  Although different schools used 
race conscious programs with different motives, such as alleviating personal 
disadvantage, remediation for a history of discrimination, or the benefits of interracial 
association, “this Court should not shut off the study, debate and experimentation by 
undertaking to prescribe, upon further findings, a detailed set of constitutional 
rules.”121  In support for this argument, they cited Justice Powell’s dissent from a 




1977 Supreme Court opinion, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, in which he stated, “One 
of the great virtues of federalism is the opportunity it affords for experimentation and 
innovation, with freedom to discard or amend that which proves unsuccessful or 
detrimental to the public good.”122  The institution of education holds special 
pertinence, argued the Regents as they cited another Supreme Court opinion, because 
of it is “dealing with the ‘myriad of intractable economic, social, and even 
philosophical problems’ which education presents.”123 
Likewise, the National Association of Minority Contractors and the Minority 
Contractors Association of Northern California asserted that, while they were neither 
for nor against the admissions program, they believe that “the program is a 
constitutionally permissible exercise of non-judicial, government authority,” and that 
the Supreme Court should “reserve to the non-judicial branches the task of 
establishing society’s goals and allocated its scarce public resources.”124  The State of 
Washington and University of Washington argued for “educational discretion” in 
determining which factors would benefit students. 
A collective brief from Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford 
University, and the University of Pennsylvania defined both the university’s mission, 
and large space historically given to the university in achieving it: 
A university’s highest function is to give people of great talent and motivation 
the opportunity to participate, as students and as teachers, in rigorous 
intellectual…inquiry—and thereby simultaneously to enlarge today’s corpus 
of knowledge and creative works, and to develop tomorrow’s cohorts of 
physicians and poets, physicists and planners, philosophers and politicians.  




In pursuing this function and these goals, colleges and universities, 
with rare exceptions, historically have been accorded freedom from external 
influence and intrusion.  Our society has recognized that higher education can 
flourish only so long as educators have substantial independence to formulate 
and implement the policies by which it is transmitted…When…the problem is 
central to the educational process as is the determination of the qualification 
of students, when educators are searching in good faith for solutions, and 
when applicable legal norms are in doubt, we believe that the cause of 
education, and hence the welfare of our society, are best served by judicial 
restraint.125 
The Justice Department supported the freedom to experiment forwarded by 
the Regents and other university amici in their briefs. Given the deluge of white 
applicants and the myriad goals of higher education, the Justice Department argued 
that “professional schools therefore must have discretion to seek to make judgments 
about applicants that cannot be captured in a simple formula,” suggesting that “the 
wisdom of deference to the answer given by the admissions committees charged with 
making such decisions every day.”126  Similarly, the Board of Governors at Rutgers et 
al. posited the negative effects on universities, were Bakke lower court’s decision 
upheld:  “affirmance of the Bakke decision will stultify the ability of political 
institutions to respond to the social reality of race-based inequality.”127 
Non-Quantitative Admissions Considerations.  The progressive argument for 
education as training for pluralistic citizenship became more complicated when the 
focus came to graduate schools with a professional (as opposed to scholarly or 




cultural) focus.  Scott argued about college education in general, and professional 
schools in particular, that “because of the greater reliance on formal educational 
training for job placement in an organizational society, competition for educational 
opportunities becomes practically synonymous with competition for occupational 
status.”128   
Sindler attributes the increased interest in occupation-oriented graduate 
education to several factors, including the post-Sputnik interest in scientific 
education, followed by an economic downturn that made a medical career a much 
more lucrative alternative to graduate school.  By 1976, “the average income of 
doctors grew rapidly to over $60,000 a year…, more than twice that of lawyers, 
which visibly made medicine the best-paid profession in the country.”129  Thus, 
during the 1975-76 school year, the 114 medical schools in the United States received 
over 366,000 applications, with an average of 2711 applicants for 135 seats at each 
school.130  This was paired with an increase in the unemployment rate; Scott noted 
that “between 1968 and 1976, the unemployment rate for persons 25 to 34 who had 
four or more years of college training increased from 1.0 to 3.1 percent.”131  Thus, 
more college graduates were going back to school.  
For professional schools, the drastic increase in applications meant that the 
percentages of white applicants with higher test scores virtually blocked from 
consideration the smaller number of minority group students with high test scores.  If 
schools were to choose purely on test scores – tests that were not developed to be 
discerning at the high end of the scales, and which had little predictive value at that 
end – then they would have white students only.  The absence of color was especially 




severe at medical schools, which were in essence – though not necessarily in policy – 
segregated into the early 1960s.  For instance, in 1961-62, 600 of 771 black medical 
students attended all-black medical schools at Howard University in Washington, DC 
and Meharry Medical College in Nashville, Tennessee. 
Professional schools began to increase numbers of minority students with 
special admissions efforts that considered race as one factor in the selection of 
quantitatively qualified students, beginning in the late 1960s.  As early as 1948, the 
National Scholarship Service and Fund for Negro Students was established to help 
black students gain admission and financial aid to integrated schools.132  Newfield 
argues that the post-World War II commitment to public higher education reflected 
the epistemological benefits of multiculturalism, and the liberal humanist belief in 
liberal education as a gateway to responsibility citizenry and middle-class economic 
growth.133  Brainerd Alden Thresher noted the public interest component that should 
be taken into account, during his publication about college recruitment: 
…the ‘systems’ view of the entire process…involves the interaction of all the 
colleges and universities with each other and with secondary schools as they 
appraise and deliver their annual crop of students coming forward out of 
society; it involves not only the ‘manpower’ demands of the economy in a 
narrow sense, but also the demands of the entire polity for an increasingly 
literate society, an increasingly knowledgeable electorate, and a citizenry with 
a depth of cultural awareness that would scarcely have been thought of a 
generation ago.134 




Many universities undertook affirmative action programs voluntarily – as 
opposed to those required by administrative or judicial order – and their efforts 
“reflected a mix of motives,” including a strong desire to see minorities succeed in 
their discipline, voluntary compensation over past discrimination, pressure from civil 
rights organizations and student protests to increase admissions, and political support 
and pressure in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Executive Order 11246, and 
federal mandates for all agencies receiving federal funds to submit affirmative action 
plans.135  Most comprehensive studies of higher education concluded with 
recommendations to increase opportunities for members of racial minority groups: 
these studies included the “Assembly on University Goals and Governance: A First 
Report,” (1971); The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education in a publication 
entitled “A Chance to Learn: An Action Agenda for Equal Opportunity in Higher 
Education,” (1970); the report of the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest 
(1970); and the “Report on Higher Education to the Secretary of Health, Education 
and Welfare” (1971), all of which were cited in briefs supporting the UC-Davis 
program.  Pressure came from the grassroots, as well: for instance, members of the 
Black Student Union at the University of Washington stormed the office of university 
president Charles Odegaard in May 1968.  They demanded that the university admit 
more minority students, a request that Odegaard made happen. 136 
Professional and academic publications also showed great interest in the status 
of minority group enrollment in professional schools, and the amicus briefs in Bakke 
marshaled those sources toward their claims – mostly claims supporting the UC-
Davis program, or at least the need for targeted race-conscious admissions programs 




in general.  Ely opined in the University of Chicago Law Review that:  “If we are to 
have even a chance of curing our society of the sickness of racism, we will need a lot 
more Black professionals. And whatever the complex of reasons, it seems we will not 
get them in the foreseeable future unless we take blackness into account and weight it 
positively when we allocate opportunities.”137  Studies also included Thresher’s book, 
published by the College Entrance Examination Board in 1966 and entitled College 
Admissions and the Public Interest.  In it, Thresher noted that “schools routinely have 
given preference to applicants who will bring distinction and diversity to the school 
because of special talents, skills and motivations” including leadership skills and 
students who were in-state residents, for whom there were often quotas.138  Thus, 
special treatment was already given for a variety of competitive and social reasons, 
argued Thresher, and affirmative action programs fit nicely into such preferences.   
The topic of the twelfth annual College and University Self-Study Institute,  
held in at the University of California, Berkeley in 1970, was “The Minority Student 
on Campus: Expectations and Possibilities.” The published version, cited in Justice 
Mathew Tobriner’s dissent to the California Supreme Court decision on Bakke, 
included discussions about non-curricular and curricular programs of minority 
students, pluralism on campus, and questions of power and priorities.139  The 
Association of American Medical School Colleges solicited applicants for medical 
school affirmative action programs in the 24th edition of their annual publication of 
“Medical School Admission Requirements, U.S.A. and Canada” in 1974-75.140  In 
1973, the Educational Testing Service published the 5th edition of a pamphlet entitled 
“Graduate and Professional School Opportunities for Minority Students,” which 




“provides information on medical school programs for minority students including 
recruitment, admission, academic aid, summer enrichment, and financial aid.”141 
During the time that Bakke was being considered by the courts, the push for 
racial diversity in higher education was showing varied results.  On the positive side, 
the enrollments at the two black medical schools, which had accounted for about 78% 
of black medical students in the 1961-62 school year, by 1975-76 accounted for only 
19%: the rest were in integrated schools.142  According to Sindler, “this shift reflected 
the adoption by over 90 percent of medical schools of special recruiting and 
admissions programs aimed at stepping up enrollment of blacks and other 
minorities.”143  However, despite these efforts, “the goal of minority enrollment in 
1975 set by a task force of the Association of American Medical Colleges in 1970 
still has not been met; 12 percent of first-year enrollment for four minority groups 
(blacks, Mexican-Americans, mainland Puerto Ricans, and American Indians…). The 
actual proportion varied narrowly between 8.5 and 10.1 percent from 1971-1972 
through 1975-1976.”144   
Between the need to choose among a flood of graduate school candidates 
whose acceptance had long been based on entrance scores and grades, and a want to 
increase students of minority status who would be drowned out by the increase in 
applications, “the issues of the affirmative action debate are organized around the 
same structural opposition between reason and bias…To integrate institutions [meant 
to] compromise meritocratic standards either temporarily (remedy-based)…or 
permanently, by diffusing merit with other ends such as diversity.”145  Thus, briefs 
from supporters of the UC-Davis program argued for the academic freedom to be able 




to answer these multiple needs and for broader definitions of meritocratic 
qualifications that are based on the specific needs of the profession. 
A common argument coming from professional schools and other UC-Davis 
supporters, then, included the need to consider non-quantitative factors that would 
make for better professionals.  This was particularly necessary, argued these briefs, 
because many more students qualified though test scores and grade point averages 
than could possibly be admitted.  A representative example of this argument comes 
from the amicus brief of the Association of American Medical Colleges: 
The primary purpose of the medical school admission process is to select from 
among applicants deemed qualified to study medicine those who, in the 
judgment of a duly constituted admissions committee, will become physicians 
most likely to contribute to the needs of the country or the state of medical 
care.  This purpose necessarily implies that some subjective judgments must 
be made in assessing the needs of the state and the likelihood that one 
individual, more than another also qualified for medical study, will tend to 
serve those needs.  Many criteria should be applied to aid in this difficult 
evaluation process, including relevant personal characteristics.  When the 
institution’s goals include training professionals to serve a presently 
underserved minority population, the consideration of race as one of many 
measuring tools is relevant ‘rationally related’ to the enunciated purpose, and 
in pursuit of a ‘compelling state interest’…Nonobjective standards other than 
grade point average and test scores have long been used in selecting those 
applicants to whom admission to medical school is offered.146 




The amicus brief for the Black Law Students Association at UC-Berkeley 
critiqued the heavy use of MCAT scores, especially when opponents of the program 
argued that the minority candidates admitted were “less qualified.”   In their brief, 
they argued that: 1) the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT) does not identify 
“more qualified” candidates, only those who meet minimum academic qualifications; 
and 2) a higher MCAT score than the minimum passing score is not predictive of 
success, either in medical school or in the profession.147  Similarly, the National 
Employment Law Project asserted that the exclusive reliance on grade point averages 
and MCAT scores would exclude most minority applicants because of disparate 
primary education backgrounds, a fact compounded by a number of studies showing 
that the “admission criteria which impact adversely on minority applicants do not 
bear any proven relationship to physician or medical school performance.”148  The 
amicus brief for the Antioch School of Law argued that, in addition to tests not being 
predictive of professional competence, race is a relevant factor in the medical 
profession because proper communication skills involve factors of race, culture, class, 
and national origin, without which doctors would be ineffective.149  Finally, the 
Regents’ brief asserted that the “less qualified” argument was specious because, while 
“it is accurate to say that a minority admissions program results in selecting for 
admission from among many fully-qualified candidates some fully-qualified minority 
applicants who not have been chosen under earlier color-blind criteria for 
selection…such arguments otherwise confuse ‘qualification’ with ‘selection.’”150  
Those arguing that the program violates meritocracy “assume, contrary to fact, that 
there is some abstract and universal measure of who is ‘better qualified’ for all 




purposes.”151  Qualifications have long considered public need, and are continuing to 
do so here, argued the Regents; but there must be additional qualifying factors in 
order to choose between so many applicants.  
Because the Supreme Court had previously concluded that equal access to 
schools was a constitutional right, and the deprival of access discriminatory, 
proponents of the affirmative action program placed also argued about the 
discriminatory effects of striking down such policies. 152  In doing so, these arguments 
placed the university as a primary enforcer of the mission of Brown v. Board of 
Education.  Given disparities in education for targeted minority groups, insisting on 
race-neutral policies that rely primarily on entrance exams is the basic equivalent of 
segregation, argued several amici: “In light of the general pattern of poor test 
performance of black students, the practical consequence of its use can be as 
particularistic as was the obvious use of racial background in the past.”153  The 
National Employment Law Project argued that abandoning the special admissions 
program would result in unlawful discrimination, because of the disparate impact of 
past discrimination on grade point averages and test scores.154  Anti-discrimination 
laws and the legacy of Brown v. Board disallowed such effects, argued these 
proponents.  The Regents equated an upholding of the California Court’s decision 
with reverting to pre-Brown segregation: 
This case concerns whether faculties will be permitted by the judiciary to 
continue to make such discretionary judgments about basic educational policy 
and to continue, voluntarily, to make a meaningful effort to carry out the 
country’s commitment to the principles of Brown v. Board of Education. An 




affirmance of the judgment below would—put bluntly—represent an 
abandonment of the minority students who have seen the hope but not yet the 
promise of Brown.155 
The ability to consider race in order to achieve institutional goals was 
particularly important given the increased competition in schools, argued UC-Davis 
supporters. Pro-Regents scarcity arguments framed the increased competition for 
professional school seats as a market flooded with white applicants, who by virtue of 
sheer numbers blocked the upper-end of GPAs and test scores. The amicus brief from 
the Deans of the University of California Law Schools offered tables and charts 
supporting the “explosive growth” of highly qualified applicants, and concluded that 
graduate schools would have hardly any people of color if not for race-conscious 
goals and special admissions programs because of the number of highly qualified 
students applying.156  The Justice Department argued similarly, noting that because 
there were so many white applicants, only slightly lesser minority test scores would 
mean and all-white student body.  Thus, argued the brief, “professional schools 
therefore must have discretion to seek to make judgments about applicants that cannot 
be captured in a simple formula,” including factors such as “motivation, self-
discipline, personal interests, and the extent to which applicants can diversify and 
enrich the profession.”157 
The Regents’ brief addressed the scarcity argument forwarded by pro-Bakke 
briefs, but ultimately rejected it as a standard for judgment.  Far from the “simplistic 
assertions” that Bakke was excluded solely based on his race, Regents argued that the 




very individual meritocratic competition that Bakke insisted had been denied to him 
had, in fact, kept him from getting in: 
Respondent failed to gain admission because there were approximately thirty 
applicants for every place available at Davis and his credentials were judged 
not to be strong enough to win him one of the places available to him…[He 
was] denied for exactly the same kinds of reasons that the Admissions 
Committee in making selection decisions denied many other well qualified 
non-disadvantaged applicants, whites and minorities.158 
More importantly, however, the Regents shifted the goals of higher education from 
those of allotting a scarce commodity to a larger social goal. “Selection for 
admissions is not simply a rationing of benefits,” argued Regents; “it involves 
decisions concerning the characteristics of the kinds of students and graduates of 
professional schools which society needs.”159  They continue: 
Here, in today’s society, because of the past, being black, chicano, Asian or 
American Indian, is a fact and a highly relevant personal attribute.  Race or 
color is relevant to educational and social policies and therefore to 
admissions, not because being black, chicano, Asian or American Indian is 
inherently better or worse, or makes one more deserving or less deserving that 
anyone else, but because decades of hostile discrimination, de jure as well as 
de facto, isolated the minorities in barrios and black or yellow ghettoes and on 
Indian reservations, yielded inferior education, denied the minorities access to 
the more rewarding occupations and thus withheld from succeeding 
generations the examples which stimulate self-advancement. The Equal 




Protection Clause does not require the Court to BLIND itself to what the 
world already knows.160 
Race Consciousness.  What the world already knew about race depended on 
the worldview of the people you asked.  Briefs supporting UC-Davis attempted to 
establish the primacy of race consciousness as a feature of twentieth century 
American life, or at least of twentieth century American university life. The rejection 
of colorblind ideology enjoined this belief.  The Deans of the University California 
Law Schools asserted that the need for race-consciousness was the single feature that 
united the various programs at stake in Bakke: “These ‘special admissions’ programs 
differ somewhat among the schools, both in the procedures used and in the size of the 
program.  They do have one common characteristic: they deliberately rely upon race 
or cultural background; almost without exception all persons admitted are members 
of minority groups.”161  This is true, argued the Deans, because a race-neutral solution 
to a racially-born inequality is “footless”:  “If there is a race-blind method of selection 
in a unitary program which will select out a meaningful number of persons from a 
relatively small group of minority applicants in competition with a much larger group 
of whites, we do not know what it is.”162  Furthermore, argued the brief from the 
National Employment Law Project, “the special admission program did not create 
racial categories; it made rational adjustments in selection procedures to equalize 
admission opportunities among the ‘qualified’ applicants.”163  To do otherwise is 
disingenuous, argued the Regents in their petition to grant certiorari.  For the 
Regents, it should be: 




Attempting to disguise those effects by advancing transparently ineffectual 
‘alternatives’ in an unacceptable way to deal with so fundamental a problem. 
Apart from the risk that it may breed cynicism about the rule of law, such an 
approach invites much the same kinds of evasive responses that this Court has 
found difficult to deal with in implementing Brown.164   
Pro-UC-Davis briefs argued that colorblind admissions processes were 
ineffective for several reasons: they were based on an unrealistic understanding of 
race; they failed to account for racial disparities in educational opportunities at lower 
levels; they constrained universities from achieving their goal of racially diverse 
student populations; and they disvalued a crucial component of American society – 
multiculturalism.  
Critics of colorblind ideology, such as Newfield, argue that such logic fails to 
recognize that “individual identity [is] simultaneously voluntary and involuntary,” 
and ignores “the history of racial progress in the United States derived at every point 
from race-conscious critiques of existing arrangements.”165  In contrast to notions of 
race articulated in the pro-Bakke briefs, proponents of racial pluralism have claimed 
that, although individual identity and choice were relevant to discussions of racial 
identity, nevertheless:  
hybridity, mobility, and freedom coexisted with a group-based life that 
societies assigned to the members of groups, particularly those that were 
disfavored.  That meant that democracy depended on the recognition of the 
political and economic realities created by that group life—by systemic racial 
inequalities, by ongoing racial disparities, by racism past and present.166 




Proponents of race consciousness in Bakke describe race more as an 
experience, inseparable from each person’s identity and providing benefits and 
disadvantages whether they are acknowledged or not.  This understanding of race 
leads to contextually-driven interpretations of race-related legal doctrine and policy, 
including the social context surrounding the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Moreover, they articulate more legal realist 
applications of laws and constitutional interpretations, including the effects of past 
discrimination on the current state medical access for minority communities, the 
impact of disparate educational opportunities on grade point averages and graduate 
test scores, and the practical social needs of remedial race-conscious policies. 
Remedial Societal Needs.  Many briefs, like many affirmative action policies 
at the time, argued that affirmative action programs resolve a race-specific critical 
need in the minority community – medical attention.  Arguments were couched in 
legal doctrine ranging from the constitutionally permissible “compelling state 
interest,” to anti-discrimination arguments, to citations of the Geneva Convention 
rules against the unresolved deaths of particular racial subgroups.  Doctors Price M. 
Cobbs and Ephraim Kahn petitioned the court on behalf of “members of various 
minority groups” attesting to the need for more minority doctors.  The NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund argued in support for the UC-Davis program for a 
variety of reasons – the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment allows it, the 
program stigmatizes neither whites nor minorities, a history of discrimination in 
medical education compels affirmative action – including the compelling goal of 
serving minority health needs.  The Association of American Law Schools claimed 




not only that special admissions programs had laudable goals, including the need for 
more minority lawyers and the upward social mobility that graduate schools offer, but 
that they were proven to produce successful minority lawyers. Dr. Jerome Lackner, 
the Director of California’s Department of Health, and Marion J. Woods, the Director 
of California’s Department of Benefits Payments, gave numerical evidence detailing 
the desperate need for medical help in California’s minority communities, paired with 
evidence that minority graduates of medical schools practice in minority areas “in far 
great proportion than their peers.”167  The UCLA Black Law Students Association et 
al. took a novel approach, arguing that the Genocide Convention of the United 
Nations “provides restrictions of international law” when “race discrimination results 
in the deaths of a significant portion of a racial subgroup,” which they assert is what 
is happening in medically underserved minority communities.168  The Fraternal Order 
of Police was one of the few briefs to combat this remedial argument, mirroring the 
majority’s argument in the California Supreme Court that the minority medical need 
does not justify more minority doctors, in part because it assumes that doctors will 
return to minority communities to set up practice, an assumption the FOP argued was 
unproven and stigmatizing. 
 Other briefs linked the UC-Davis program to the continuing mission of 
integration, set against a historical context of discrimination.  The brief of the Law 
School Admission Council, for instance, argued that admissions policies should make 
allowances for the effects of prior segregation, which had been judicially recognized 
as hampering educational achievement; they also argued that diversified 
representation in the profession is crucial to a fair and complete understanding of the 




nuances of that field.169  The American Medical Student Association and the Council 
on Legal Education Opportunity also evoked “integration” as their interest in the 
case. The Regents most clearly linked the special admissions program to the 
integration goals of Brown v. Board of Education: 
Among the applicants for admission to professional and graduate education in 
the 1970’s are minority students who attended elementary school in the 
immediate post-Brown environment. These are the children for whom Brown 
was a beacon of hope, a call for open education as an avenue of ending the 
effects of centuries of prejudice and suppression.  Yet these are also the 
children for whom the commitment expressed in Brown has been as much a 
hope as a reality—for whom, in many instances, the efforts to implement 
Brown were late, of even too late, in coming…170 
Others argued a structural approach:  the societal effects of racial 
discrimination made race-neutral entrance virtually impossible, especially when 
combined with entrance requirements that favored historically privileged groups, 
including whites, children of alumni and children of contributors.  The amicus brief 
from the Justice Department argued a combination of integrationist and structural 
discrimination justifications, asserting that although “this court has witnessed a 
history of discrimination against minority groups that does not require repetition 
here,” and that “discrimination has affected the medical profession no less than other 
professions,” in this case the “only question is whether a state university admissions 
program may take race into account to remedy the effects of societal discrimination.  
We submit that it may.”171  




Whether or not the race-conscious goals were temporal in nature – only in 
place until racial disparities cease to exist – or whether goals were more universally 
multicultural – a diverse student body is a valid educational goal in a pluralistic 
society – was a dividing line in the briefs.  For the former, race was primarily imbued 
with historical meaning; when discrimination was no more, then racial classifications 
would lose their importance as a remedial category.  For the latter, race was a cultural 
commonplace, bringing more than historical tales; with race comes traditions, habits, 
philosophical perspectives, different notions of identity, and different spheres of 
knowledge.  
Several affirmative action proponents base their arguments of race 
consciousness on the goal of a fully integrated, colorblind society.172  The Regents 
were among those who envisioned an end to the need for race-conscious policies:  
race, they argued, is “a personal characteristic relevant to the implementation of such 
[integrative] measures….and race will become irrelevant if the measures are 
permitted to succeed.”173  While it should be “…obvious by now [that] ‘our society 
cannot be completely color-blind in the short term if we are to have a color-blind 
society in the long term,’” argued the Regents, at some point “race-conscious 
admissions programs will no longer be required or justified.”174  The amicus briefs for 
the Bar Association of San Francisco and the Los Angeles County Bar Association, as 
well as the brief for the National Fund for Minority Engineering Students, supported 
affirmative action programs, but anticipated their end when “necessity ceases” or 
“minorities achieve equal access to professional schools and to the professions.”175 




The second – and not mutually exclusive – argument on behalf of a race conscious 
admissions policy was the benefit of a diverse student body. 
Diversity as a Social and Educational Good.  The appreciation of pluralism 
has been as central to American democracy as has the sense of individualism 
evidenced in liberal political theory.  Contemporary political theorists assert that the 
combination of free association and multiple group associations form the “central 
elements of liberal and democratic aspects of [American] politics” by setting faction 
against faction in the free market of ideas that assured no single group total power.176  
The argument for diversity embodies the most robust conception of race; one that 
considers racial categories as culturally-driven, wherein race is an embodiment of 
“broadly shared beliefs and social practices;” a concept referring to a community in 
both the physical and spiritual senses.177  For proponents of race-consciousness in the 
nationalist tradition, race means not only shared experiences, but also bringing 
particular talents, values, and specialized knowledge to a situation, all of which is part 
of an individual’s identity and character.  These talents, values, experiences, and 
specialized knowledge enrich the classroom and the skills of the profession, argued 
many proponents of race-conscious entrance programs. This conceptualization of race 
is also the one evoked in the spirit of cultural diversity, which went beyond remedial 
functions of race conscious policies to “assert a positive and liberating role of race 
consciousness.”178   
The Cleveland State University Chapter of the Black American Law Student 
Association summarized the positive associative benefits of diversity within 
professional schools: “Our…student body should be more representative of the 




outside world.  There is educational value in exposing students to the viewpoints of 
their peers from differing economic, social and cultural backgrounds.”179  The brief 
from Columbia, Harvard, Stanford, and University of Pennsylvania agreed:   
by not enrolling minority students in significant numbers, the amici were 
continuing to deny intellectual house room to a broad spectrum of diverse 
cultural insights, thereby perpetuating a sort of white myopia among students 
and faculty in many academic disciplines—most particularly the 
professions…A primary value of a liberal education should be exposure to 
new and provocative points of view, at a time in the student’s life when he or 
she…is eager for new intellectual experiences.  Minority students add such 
points of view, both in the classroom and in the larger university 
community.180  
 Often, the two goals of social justice for minority groups and multicultural 
benefits of a diverse student body were listed together. Peller argues that, by the 
1970s, such a merger was becoming more common in discourses about race:  
successes in struggles for political influence in or control of many cities, 
combined with the national commitment to ‘cultural diversity,’ began to echo 
features of the nationalist program as American mainstream institutions 
seemed to accommodate a diffused and limited version of black race 
consciousness.181  
The Regents’ brief listed both goals as legitimate educational objectives, although 
their articulation of a time limit made the latter seem to be an incidental benefit rather 
than an independent goal.182   The brief of the Law School Admission Council, for 




instance, argued that admissions policies should make allowances for the effects of 
prior segregation, which had been judicially recognized as hampering educational 
achievement; they also argued that diversified representation in the profession is 
crucial to a fair and complete understanding of the nuances of that field.183 
The Supreme Court had previously formed a similarly multicultural 
conclusion, if much narrower in scope, about higher education in Sweatt v. Painter 
(1950): 
…although the law is a highly learned profession, we are well aware that it is 
an intensely practical one. The law school, the proving ground for legal 
learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and 
institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has 
practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from 
the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is 
concerned.  The law school to which Texas is willing to admit petitioner 
excludes from its student body members of the racial groups which number 
85% of the population of the State and include most of the lawyers, witnesses, 
jurors, judges and other officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be 
dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas Bar.  With such a substantial 
and significant segment of society excluded, we cannot conclude that the 
education offered petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would 
receive if admitted to the University of Texas Law School.184 





The Regents’ plea that the Court not blind itself to what the world already 
knows was a more difficult request than it seemed: indeed, the evocation of blindness 
was a powerful tool of the opposing side.  Although the Supreme Court had never 
upheld the “colorblind” doctrine evoked in the dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, it was 
consistent with a primary function of the Court as interpreter of the Constitution:  
enacting social solidarity across the United States citizenry.  Given the increased 
value of multiculturalism discussed in Chapter Two, a twentieth century value-
recognition of a plurality of races, ethnicities, religions, and cultures that predated the 
nation, Robert Post argues that individualism may be a unifying American 
commonality: that is, Americans are similar in their appreciation for their 
individuality, and for the rights that support and protect it.  However, argues Post, if 
groups “argue that cultural diversity should be protected because group culture is 
essential to the identity of persons,” then “they do not share the common status of 
individuals, because they possess the (by hypothesis) distinct identities created by 
their groups.”185  If this is true, continues Post, then it would “account for the 
[Supreme Court’s] concern…that interpreting equal protection as authorizing special 
rights would effectively undermine ‘the dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a 
society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement,’…a dream 
the Court manifestly views as essential to constitutional unity.”186  
The final quote by Regents highlights more than differences in principles of 
scarcity: it highlights the different conceptions of race and its importance in public 
life.  The increasing “visibility” of whiteness as a contestable racial category, the role 




of race in individual identity, the extent to which race equals culture, and the value of 
racial and cultural diversity contributed to these negotiations. 
The backlash against coordinated group efforts highlights the tension between 
the values of individualism and collectivity that is underlying fault line in the Bakke 
case, as well as a consistent struggle in constitutional interpretation. Argues Post, 
“implicit in such decisions will always be a portrait of group relationships viewed 
from the perspective of national culture.”187 This is true, continues Post, because 
“democratic legitimacy ultimately rests upon the reconciliation of individual and 
collective autonomy, so that a democratic state must always maintain a relationship 
with its citizens, viewed as individuals.  Individualism is the modern ideology, par 
excellence, because the only thing we have in common is our status as individuals.  
Individualism is thus the only ideology capable of sustaining the legitimacy of the 
contemporary, heterogeneous state.”188 
No single brief, including the petition from UC-Davis, separated the 
justification of diversity from the broader remedial goal of affirmative action 
programs.  Just as the Brown justification of integration was multi-tiered, including 
both the unconstitutional disparate treatment and the benefits of remedying that 
treatment, most amici supporting the program included diversity more as a 
consequence of affirmative action programs, the justification of which was to increase 
access to minority groups whom they felt were underserved.  Justice Powell’s goal, 
then, would be “to establish a fragile balance between, on the one hand, allowing 
academic affirmative action plans to continue as a means of redressing deep social 




dislocations and, on the other, ideologically destabilizing such plans so as to prevent 
their slide into a regime of racial and ethnic rights and entitlements.”189 
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Mapping the Middle Ground in Bakke;  
Lewis Powell’s Inventional Process and the Ideological 
Articulation of “Diversity” 
 
In 1977, only three years after declining to decide on a similar case, the U.S. 
Supreme Court faced another case questioning the fairness of affirmative action in 
higher education: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.  The justices, as a 
whole, were having trouble determining the grounds for their decision.  None of the 
justices thought that the case between white applicant Allan Bakke and the Regents of 
the University of California was ideal.  Justice Thurgood Marshall, who would later 
advocate overturning the lower court’s ruling and upholding the UC-Davis 
affirmative action program in the final opinion, said during deliberations that, 
“despite the lousy record, the poorly reasoned lower court opinion, and the absence of 
parties of those who will be most affected by the decision (the Negro applicants), we 
are stuck with this case.”1  Four of the justices thought the UC-Davis admissions 
program was discriminatory (John Paul Stevens, Potter Stewart, William Rehnquist, 
and Chief Justice Warren Burger), but nevertheless wanted to avoid making a 
constitutional declaration about the program, and hoped to resolve the case 
statutorily, under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  This way, they reasoned, 
the Court could once again avoid deciding the constitutionality of affirmative action 
as a policy, which had burgeoned over the past decade in public institutions, in 




government contract decision-making, and in the language of presidential executive 
orders.  Four other justices (William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, 
and Byron White) found a far different interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
as well as the Fourteenth Amendment.  They argued that the history of these acts, 
paired with ongoing racial inequities, motivated an interpretation that made the UC-
Davis task force program constitutional (the “task force program” being the moniker 
that UC-Davis had given to its affirmative action program), and they believed that the 
Court should speak directly to its constitutionality. 
Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. found both solutions to be onerous for 
jurisprudential and pragmatic reasons, however.  He argued that Title VI could not be 
interpreted as having a substantively different meaning than the Fourteenth 
Amendment; so deciding on Title VI would, essentially, be deciding on the 
constitutional issue, anyway.  Moreover, Powell warned his colleagues that failing to 
reach the constitutional question would both be perceived as – and would, indeed, 
actually be – an act of avoidance that left an important public question unanswered.  
Yet he proclaimed to have serious trouble with UC-Davis’s solution to the lack of 
minority students in its medical school, which was to develop a task force program 
which held aside 16 of the 100 available medical school seats for minority students. 
This arrangement meant that white applicants could only compete for 84 of the 100 
seats, while minority applicants could compete for all of them.  His ambivalence put 
Powell in a unique position in relation to his colleagues, who wanted either to affirm 
the lower court’s decision striking down the UC-Davis program, or to overturn the 
decision, thus legitimizing the two-track system.  His ambivalence also put him in the 




best, albeit difficult, position to author the opinion of the Court.  As chief justice, 
Burger assigned this duty, and Brennan suggested to him that Powell write the 
opinion for Bakke.2 On May 2, 1978, Burger circulated a memo to the conference 
agreeing to this:  “Given the posture of this case, Bill Brennan and I conferred with a 
view to considering what may fairly be called a ‘joint’ assignment. There being four 
definitive decisions tending one way, four another, Lewis’ position can be joined in 
part by some or all of each ‘four group.’ Accordingly, the case is assigned to 
Lewis...”3 
The Court’s ambivalence about how to deal with affirmative action reflected 
wider public uncertainty about the policy, an occurrence which itself embodies the 
symbiotic relationship between the public and the courts.  The Supreme Court is 
never insulated from the community of which it is part, to whom it speaks, and which 
it serves a role in rhetorically constituting through its judgments.  It necessarily draws 
its justificatory resources from the larger rhetorical environment, in this case 
including discourses about colorblindness and race consciousness, the value and 
meaning of race, and higher education’s role in the United States.  Analysis of 
Powell’s inventional process in the Bakke case reveals a Court self-reflective about its 
constitutive role, and balancing the material features of this specific case against 
jurisprudential norms as well as their own constructed narratives about the role of 
race in a democratic society. 
The nature of those jurisprudential norms is complicated. While the basic 
charge of the Supreme Court is agreed upon – to pass appellate judgment on lower 
court decisions in light of their adherence to constitutional and other legal principles – 




the scope of the Court’s authority in the broader governmental structure, its 
appropriate concern with policy implications, the justices’ role as institutional 
stewards, and the appropriate use of legal doctrines are but a few ways that individual 
justices might disagree.4  These differences are negotiated during deliberations as 
well as through the circulation of memoranda and opinion drafts, and final opinions 
often bear the imprint of those negotiations through compromises in justifications, 
altered narratives of the case, and omissions of particular points.   
This is not to say that justices merely behave strategically toward self-
interested policy goals.5  Howard Gillman and Cornell Clayton argue that “justices’ 
behavior might be motivated not only by a calculation about prevailing opportunities 
and risks but also by a sense of duty or obligation about their responsibilities to the 
law and the Constitution and by a commitment to act as judges rather than as 
legislators or executives.”6  Ideological structures control both the ruler and the ruled, 
and justices are bound by the rules that they help constitute because “individuals who 
are associated with particular institutions often come to believe that their position 
imposes upon them an obligation to act in accordance with particular expectations 
and responsibilities.”7 For Powell, the Court’s responsibilities included the duty to 
speak clearly about how affirmative action policies might properly be administered.   
This chapter examines Justice Powell’s inventional process as he used the 
rhetorical resources at his disposal – pulled from the larger rhetorical environment 
surrounding Bakke and transformed into the language of the law – to craft the Court’s 
deciding opinion, in which he concluded that the goal of a diverse student body was a 
compelling enough state interest to justify the consideration of race as one factor in 




the university admissions process.  Powell and his law clerks began their work by 
using legal topoi to interrogate the validity of the amicus briefs, party briefs, various 
legal doctrines, and other justices’ arguments in light of institutional traditions of 
decision-making.  Then, pulling on strains of public discourse about the role of race 
in the United States and mindful of the public audiences who would bear the force of 
the result, Powell and his clerks justified the holding by pairing the pro-Bakke 
ideological principles of individualism and competition with the pro-Davis principles 
of race-conscious diversity and academic freedom.    
Finally, a justice’s decision-making habits will limit the types of wider 
arguments that will be accepted.  As opinion writer, Powell held a position that 
“enjoys an agenda-setting advantage, given his or her ability to propose a policy 
position from the range of available policy alternatives.”8  Powell’s pragmatic 
jurisprudential style and personal experience on educational boards would influence 
the choices he made.  Yet, “because outcomes on the Supreme Court depend on 
forging a majority coalition that for most cases must consist of at least five justices, 
there is good reason to expect that final Court opinions will be the product of a 
collaborative process.”9  Supreme Court opinions are acts of collective authorship – 
even in rare cases like Bakke in which a single justice writes the narrow holding of 
the Court – and Powell would need to coordinate with his fellow justices to cull 
together both a holding and a series of justifications that supported it.   
Powell’s primary law clerk for the Bakke case, Robert Comfort, proved to be a 
key dialectical resource for Powell as he negotiated these factors.  A central function 
of Comfort’s memos was to open up possibilities for arguments, as well as revealing 




weaknesses.  His lengthy bench memo served as a deliberative map throughout 
Powell’s opinion-crafting process – just as the briefs had functioned as a reservoir of 
arguments for Comfort and the other law clerks and, before that, strains of public 
discourses had been pulled from the larger rhetorical environment into the Bakke 
briefs.  These discourses were filtered through institutional rhetorical traditions 
which, bearing their own ideological leanings, entrench some principles and discount 
others, allowing certain experiences to be heard and others to be silenced.  In turn, the 
topoi laid out by Comfort for Powell were judged against the multiple audiences for 
which Powell would write:  primarily, the other justices and ultimately the wider 
public.   
Taking Inventory of Legal Topoi 
Early questions in the Bakke case began as all Supreme Court cases do: that is, 
in ancient terms, to determine the stasis of the issue, or to figure out which of these 
issues was at the center of the dispute. George L. Pullman argues that the notion of 
stasis is as relevant today as it was during Aristotle’s time, especially in judicial and 
deliberative proceedings.  Pullman defines stasis as “the discursive pause created 
when a difference of opinion arises.  Heuristically, stasis is a series of hierarchically 
arranged questions that can be used to locate specific differences of opinion within a 
broader disagreement.”10  Generally, the Supreme Court’s search for stasis involves 
determining whether it fits the Supreme Court’s guidelines for granting certiorari, 
reviewing the party briefs, amicus briefs, and lower court decisions, and deciding 
what they would consider to be the relevant issues.    




Law clerks were integral to this inventory process, especially in outlining the 
discrete facts or controversies surrounding the case, the precedents that might relate, 
and the possibilities for interpretive strategies.  This inventional help comes in two 
waves: by a clerk who briefs each of the cases’ request of certiorari for the benefit of 
all of the justices, and a more detailed “bench memo” from a law clerk within each 
justice’s chambers.  Bench memos are detailed summaries of the facts, arguments, 
precedents, and suggested conclusions offered by the parties, non-party groups and 
individuals, lower courts, and any other sources that law clerks find to be relevant.11 
The specific duties of law clerks may vary within each justice’s chambers, but they 
always “consist of legal research and writing. Clerks conduct research, prepare 
memoranda, and draft orders an opinions.”12   
An additional function of Powell’s law clerks was to engage him in a process 
that the sophists called antilogic: a dialectic exercise in which an arguer explored the 
possible consequences and weaknesses of the other’s argument until discrepancy or 
unacceptable solution was found.13  Aristotle posited that the process of arguing both 
sides is beneficial to rhetorical needs:  “one should be able to argue persuasively on 
either side of the question…not that we may actually do both (for one should not 
persuade what is debased) but in order that it may not escape our notice what the real 
state of the case is and that we ourselves may be able to refute if another person uses 
speech unjustly.”14   
Justice Powell found in his relationship with his law clerks a useful dialectic. 
He proclaimed to have chosen clerks from various political leanings so that he would 
have counter-arguments at the ready:  “[Powell] prided himself on hiring liberal 




clerks.  He would tell his clerks that the conservative side of the issues came to him 
naturally. Their job was to present the other side, to challenge him. He would rather 
encounter a compelling argument for another position in the privacy of his own 
chambers, than to meet it unexpectedly at conference or in a dissent.”15  
Thus, inventionally, law clerks performed “an indispensable role” to Powell, who 
said:  
in providing stimulation, challenge and testing of ideas and positions….I want 
someone of an independent mind who will test, as well as stimulate, my own 
thinking…It is most helpful, therefore, to have a clerk—in a bench memo or 
in verbal discussion—present the best view that can be taken to each side of a 
case.  In the end, of course, I have to cast a vote and often support it in a 
written opinion…But until I have ‘come to rest’ my office, and my attentive 
ear, is open.16   
After choosing his law clerks, Powell actively encouraged them to familiarize 
themselves with his opinions so that they would understand his judicial philosophy by 
the time they arrived.17  As a result, Artemus Ward and David L. Weiden argue, 
“Powell’s clerks knew that he was often searching for a moderate position in tough 
cases.”18   
In the cover letter of his bench memo for Bakke, law clerk Robert Comfort 
reflected knowledge of his justice’s pragmatic habits when he described his attempts 
as “an effort to separate the issues which must be addressed from those that need not 
be, to present those issues in a logical sequence, and to map out the middle ground 
which avoids the dire consequences each side predicts if it should lose.”19  The bench 




memo – which Powell declared on the cover letter to be an “Excellent memo” – laid 
out in meticulous detail the available legal topoi, the judicial starting places of 
argument.20  In turn, Powell wrote his thoughts in the margins, including areas of 
agreement and disagreement with Comfort’s assessment, as well as underlining 
salient points.  In this manner, Powell engaged in a dialectic on the issues, 
encountering the arguments from the parties and amici – those starting places of 
“facts,” precedents, and public culture – through the lens of the pre-existing standards 
of legal interpretation. Comfort subsumed the context-specific arguments within the 
topical frames of legal doctrine:  the diverse arguments supplied by the briefs became 
sublimated, used as rhetorical artifacts to either support or undermine particular 
possibilities for acceptable legal interpretations.  These “starting points” cannot easily 
be separated from the reasoning that bears out a fully formed argument:  both 
Comfort and Powell would use this document throughout the opinion-writing process, 
the first draft of which was written by Comfort on October 6, 1977, just over a month 
after the bench memo was completed and six days before oral arguments were held.  
This inventory was rhetorically fruitful enough to determine the stasis of the case, to 
frame discussions with other justices, and to serve as the basis for Powell’s final 
opinion. 
 Pre-Bench Memo: A Search for Authority 
 
After the Court decides to hear a case, law clerks brief their justices on the 
case in anticipation of oral arguments.  The most substantive of the memos is, of 
course, the bench memo.  However, clerks also point out the particular amicus briefs, 




academic and law review articles, and newspaper articles that they find pertinent in a 
pre-Bench memorandum. 
  In June 1977, three months before the bench memo was written, Powell 
received an annotated bibliography “on the DeFunis/Bakke question,” which included 
ten academic sources about the questions of discrimination, affirmative action, and 
higher education.  The sources included mostly law review articles, as well as an 
article from Philosophy and Public Affairs and a book.  Of these, the author (signed 
only as “Willy” in the memo) recommended that Powell read for himself the book, 
entitled Discriminating Against Discrimination (1975) by former Brennan law clerk 
Robert M. O’Neil, which “strongly favors preferential minority admissions 
programs;” an article by Michigan law professor Terrance Sandalow entitled “Racial 
Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role,” 
(1975) which accompanied a comment by the clerk that the article “strikes me as does 
much of the other literature on the topic – a cataloguing of the societal values to be 
served, and a rather perfunctory legal analysis;” University of Chicago law professor 
Richard A. Posner’s article about DeFunis and the constitutional impropriety of 
preferential treatment based on race, no matter what the justificatory grounds; and 
two published symposiums, one of which Willy found useful because, (s)he argued, 
the non-prestigious status of the law school rendered the writings more approachable 
and effects-driven.21  
From the fifty-eight briefs filed, Comfort wrote to Powell that only twelve “of 
the briefs and articles concerned with this case…merit your attention. Some of the 
briefs are included not for quality,” Comfort explained, “but because they present a 




unique argument.”22  These briefs included: The American Jewish Committee, for its 
“strong pro-Bakke arguments;” the Association of American Law Schools, because 
Comfort thought it was “one of the best expressions of the professional schools’ 
admissions concerns”; The Anti-Defamation League of the B’nai B’rith, both because 
of the author – “Professor Kurland” – and because of its brevity; the Chamber of 
Commerce, of which Powell been a member, because of the “good discussions of 
United Jewish Orgs and other special benefits cases;” Howard University, due to its 
“concern about the demise of affirmative action;” the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil 
Rights Under Law, the “only [brief to offer] discussion of independent state ground;” 
the NAACP, because it offered a Title VI argument that Powell’s colleagues found 
important; the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, which Comfort recommended that 
Powell “skim” because it offered “historical argument[s] from Freedmen’s Bureau 
Act, etc;” The National Association of Minority Contractors, both because it was 
“short” and the “closest thing to a structured way of viewing the case;” Board of 
Governors of Rutgers due to a “unique Thirteenth Amendment argument;” the Order 
of the Sons of Italy, which Comfort declared a “marginal choice” that “contains some 
interesting arguments dealing with the threat of a system of proportional 
representation,” meriting a “skim;” and finally, the brief from the Young Americans 
for Freedom, for “purely…historical interest; Marco DeFunis is on the brief,” next to 
which Comfort wrote, “laugh.”23 
 The law clerks also searched through the leading law review journals, and 
Comfort reported on these, as well, in the same memo.  “Most of the articles,” wrote 
Comfort, “simply are not very good.  Sandalow’s does the best job of pulling together 




the various considerations in a coherent form,” and “it might be worth reading Ely, 
The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination…since that is the 
fountainhead of the political argument favoring Petitioner’s view of the Equal 
Protection Clause.”24  His assessment was based on the paucity of precedent related to 
the current case: “Because there simply is not that much detailed legal analysis to be 
done in this area – there are virtually no cases on point – law review pieces do not add 
that much to the arguments made in the better briefs. Beyond the ones listed here, 
none of them repay close study.”25 Powell agreed:  on the cover of this memo, Powell 
wrote, “Good memo. Articles are not helpful.”26 The clerks and Powell would find it 
necessary, then, to craft their own pathway to a decision. 
 The Bench Memo: A Search for Stasis 
 
Chapter One identified the main inventional topoi, or starting places of 
argument, for contemporary judicial argument. They include the “facts” of the case, 
the various constitutional and statutory interpretations under question, the precedents 
that may be applicable to the case, other justices’ arguments about the case, and the 
public culture surrounding the case.  From these interrelated starting places, justices 
construct the rhetorical resources necessary to form an acceptable legal judgment: 
these include the building and maintenance of the Court’s authority; specific 
constructions of history which support and even naturalize the outcomes that the 
opinion argues for; and maintaining and building upon certain features of legal 
culture which confer institutional legitimacy and legal decision-making.  Comfort’s 
bench memo dealt with each of these topoi, along with the construction of resulting 
rhetorical artifacts.  As he did so, Comfort – and Powell, in his handwritten notes on 




the memo – rejected those arguments that were unsupportable under their 
interpretations of the legal topoi or which would not offer the necessary rhetorical 
resources for crafting a final opinion. 
In his table of contents, Comfort divided the bench memo into two sections, 
the first addressing the “obstacles to review on the merits” – problems with offering a 
judicial opinion based on the questions asked – and “judicial review of the task force 
program,” in which he detailed the possible standards of judgment that the Court 
could consider.  Comfort folded the party and amici arguments under these broader 
categories.  Of the four subcategories detailing potential standards for judicial review, 
the section addressing the applicability of strict scrutiny was disproportionately 
larger, at 43 pages of a 70-page memo.  This was true in part because of the large 
number of party and amicus briefs that addressed it, and in part because it is the 
clerk’s job to consider how the arguments could be answered under existing 
jurisprudential standards and the level of scrutiny is often foundational to 
discrimination cases. 
Comfort’s memo was outlined chronologically, in the order that the Court 
would have to consider the case (whether to decide the case on its merits, then on 
what specific grounds to decide it).  For each of these categories, he offered a 
summary and a preliminary personal comment, followed by the benefits and 
drawbacks of each major argument.  For the concept of strict scrutiny, Comfort 
summarized arguments from the parties and amici against and for its use, including 
whether or not the majoritarian process protects whites such as Bakke; whether the 
program creates a stigma against whites, and if that matters; whether the tradition and 




history of the Equal Protection Clause support such an application; whether the 
judiciary is qualified to determine which races and ethnicities have been sufficiently 
disadvantaged so as to deserve special treatment; and whether this case is a question 
of expanding access to all, or one of dividing limited access among more people. 
Next, Comfort engaged in a preliminary judgment of the legal topoi, addressing 
“consideration of competing arguments of the application of strict scrutiny,” under 
which he critiqued the relative persuasiveness and judicial feasibility of the claims he 
outlined.27  He separately considered the legal standard of “substantial state interests 
served by the program,” which he divided into similar sub-categories: a brief 
summary of the question at hand, a summary of Bakke’s and UC-Davis’s claims, and 
his evaluation of those claims.  Finally, he addressed a legal standard not significantly 
addressed by the briefs, but important to a decision about strict scrutiny: whether the 
task force program was necessary to promote the state interests addressed in the 
previous section.28    
Comfort summarized the main “fact” necessary to review the case: “Assuming 
that all obstacles to review on the merits are passed,” wrote Comfort, “no one seems 
to deny that race-related decisions of university faculties and administrations are 
reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause.”29  Thus, Comfort moved on to the 
second category, entitled “Judicial Review of the Task Force Program.” In this 
section, Comfort outlined the Court’s authority to review the program.  This is an 
important starting place of judicial argument, because its authority to speak on any 
case is not a given: it is constructed by the Supreme Court.  Even the capacity for 
judicial review was a carefully constructed argument made by the Court in Marbury 




v. Madison (1803), and because it lacks any enforcement body, the Supreme Court 
depends on the assent of its audiences for its legitimacy.30   
  In most of this section, Comfort addressed a major argument put forth by 
supporters of UC-Davis: that of academic freedom.  “When Petitioner and its allied 
amici call for this Court to recognize their discretion to make decisions related to the 
educational process, they are not claiming academic freedom from judicial scrutiny of 
racial classifications, nor could they.”31  Comfort continued by asserting that the 
argument for “judicial restraint” – meaning that the Court declines to review the 
racial classifications altogether – was not an option for the Supreme Court in this 
situation, for both precedential reasons and for appearance of consistency.  To this 
latter point, Comfort pointed out that “this Court obviously would not allow a 
classification that operated against minority groups to go unreviewed.”32   
Nevertheless, Comfort did not find this point to be fatal to the possibility of 
using “academic freedom” as a justification for a certain amount of judicial restraint, 
because there is precedent for such an argument. Because precedents cue a primary 
source of justification in Supreme Court legal arguments, they are crucial to the 
inventional process.  After examining the holding of San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez (1973), Comfort concluded that they could rely on it for 
precedential support, because its “admonition [against judicial interference in 
academic freedom] appears to stand for the proposition that once strict scrutiny has 
been by-passed, it is not for judges to second-guess educators in matters of 
educational policy.”33 




Comfort noted that there were some – though few – who argued that all racial 
classifications are per se invalid. These included an amicus brief from the American 
Federation of Teachers and, importantly, the California Supreme Court, whose 
opinion was now being reviewed.  Finally, Comfort noted a significant party who did 
not argue that racial classifications are always invalid – Allan Bakke.34  Thus, 
Comfort concluded, “the applicability vel non of strict scrutiny, and the related 
inquiries into the state’s interest and its means, present the major points of contention 
in the case.”35 To this point, he devoted most of the remaining space. 
The first step was to define the “nature of the task force program.”  In the 
briefs, this question evoked narrative histories of racial inequalities justifying the 
program, of university goals created to meet multiple needs of its student bodies, of 
the medical community’s call for such programs, and charges of discrimination 
lodged against it.  For legal decision-making purposes, however, Comfort declared 
the only relevant question to be the crucial charge from Bakke’s brief:  whether or not 
the task force program excluded whites from competing for all available seats.  
Powell shared this belief, writing underneath the header, “Is it a racial quota?” and in 
the margins, “Courts below found it was a quota system – I’m inclined to agree. 
Always will be 16 seats for which whites may not compete. Others may compete for 
100.”36  Comfort cared less about the definitional argument between a quota and a 
goal, summarizing that “both the ‘quota’ label and the academic freedom argument 
seem to be smokescreens at this level of the analysis. They will become relevant when 
the nature of the state’s interest and the concomitant means are examined. Calling 




this a goal rather than a quota does not change the fact that in practical terms a 
minimum number of seats is allotted to non-whites.”37 
 For Comfort, “much of the rhetoric and confusion generated by the various 
briefs stems from not breaking the problem down into its component analytical steps 
and recognizing [strict scrutiny] as the first.”38 Comfort argued that the stasis of this 
argument was the appropriate legal doctrine, and further that the appropriate legal 
doctrine was the application of strict scrutiny to the race-conscious admissions 
program.  He began by summarizing UC-Davis’s argument – that their form of racial 
classification is benign, because “it favors minorities traditionally protected by the 
Equal Protection Clause,” thus “insulat[ing] it from the strict scrutiny applied to 
classifications disfavoring those minorities.”39  From there, Comfort subdivided the 
arguments into other legal, political, and social arguments against the application of 
strict scrutiny.  Next to most of these categories, Powell wrote either counter-
arguments or dismissive statements.  
 The first argument dealt with political power – namely, that the Equal 
Protection Clause protects minorities against the “ravages of the majoritarian 
process,” next to which Powell wrote “But see Castemada.”40  To the argument that 
the classification is allowable because it does not stigmatize whites nor brand them as 
inferior, Powell countered, “But the selection process is segregated.”41 He did not 
comment on the tradition and history of the 14th Amendment (the Equal Protection 
Clause was intended to aid disadvantaged groups, not to forbid classifications that 
would help them), nor on Comfort’s summary of the precedent of Washington v. 
Davis (1976) offered by several amici, which they argue finds that segregative intent 




must be shown.  Powell wrote “Nothing to this” next the argument provided by 
Rutgers that the absence of African Americans from medical schools constitutes a 
badge of slavery, evoking the protections of the Thirteenth Amendment.42  Finally, 
Powell he wrote ironic quotation marks around the word “Benefits” in Comfort’s title 
“Judicial Approval of Race-Related Benefits,” as well as the comment next to 
Comfort’s list of precedents that “Strict scrutiny has not been applied to ‘benefits’. 
But these cases did not deprive whites of anything.”43  
By dismissing the arguments against strict scrutiny, Powell was doing more 
than measuring them against jurisprudential norms:  he was making decisions about 
the role that race does and should play within the nation’s political system.   Because 
the legal category of “strict scrutiny” is used to measure the extent to which race is 
considered suspicious, it preserves within it assumptions about “good” and “bad” uses 
of race.  Thus, the category of strict scrutiny performs an ideological function – it 
assumes that racial categories are inherently suspect, because they violate the 
principle of individualism.44  This, in turn, belies a conception of race consciousness 
that is “associated with status-based social coercion,” depriving the individual of his 
or her choice of group membership.45  Powell would reiterate the principle of 
individualism throughout his deliberations and in his final opinion.  
After doing away with arguments against strict scrutiny, Comfort then 
addressed arguments that supported its application.  “Respondent and his allies insist 
that strict scrutiny ought to be applied to the Task Force program,” summarized 
Comfort. “Indeed, they take the position that strict scrutiny ought to attend every 
instance of racial classification.”46  As with the counter-arguments, Comfort listed 




sub-categories of argument, based on party and amicus briefs.  The first in support of 
strict scrutiny was “‘Equality’ Means Equality”: “Looking at the language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, even in the light of its historical origins as a shield for black 
rights, one may ask the following question: to whom are non-whites to be ‘equal’ if 
not to whites?”47   
For these briefs, equality is construed as both colorblind and individual.  
Comfort marshaled the credibility of Professor Philip B. Kurland in the B’nai B’rith 
brief to support that argument for color-blindness; in this case that the Equal 
Protection Clause “must mean that all races are entitled to the same protection.”48  An 
even more supportable argument, according to Comfort, was one that framed 
Fourteenth Amendment rights as individual in nature:  “The conclusion that all 
individuals, regardless of color, are entitled to the same protection under the 14th 
Amendment finds support in several famous dicta cited by Respondent and his 
allies,” including Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), which concluded that “‘The rights 
created by the first section of the 14th Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the 
individual. They are personal rights.’”49 
Comfort next summarized the a-historical construction of race forwarded by 
Bakke’s brief: namely, that there is no principled way to determine which minority 
groups have been “historically/politically disadvantaged,” that “politics consists of 
coalitions of various minority interest groups, each one putting pressure on the 
legislators.”50 Moreover, Comfort argued, “the frame of reference for the 
majority/minority test is never made clear: city, county, state, nation.”51 Offering a 
hypothetical, Comfort asked, “Would discrimination against blacks not trigger strict 




scrutiny in Newark, NJ, Detroit, or the District of Columbia, simply because blacks 
are the majority race in those localities and control political institutions?”52  The same 
reasoning was used to negate the argument that no stigma was attached to racial 
distinctions, and Comfort offered valuable precedents to support this reading.  
Protections against discrimination “applied equally to whites and non-whites, 
eliminating any clear ‘stigma’ to one race or the other, including Shelley, Loving, 
McLaughlin, and Buchanan.”53 
Comfort next voiced a distrust of university faculty similar to that Powell had 
articulated in his pre-nomination memorandum to the Chair of the Chamber of 
Commerce Education Committee, entitled “Attack on the Free Enterprise System.”54  
The university campus, Powell argued in that memo, “is the single most dynamic 
source” of the attack on free enterprise, from the “Marxist faculty member at the 
University of California at San Diego,” to the “convinced socialists” and the “liberal 
critic.”55   Likewise, Comfort posited in his memo that another problem with the 
political safeguard argument forwarded by UC-Davis was that “the group 
discriminating against [Bakke] was not the democratically elected legislature…but a 
medical school faculty.  There is no particular reason to believe that this group is 
susceptible to the majoritarian political safeguards Ely and Petitioner laud.”56  The 
particular ideological leaning of the professors make it less likely for Bakke to be 
treated sympathetically, argued Comfort: “Nor is there any reason to believe that a 
liberal, highly educated professor will be more likely to be impressed with the 
problems of a lower class, marginal white applicant, than with those of a non-
white.”57  




 Under a subsection entitled “Problems of Judicial Competence,” Comfort 
forwarded Bakke’s argument that deciding whether something is “benign” or not is 
beyond capacity of judiciary.58 If the Supreme Court attempts to answer this question, 
then they face worse consequences than charges of legal realism: Bakke argued that, 
because “most of the ethnic groups comprised by American society have 
faced…prejudice and hostility,” then “courts will be faced with myriad competing 
claims to ‘target’ minority status.” Because “principled bases for such racial 
distinctions…are hard to imagine…strict scrutiny ought to be applied to all 
classifications dealing with race.”59  This fear of balkanization, prevalent in wider 
public arguments about the dangers of race conscious laws and policies, appealed to 
Powell, who used language similar to Bakke’s “competing groups” argument in his 
final opinion. 
 In the bench memo, Comfort devoted space in both sides of the argument to 
the different articulations of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment: an important 
search, because the rhetorical construction of history is another staple of the judicial 
opinion.  In order to motivate acceptance of a particular interpretation in light of the 
particularities of a given case, a legal author must offer a history of the principle and 
of the case that makes her conclusion seem logical, natural, or inevitable.60  Thus, the 
various constructions of history offered by the briefs and justices are foundational to 
the inventional process.  Additionally, these constructions of history reflect long-
standing assumptions about the nature of race, and the capability of positive law to 
mediate social relations.   




In arguments supporting strict scrutiny, Comfort relied on Bakke’s brief, 
which argued that while the Fourteenth Amendment was passed “exclusively as a 
shield for blacks, see, e.g., The Slaughterhouse Cases…, it is too late in the day to 
restrict that Amendment to some narrow class of historical ‘wards.’”61  At this point, 
“some form of heightened scrutiny” has been given to “Asians, aliens, women, and 
illegitimates,” Comfort summarized in language that Powell would later modify to 
less polarizing descriptions.  Powell circled each of these categories and wrote in the 
margins, “E/P Clause not limited to blacks.”62  Powell and Comfort would expand on 
this notion of an increasingly heterogeneous nation in drafts of Powell’s opinion, 
forwarding an articulation of history that Vincent N. Parrillo labels the “fallacies of 
cultural homogeneity.”63  This version of American racial history imagines an early 
colonial population consisting almost entirely of British immigrants of similar 
cultural beliefs and habits, juxtaposed against a contemporary America wherein 
cultural diversity is “not only a new construction but somehow also a threat to the 
cohesiveness of American society.”64 
The scarcity of resources had been a strain of discourse far-reaching into the 
history of the Bakke case, and its reliance on the principles of economic reasoning fit 
with Powell’s values, strains of which were seen in the anxious memo to the Chamber 
of Commerce.  Shades of the scarcity argument had been seen in public discourse 
about race for centuries: for example, amid fears about freed slaves taking jobs held 
by whites and in arguments about immigrant access to the country and its benefits. In 
Bakke, the principle of scarcity motivated the creation of programs like the one under 
question, as more and more students applied for a limited number of graduate school 




seats, making students of color less of the total percentage applying.  It also motivated 
the economic counter-argument of competition, which Bakke used to argue against 
the fairness of the program.  In his bench memo, Comfort borrowed the 
characterization of the subtitle “Expanding and Dividing Pies” from legal journal 
articles to summarize this principle of scarcity as it relates to past and current cases.  
The cases UC-Davis cited to support their program “involved what Professor Redish 
would call ‘expanding pies,’” Comfort explained to Powell:65 
In Lau and United Jewish Orgs., society’s assets do not look like a single pie, 
which can be divided up only by taking away from some in order to give to 
others. Instead, the pie is being expanded, so that some may get a larger share 
without taking anything away from anyone else.  Admission to medical 
school, however, is not an expanding pie, and there is no question, said 
Respondent, that the Task Force attempt to give more of it to minority group 
members takes some away from persons like Bakke.  This fact of imposing 
affirmative burden distinguishes Bakke’s case from the special benefit cases.66 
 In addition to testing the limits of particular arguments, the inventional topoi 
distinctions are also used to open up creative space for argument.  Comfort and 
Powell were looking for ways to allow some consideration of race, despite Powell’s 
distaste for the particular program under question.  The lower court had declared any 
consideration of race to be unconstitutional, and not a single member of the Court 
was willing to uphold this ruling as it stood, because the consequences would be to 
end affirmative action programs altogether.  Thus, this category of expanding and 
dividing pies sparked an important aside from Comfort: “[It also serves to narrow an 




affirmance in this case down from a death sentence to all affirmative action. 
Affirmative action which does not exclude anyone from full consideration on account 
of his race – recruitment, remedial programs, etc – would not be implicated 
necessarily by an affirmance in this case. Those are expanding pie situations, while 
this case involves a dividing pie.]”67  
 Having outlined the dominant arguments surrounding the question of strict 
scrutiny, Comfort offered his analysis of what the above-mentioned categories meant 
for the case.  After working the specifics of the case against the generalized legal 
topoi, Comfort concluded several things:  that reliance on precedent alone was an 
untenable solution; that neither the Court nor the universities had the authority to 
declare which races were disadvantaged, and that the Court’s attempts to do so would 
deprive the Equal Protection Clause of its useful ambiguity; that, because of this, 
strict scrutiny of all racial classifications is the only acceptable standard; and that 
room could be made under the standards of strict scrutiny to allow some 
consideration of race. 
First, Comfort declared Bakke the winner on matters of legal precedent and 
established doctrines for interpretation – components that Comfort characterized as 
“authority” – in large part because the question is new to the Court, and to the history 
of race relations in the United States.  “The major reason for the lack of authority 
supporting Respondent,” asserted Comfort, “may be the simple historical fact that 
discrimination in favor of a ‘target’ minority has occurred to a significant degree only 
recently.  Thus, in the century of Fourteenth Amendment exegesis, there was never 
any need to consider any racial classifications that did not involve the hallmarks 




Petitioner describes.”68  Because of the lack of precedent, Comfort concluded that the 
tradition of stare decisis was unhelpful in deciding the Bakke case: “legal (i.e. case-
by-case) analysis is of…little avail on this issue. The question requires a decision on 
the contours of the Equal Protection Clause in light of social and historical changes, 
changes which this Court to a large extent helped bring about.”69  In cases where 
there is no clear precedent, the choice of starting places is opened wider for justices. 
Warren Wright argues that: 
In the absence of clear precedent, …the judge makes what amounts to 
legislative choices; his official opinion then is the rhetorical medium for 
defending his choices…If the judge extends the principle ‘logically,’ his 
inventio is the logic of that extension; if he elects to extend it historically, he 
refers to the origins and the evolution of the principle; if he extends it 
traditionally, his material is drawn from the customs of the community; if he 
extends the principle sociologically, his reasoning is rooted in the attitudes, 
the aspirations, and the social needs of the community…The choice in all 
instances is guided by the circumstances of the case and by the judge’s 
experience.  But there is a choice.70 
  The choice that Comfort recommended was temporal in nature. Traditional 
judicial frameworks extend their temporal valence toward the past – an orientation he 
declared unhelpful because there was no precedent to aid in “defining the contours of 
the Clause.”71 Instead, Comfort encouraged “prudential judgments about [the Equal 
Protection Clause’s] consistent operation in the future.”72  Eileen Scallen explains 
that “interpretation [can be] a combined deliberative and judicial question, sometimes 




emphasizing a reading of a text that would provide the most useful effects in the 
future, and sometimes emphasizing a particular reading as the ‘historically’ accurate 
one, in the sense of the drafter's original intent or purpose.”73  Having discovered that 
a historical reading of the Equal Protection Clause would not be useful, Comfort 
outlined the benefits of casting a forward-looking orientation on the interpretation of 
the clause: 
If the Clause is seen as a narrowly limited license, permitting the Court to 
interfere with legislative decision-making only when there is reason to distrust 
some broadly defined majoritarian process, then Petitioner’s arguments are 
more appealing. If the Clause itself is broadly defined to mean that all 
persons, regardless of color, ought to be free from legislative burdens based 
on that color, except when necessary to further a substantial state interest, the 
Respondent’s arguments seem more reasonable.74 
Layered on top of ideological valuations about race under question in Bakke – 
race consciousness, colorblindness, group identity and individuality – were judicial 
concerns about the maintenance and fitness of constitutional principles which might 
be altered in the particular application.  In his bench memo, Comfort characterized 
the question about whether particular groups need additional protections not as a 
question of idealized fairness or matter of right, but of the potential effects on future 
interpretation and political neutrality of the Equal Protection Clause.  If they were to 
decide that the Task Force Program did not merit strict scrutiny because it benefits 
particular groups, then “this would…enshrine in the Constitution the political 
system’s judgments that membership in particular racial or ethnic groups renders 




some individuals more deserving than others.”75  This is problematic, argued 
Comfort, because the clause “should not change in meaning with the political 
judgment of each generation.”76  
The solution to this dilemma, albeit motivated by institutional concerns, was 
ideologically bound to Bakke’s construction of race.  The way to safeguard the broad 
utility of the Equal Protection Clause, argued Comfort, was to maintain the ambiguity 
of the text: “it would seem better to keep the constitutional text of racial 
classifications the same to each individual.”77  Thus, the Court could avoid doing 
damage to the useful generality of constitutional language by offering an 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that held the rights offered therein as 
individual rights. To maintain focus on the rights of an individual would keep the 
courts from “delving into the intractables…or deciding whose ox has been gored 
more often and for how long.”78  
 Having concluded that strict scrutiny was the appropriate doctrine to apply to 
this case, Comfort went about exploring the subcategories that need to be met in order 
to justify a race-conscious program under strict scrutiny.  For Comfort, the strict 
scrutiny standard did more than curb a racial classification program that rendered 
problematic the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause: it opened up an 
opportunity to validate some forms of racial consideration while condemning the UC-
Davis Task Force Program in particular.  A previous Supreme Court case (re 
Griffiths, 1973) had laid out the elements for judgment via strict scrutiny, and 
Comfort cited them: “‘in order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State 
must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and 




substantial and that its use of the classification is ‘necessary [to] the accomplishment’ 
of its purpose of the safeguarding of its interest.’”79  Under the section labeled 
“Substantial state interests served by the program,” Comfort outlined the state 
interests argued by UC-Davis and refuted by Bakke, concluding that the goal of a 
diverse student body to be the only justifiable solution. 
 Comfort methodically laid out the major arguments, and then weighed them 
against each of the elements of strict scrutiny.  UC-Davis and their amici offered 
three main arguments promoting the substantial state interests provided by the Task 
Force Program: it remedied past exclusion of minorities from medical school; it 
would increase minority access to health care; and it would promote educational 
diversity.  Bakke and his supporters counter-argued that the first two goals were 
unsubstantiated by evidence, said Comfort.  They did not directly challenge the 
school’s right to seek a diverse student body, although Comfort felt that they over-
relied on the concept of “merit” to discount any consideration of race. “[T]he vast 
amount of argumentation over selection based on ‘merit’ is beside the point,” argued 
Comfort. “It does not address directly the question whether race is a valid admissions 
criterion. Instead, the ‘merit’ advocates assume that it is not, because it is not part of 
‘merit.’”80  This is fallacious, continued Comfort; “The issue is not whether 
admissions decision must be based exclusively on ‘merit,’ for they are not; instead, 
the issue is whether race is one of the non-‘merit’ factors that can be taken into 
account.”81   
 Comfort reiterated his concerns with remediation as a state goal, because he 
felt that there was no acceptable institutional means to justify it: “there is no 




principled way to contain the notion that quotas can be used to ‘remedy’ the past 
exclusion of a particular group, when the existence of that exclusion has not been 
linked to any specific constitutional or statutory violation.”82  Furthermore, there was 
no case on which to argue precedent, although Comfort admitted that “once again that 
lack may be owing to historical circumstance: this is one of the first cases to present 
the question.”83  Finally, Comfort found this position untenable because the university 
made no attempt to prove a history of discrimination, and because he felt it dangerous 
for either the Supreme Court or the university to make a judgment about larger 
societal discrimination.  However, Comfort posited, if the Court were to accept this 
goal as legitimate, “then the Task Force program is probably a perfect fit.”84  The 
opposite problem existed for the goal of increasing minority health care: whereas 
“everyone appears to agree” that this “is both substantial and legitimate” as a state 
goal, Comfort posited that the UC-Davis task force program was a circuitous means 
of securing that end, thus failing under the strict scrutiny standard of the ends being 
necessary to promote the goal.85 
“The nettlesome question of voluntary remedies for traditional exclusions 
perhaps can be avoided in this case by relying on the somewhat narrow holding that 
obtaining a diverse student body in a state-related institution of higher education is a 
legitimate and substantial state interest,” offered Comfort in the longest subsection of 
the memo, and the one reflected most directly in the final opinion.86  Powell’s margin 
notes were less than enthusiastic: “diverse student body is leg. state interest – I agree 
– but it does not follow that quotas are valid.”87  The diversity justification carried 
with it useful legal artifacts, and shed burdensome arguments, according to Comfort.  




Albeit slim, “there is language in some opinions supporting this view,” including 
Sweatt v. Painter (1950) and Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957), and “there are First 
Amendment policies supporting the university’s right to determine who is to be taught 
and how.  Other things being equal, academic freedom of expression, thought, and 
certification ought to prevail.”88  Support for academic freedom was not a new 
concept to Powell:  years before, in his “Free Enterprise” memo, he had written that 
although universities were showing more leftist tendencies than he thought prudent, 
“few things are more sanctified in American life than academic freedom. It would be 
fatal to attack this as a principle.”89  Better, then, to “[restore] the qualities of 
‘openness,’ ‘fairness,’ and ‘balance’…to the academic communities…The ultimate 
responsibility for intellectual integrity on the campus must remain on the 
administrations and faculties of our colleges and universities.”90 
 This option has the benefit of being able to justify leaving the universities 
room to consider race as one element of educational diversity, asserted Comfort, 
while allowing the Court to proclaim judicial restraint on the issue.  “Under this 
approach,” he said, “the proper judicial role is to circumscribe the exercise of 
academic discretion only to the extent that it impinges upon constitutional rights.”91 
The main question would be whether it is constitutional to consider race as one factor. 
As an answer, Comfort offered an example which Powell (who received an LL.M. – 
or Master of Laws degree – from Harvard in 1932) would repeat throughout memos, 
drafts, and the final opinion: “It seems undeniable that an individual’s race and the 
experiences he has by virtue of it are the same kinds of qualities that prompt Harvard 
College to prefer the scarcer Idaho farmboy over the Boston Brahmin.”92 Other non-




quantitative factors such as geography, athletic skills, and work experiences were 
already considered in the admissions process, offered Comfort; “unless the Court is to 
say that it is impermissible for the state to consider race in any way…it would follow 
that universities could consider race as one element in their admissions systems.”93 
 Comfort used the Idaho “farmboy” example from Harvard et al.’s amicus brief 
to interrogate the means-end fit component of strict scrutiny as it relates to 
educational diversity.  He concluded that a set-aside system was not necessary to 
meet the needs of diversity:  Harvard did not hold aside a number of seats for Idaho 
farmers, insulating them from comparison with the rest of the applicants. “Instead,” 
Comfort asserted, “[the Harvard plan] takes the fact of geographical origin as one 
factor weighing in the farmboy’s favor when he is compared against all other 
applicants competing for a marginal seat.”94 At UC-Davis, however, “The Task Force 
program tells whites that they can compete only for 84 of the 100 seats in the class, 
while blacks can compete for all 100” – a sentence which Powell wrote was a “Key 
point.”95  This would be a perfect solution for remedying past exclusion, argued 
Comfort – but the university had not offered evidence of past exclusion, and he found 
the assertion of broad societal discrimination to be unreliable, considering its non-
democratically elected source.   
If, however, “diversity is the only goal recognized as legitimate and 
substantial, the only means necessary to promote it is the giving of extra credit 
toward admission for being non-white, because otherwise non-whites would be 
scarce.”96  Comfort addressed a potential counter-argument here, which he found 
non-fatal to the diversity argument:   




…it can be objected that this view elevates form over substance, that it 
permits the university to do sub silentio what it now does above board…That 
may be true, but it is not clear why it is relevant…each white gets the chance 
to compete for each seat at the margin.  He will be weighed against each 
minority applicant to see if his qualifications in total overshadow the minority 
candidate’s when race is added into the equation.97 
Ultimately, Comfort concluded, the “symbolic value of opening the whole class to 
[individualized] competition by members of all races may be important,” as well as 
the emphasis on race in “only a positive way”; “once a substantial number of non-
whites (or Idahoans) are admitted, the fact of race (or geography) no longer weighs in 
their favor, but it does not count against them.”98  Moreover, the diversity approach 
obviates one of the strongest arguments by UC-Davis and its supporters:  “that 
abandonment of the special admissions program means a return to lily-white 
professional schools.”99  
Collaborative Invention 
By the end of the bench memo, Comfort had identified the stasis of the case 
for Powell’s chambers – the application of strict scrutiny.  Additionally, Comfort laid 
out a preliminary set of topoi from which they could build their argument, should 
Powell agree with his assessment.  This did not mean that these common assumptions 
were held by all of the justices, however.  Because Supreme Court opinions involve a 
combination of independent, interdependent, and institutional considerations, the next 
stage of Powell’s judicial invention process would be to negotiate agreement on 
enough topoi to craft a coherent public opinion.100   




 This task was well suited to Powell:  his reputation at the Court was one of a 
moderate who often sought the middle ground.  Known as a political moderate, 
Powell’s pre-Supreme Court biography balanced trial lawyers associations with legal 
aid work, and a position at a prestigious private practice law firm with membership 
on President Lyndon Johnson’s National Crime Commission.  In the years before his 
nomination to the Supreme Court, Powell also held positions as President of the 
American Bar Association (1964-65); President of the American College of Trial 
Lawyers (1968-70); Vice President of the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association; and membership on several educational boards, including the Virginia 
State Library Board, the Virginia Foundation of Independent Colleges, and the 
governing boards of Hollins College, Union Theological Seminary, and Washington 
and Lee University.101  His role as chairperson of the Richmond School Board from 
1953 to 1961, followed by membership (and later presidency) of the Virginia State 
Board of Education, during massive state resistance to the Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954) call to desegregate schools “revealed his tendency towards 
moderation and consensus.”102  He was both criticized and praised for his leadership 
strategy during Virginia school desegregation:  by the time he resigned the Richmond 
School Board to take a role at the Virginia Board of Education in 1961, only two 
black students had enrolled in Richmond public schools.  To some, this was an 
indication that he was the type of Southern white moderate that Martin Luther King 
Jr. had warned about in his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” using a “strategic 
constitutionalism” that, while working to end racial violence, “discreetly shifted the 
burden of constitutional change onto black shoulders” and “held them responsible for 




their plight.”103   To others, “Powell probably did the most he could have 
accomplished…given Virginia's political climate in the Fifties and Sixties.”104  
Powell was questioned about his role – or lack thereof – in desegregating schools 
during his confirmation hearings, but because he had been packaged with the more 
controversial William H. Rehnquist for approval, he was not seriously impeded by 
it.105 
On the Court, “Powell had positioned himself in the center, along with 
Stewart and White. And since Stewart and White went in opposite directions on so 
many key issues, Powell was becoming the true swing vote.”106  This came as a 
welcome relief to Brennan, who feared when Powell was appointed that he would be 
easily led by the Chief Justice, according to Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong.  
There was some cause to be worried; Woodward and Armstrong reported the 
following about his early Supreme Court days: 
When Powell first arrived on the Court the previous year and voted with 
Burger in a particular case, Stewart asked why. ‘I thought I would follow the 
leadership of the Court,’ Powell had replied.  Stewart was dumbfounded.  He 
decided he had better explain to his new colleague something about the 
realities of life at the Court. The leadership was not Burger. He was Chief 
Justice in name only.  The leadership belonged to the Justices at the center, the 
swing votes, those who were neither doctrinaire liberals nor conservatives.  It 
belonged to Stewart and White and Lewis Powell if he chose.107  
Brennan’s concerns were somewhat allayed after U.S. v. U.S. District Court 
(1972), when Powell wrote the opinion of the Court that invalidated the Nixon-




sponsored unwarranted domestic wiretaps that Powell had spoken publicly in favor of 
several years previously.108  Rather than following the Chief Justice or the political 
leanings of the president who appointed him, “Powell had begun cautiously and to 
Brennan he seemed precise and fair-minded, somewhat like Harlan.  Harlan and 
Powell had both concluded, from years of private law practice, that narrow solutions 
to legal problems were better than sweeping ones.”109  Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. 
Spaeth report that, far from being led by the Chief Justice, Powell’s voting pattern 
was uninfluenced by any particular justice, making him the most influential 
conservative on the Burger Court.110  Powell’s particular jurisprudential approach was 
one of “representative balancing,” argues Paul Kahn, who defines this 
characterization as a jurisprudence which believes the justice’s role is to adjudicate 
“the existing distribution of values and authority among the competing factions that 
constitute the community,” based on the assumption that “all substantive values must 
derive from the free competition of interests within the community.”111 Craig Evan 
Klafter argues that Powell’s influence came from this pragmatism, which he asserts 
gave Powell “a distinct advantage over the more ideologically consistent members of 
the Court.”112   
Powell’s tendency toward representative balancing highlights the notion of 
co-authorship, which Karen Burke LeFevre asserts is central to any inventional 
process: 
Invention becomes explicitly social when writers involve other people as 
collaborators, or as reviewers whose comments aid invention, or as 
‘resonators’ who nourish the development of ideas.  To create discourses such 




as contracts, treaties, and business proposals, two or more writers must invent 
together…[I]nvention is powerfully influenced by social collectives, such as 
institutions, bureaucracies, and governments, which transmit expectations and 
prohibitions, encouraging certain ideas and discouraging others.113 
The collaborative invention process is explicit on the Supreme Court, where 
“…opinion authors preemptively and responsively accommodate colleagues in 
predictable patterns. These patterns depend, to varying degrees, on ideological 
agreement among the justices, the amount of support authors have from their 
colleagues, the signals sent by those colleagues, and the nature of the cooperative 
relationship with their brethren.”114 This “art of deliberation…of thinking well about 
what ought to be done when reasonable people disagree” is one of the central features 
of the rhetoricity of the law, argues James Boyd White.115  Whereas by the final 
opinion the decision is written in the language of certainty, examining the deliberative 
give-and-take between the justices reveals a process whereby “knowledge [is] 
characterized by reasonableness and by the taking into consideration diverse 
aspirations and multiple interests, defined by Aristotle as phronesis or prudence, and 
which is so brilliantly manifested in law.”116   
Powell had a less optimistic view of the inter-chambers deliberative process, 
although his papers reveal that he engaged in it frequently. He told the American Bar 
Association in 1976 that the Supreme Court “is perhaps one of the last citadels of 
jealously preserved individualism. To be sure, we sit together for the arguments and 
during the long Friday conferences when votes are taken. But for the most part, 
perhaps as much at 90 percent of our total time, we function as nine small, 




independent law firms.”117  This experience would be consistent with the Bakke case, 
wherein the ease of the Comfort-Powell dialectic was complicated by other justices 
who found the “diversity” conclusion unpersuasive.  Yet, even by Powell’s modest 
estimation, that ten percent of the time when they function collaboratively is 
significant to the final opinions. 
Comfort received early warning through his network of other law clerks that a 
decision on the case would be more complicated than expected:  
I had a long conversation this morning with Keith Ellison, one of Justice 
Blackmun’s clerks…I gathered from Keith that Justice Blackmun is troubled 
about an aspect of the case not stressed in the bench memo.  P.S. My 
conversation with Keith also confirms the suspicion, voiced in the original 
memo, that the various briefs have only confused the Court by not breaking 
the problem down into its component steps. The thinking in Justice 
Blackmun’s chambers is still hampered by the inability to separate the 
decision on the proper level of scrutiny from the weighing of the various 
justifications for the Task Force program. It seems as though conflation of the 
various questions in the case is going to plague the Court in its attempt to 
produce a reasoned result in this case.118  
Thus, when it came time for conference, Powell outlined those points he felt 
were the most central to his judicial perspective on Bakke, and took notes on his 
fellow justices’ respective thoughts.   
Powell attended the conference with personal notes listing the legal topoi that 
he considered to be “settled propositions.”119  The first few of them reflected an 




interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment informed 
by an ideological commitment to individual agency:  “We all compete throughout life 
on an individual basis. A…system…that ascends non-competitive preferred status is 
contrary to basic traditions of this country.”120  Powell framed the principle of 
individualism as a Fourteenth Amendment guarantee, supported by precedents:  “14th 
Amend. guarantees rights to ‘persons’ individually; not to any group, racial or ethnic. 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Shelley v. Kraemer, also Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada 
(1938)”.121  Additionally, Powell wrote that these individual rights were unvaried in 
their force between racial or ethnic groups.  Rights cannot be limited to members of 
“any one or more racial or ethnic groups,” wrote Powell, “[n]or is there any 
principled basis for inclusion or exclusion of groups on the basis of race or ethnic 
origins. Pet[itioner] identified Blacks, Chicanos, Orientals + Am. Indians. Why not 
Italians, Irish, Greeks, etc. Also who are identifiable as Chicanos?”122   The third 
“settled proposition” Powell posited was that “There is a racial classification – 
frankly conceded.”123  Based on this “fact,” Powell offered the legal doctrine he 
believed was appropriate: “In my view, any racial ‘classification’ is ‘suspect,’” thus 
needed a compelling state interest that cannot otherwise be attained.124  Powell could 
not agree that the “two-track admission plan based on race” was the least intrusive 
means to satisfy any legitimate interest promoted in the consideration of race. 
“Yet,” wrote Powell in his notes, “race is not irrelevant in all circumstances – 
and this for me is especially true at the admission stage in a University.”125  Here, 
Powell parted company with the California Supreme Court’s holding – and with 
typical pathway of colorblind individualism.  “[A]s I read its opinion, the Calif Ct 




held that no consideration of race as such is valid. The opinion seems to lay down a 
per se rule… In my view race + ethnic origin properly may be considered.”126  So 
long as the principle of individual competition was upheld, then racial and ethnic 
identities could be considered “on an individual basis + as one element or factor to be 
weighed – together with a variety of other factors.”127  Moreover, Powell rearticulated 
the notions of academic freedom, non-quantitative merit, and race-conscious diversity 
forwarded by Comfort’s bench memo as his settled propositions.  He reminded 
himself to read portions of the Harvard admissions plan (described in an amicus brief) 
to the conference as a good example of how to enact “the primary educational interest 
is diversity of student body in our uniquely pluralistic society,” and of the reasons 
why “a University should have wide latitude to determine the composition of its 
student body.”128  Thus, Powell concluded: 
Affirm, but on the basis above stated. The opinion should make clear its 
narrow focus. It would not foreclose sustaining affirmative action programs 
…An opinion along these lines would not be a set back to the course of full 
equality in this Country. Our Const. guarantees are framed to protect 
individuals – not groups whether racial or otherwise.129 
Powell’s “settled propositions” carried within them three interrelated points of 
divergence with the other justices, which he would need to accommodate in order for 
the Court to have any kind of a holding.  The first was an issue of interpretation:  
Powell felt that they must speak broadly to constitutional principles, and he felt that 
the most compelling interpretation was one that supported individual rights, rather 
than group rights.  Secondly, Powell felt that the Supreme Court lacked the authority 




to declare societal discrimination an appropriate justification, a presumption that 
reflected a judicially conservative institutional perspective. Finally, and most 
importantly to Powell, the Court must give the public a clear answer on how to deal 
with affirmative action programs. 
The only “settled proposition” between all of the justices was the hesitancy to 
offer a decision that would result in an end to affirmative action programs altogether.   
Howard Ball argues that, “Much like the parties and the amici, the justices of the 
Court clashed in the…effort to find meaning in the ‘spirit’ and the ‘letter’ of Title VI 
and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.”130  Yet to invalidate 
affirmative action policies on the whole could be perceived as an overreach of the 
separation of federal powers, and an increasingly conservative Supreme Court led by 
the cautious guidance of Chief Justice Burger had a tendency to adopt a rhetoric of 
judicial efficiency best explained by its link to economics:  “the primary criterion for 
those who see economics as the foundation of law is efficiency, and to them, 
efficiency is best promoted by the free operation of the market.”131  Said Burger of 
the task facing the Court in Bakke, “I am confronted with the tactical consideration of 
how best to structure and shape a result so as to confine its impact and yet make it 
clear that the Court intends to leave states free to serve as ‘laboratories’ for 
experimenting with less rigidly exclusionary methods of pursuing desirable social 
goals.”132  Another problem with the constitutional issue, argued Stevens in 
conference, was “that [the university] programs may not be permanent.”133  Stevens 
approved of what he called “quota systems” as a temporary measure, but was unsure 
about them as permanent measures, because “Negroes may not need protection for 




many more years” – a comment that met with a response by Justice Marshall that “it 
will be 100 years” before they no longer need protection.134  Yet Stevens insisted that 
he, too, would like to allow these programs to continue, and would therefore “like to 
‘duck’ the Const[itutional] issue and let this problem work itself out.”135 
 Brennan and Marshall found laughable the prospect that some of their fellow 
justices could conclude that a Civil Rights Act and a constitutional amendment, both 
written to alleviate racial discrimination, somehow disallowed universities from 
voluntarily attempting the same goals.  Said Marshall: “Ultimately I believe, after 
reviewing the entire debates, that the Congress that enacted Title VI would be 
surprised to be told that they had intentionally precluded race conscious programs 
benefiting Negroes if such programs are otherwise lawful.”136  This program is 
lawful, argued Marshall, because “This is a ‘quota to get someone in’ – ‘not a quota 
to get someone out.’”137  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was written precisely to account for discrimination, and could not be used to stop a 
program aimed at alleviating discrimination: thus, for Marshall the program is 
constitutionally sound. 
 Powell’s Pragmatic Conservativism 
Philip C. Kissam argues that the “value of everyman” embedded in pragmatic 
jurisprudence motivates a “sensitive interpretation of complicated factual situations” 
which “can engage judicial sympathy for the interests and rights of individual persons 
who bring or are affected by constitutional challenges to government policies.”138  
Kissam cites Powell’s “balanced consideration of affirmative action admissions 
policies and their possible social effects…in Bakke” as an example of this value in 




action.139  Powell’s pragmatic approach to law, fostered by a combination of his legal 
formalist education at Washington and Lee School of Law, paired with an awakening 
“from his dogmatic slumbers” by a graduate degree at Harvard Law School that 
centered on realism and fostering a keen critical eye, resulted in “a personal 
jurisprudence that emphasized the doctrine of stare decisis, except when Powell was 
persuaded that justice demanded a different conclusion.”140   
Pragmatic jurisprudence was not just a calling card of Powell’s, although his 
moderate ideological leanings made it more pronounced; the entire Burger Court has 
been characterized by Kissam as pragmatic to a fault. 
In the end, the Burger Court may have provided a glimpse of the emptiness to 
which unguided pragmatism, legal realism, and empiricism are likely to 
lead…When issues of principle came before the Burger Court – issues like the 
propriety of affirmative action, the legitimacy of the death penalty, the justice 
of using unlawfully obtained evidence, and the appropriateness of public aid 
for the nonreligious activities of church-related schools – the Court’s first 
impulse was usually to seek a middle ground.  The Supreme Court resolved 
few great issues decisively…the Court’s pragmatism was inherently incapable 
of offering the leadership, inspiration, and guidance that the American 
judiciary at its best has provided.141 
Despite this criticism, “legal principles continue to evolve,” says Don R. 
LeDuc, “in large part because courts have the capacity to use each judicial opinion 
not simply to resolve a controversy, but also to communicate continually with 
audiences beyond those litigants actually before the court.”142  In cases of public 




interest, the need to offer a reasonable explanation extends beyond the lawyers, 
judges, and parties involved with the case; the Court must also write for non-legal 
audiences. Additionally, although justices are not likely to make decisions solely 
based on public opinion, the indeterminate nature of constitutional law guarantees 
that “constitutional interpretation almost inevitably reflects the broader social and 
political context of the times.”143  At a time when the civil rights gains and the 
celebration of multiculturalism of earlier decades were met by ideological backlash 
and economic scarcity, when the invisibility of whiteness had been rendered opaque 
by the critique of white privilege, and when the open university system had given 
way to a competitive market model, the fractured Burger Court was indeed a 
reflection of the broader social and political context, and Powell’s incremental, 
modest pragmatism was a further reflection of the body politic. 
Powell professed discomfort with legitimating generalized claims of societal 
discrimination in the authoritative voice of the Supreme Court opinion; yet he 
nonetheless acknowledged its existence, and the role that Bakke would play in the 
ability to mediate it.  Powell urged his colleagues to consider the audiences to whom 
they were writing – particularly the universities.  The consequence of affirming the 
lower court’s decision, argued Powell to his fellow justices, would not be singular:  
Bakke’s acceptance into medical school would be but the first step in a larger 
sequence. “We are not reviewing the judgment below in a vacuum,” Powell reminded 
the conference. “It draws meaning from the opinion supporting it, and that meaning is 
that race may never be considered to any extent in admitting students to a 
university.”144  Such a decision would effectively end affirmative action programs 




within universities, Powell asserted, and contrary to Stevens’ belief that the problems 
evidenced in Bakke would be temporary, “there is no reason to believe that in so short 
a span of time the socio-economic position of racial and ethnic minorities will have 
changed so drastically as to end the demand for some types of preferential admission 
programs. Even the petition estimates that ‘minority conscious programs’ will be 
necessary for some 25 to 50 years.”145 
The need for a decisive answer has increased since the Court avoided the 
constitutional issue in DeFunis, continued Powell:  “We were criticized then for 
leaving the hundreds of state colleges, universities and graduate schools without 
guidance. The need for resolution of the issue certainly has not lessened.”146  Powell 
reasoned that: 
If the Court now were to affirm this case on Title VI without reaching the 
Fourteenth Amendment, again we will have resolved finally exactly nothing.  
Every state institution of higher learning in our country would then have to 
terminate forthwith all Davis-type programs.  Institutions with Harvard-type 
programs, or some variation thereof, would have no idea whether they were in 
compliance with the law. Nor, indeed, would HEW, which provides funds to 
virtually all of these institutions.  Inevitably, after some presently 
indeterminate time – perhaps another two to three years – the constitutional 
issue will again be before us.147 
Powell’s concern reflects the symbiotic relationship between the Supreme Court and 
its audiences described by Makau thusly: “The composite audience expects the Court 
to balance the need for doctrinal consistency against these compelling social 




demands.  In turn, the Court uses argumentation to persuade the composite audience 
that the Court’s selected stability and change are appropriate responses to the relevant 
rhetorical situations.”148  And, adds Wright, “if the implications of the decision are 
broader—if they apply to a pervasive political question—clarity and persuasiveness 
become simultaneously more important and more difficult. The opinion still must 
serve its purpose for litigant and counsel, but it must make the argument clear and 
persuasive to the nation at large.” 149  Thus, Powell argued:  
I have a conviction that the Court should speak out clearly and 
unambiguously.  If we merely affirm the California decision…no university in 
the country will feel free to give any consideration to race.  I simply could not 
join that result.  Nor do I think the consequences would differ in any material 
respect even if the opinion hinted broadly…that despite the affirmance of the 
California judgment, universities would be free to do essentially as they 
please.  I would think this would exacerbate the turmoil that now prevails so 
widely in the academic community…I recognize, of course, that just as the 
public has widely varying perceptions on the issue, so do we here on the 
Court. I therefore fully respect your views and those of our other Brothers. My 
own thinking may be shaped by my long experience in education, including 
experience with this problem…I think the country deserves and expects an 
unequivocal answer from its highest court.150 
 Interpretive Choices 
  
Drucilla Cornell argues that “all interpretations entail an inevitable moment of 
fictionality…Once we recognize that the process of recollection of legal principle is 




never mere exposition but involves the imagination and positing of the very ideals to 
be read into a legal text, we can no longer choose between competing interpretations 
on the basis of an appeal to what is just ‘there.’”151  Moreover, L. H. LaRue argues 
that interpretive fictions serve as more than a heuristic tool for effective reasoning.  
Interpretations, and the narratives that justices write to support them, are also “stories 
of growth” and “stories of limits” which are foundational to the Court’s maintenance 
of judicial authority:  the justices expand or constrict constitutional limits within their 
justificatory framework as interpreters.152  Interpretations constructing a story of 
limits would assert that the Constitution is not subject to legislative whim, and is 
above transient political needs.153 Stories of growth, on the other hand, see the 
Constitution as dynamic, meeting contemporary needs as they arise.154 
Powell’s belief that the Court must help guide universities, combined with his 
need to uphold individual agency against the threat of what he saw as balkanization, 
motivated a narrow, forward-casting temporal interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  It also made a difficult “story” to tell, for to accomplish this goal 
Powell would need to argue that the Constitution was both race-conscious enough to 
allow for some consideration of race within college admissions, and colorblind 
enough to disallow the particular program at UC-Davis.  Justices Stevens, Potter 
Stewart, and William Rehnquist shared Powell’s goal of finding the narrowest 
grounds on which they could satisfy their distaste for what they perceived as “quotas” 
and still avoid halting affirmative action programs altogether.  For them, however, the 
most elegant solution was to decide the case under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and declaring it a “private action” – thus, the decision would apply only to 




Bakke.  Chief Justice Burger was sympathetic to the Title VI argument, as well.  
After the first conference, a furious round of memos circulated, centering on two 
interpretations of the history of Title VI and its goals.   
The memo from Stevens’ chambers conceded that the section of Title VI in 
question was “to prevent federal funding of segregated facilities.”155  However, it 
proceeded to offer direct quotations from the House and Senate discussions about 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act which Stevens’ law clerk, Frank Blake, argued spoke 
to a belief that the section was intended to confer a colorblind, individual right. Blake 
cited two “key supporters” of the legislation – Representatives Emanuel Celler and 
Hubert Humphrey – who argued that “it cannot apply one standard of conduct to one 
person and a different standard of conduct to another,” and that “we could get over all 
these problems…if we started to treat Americans as Americans, not as fat ones, short 
ones, tall ones, brown ones, green ones, yellow ones, or white ones, but as 
Americans. If we did that, we would not need to worry about discrimination.”156  
Thus, the memo concluded, the “drafters of Title VI intended to cover discrimination 
against all races.”157 
Marshall also shared his chamber’s research, and his cover letter revealed the 
contested nature of discerning legislative intent.  “Attached is the first draft of some 
research on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prepared by my law clerk, Ellen 
Silberman,” wrote Marshall. “It appears that we have two sides of the legislative 
history.”158  Silberman offered a historical context against which to read the quotes 
from Stevens’ memo, a step she argued was crucial in the interpretation of the act.  
“The key to understanding the legislative history of Title VI, in my view, is 




understanding the evil that was being addressed,” wrote Silberman. “That evil is 
simply stated: federal tax dollars collected from persons of all colors were being spent 
on programs that excluded Negroes or that provided separate facilities for 
Negroes.”159  Silberman offered quotes from the legislative debates which provided 
that contextualization, including a passage from Senator John Pastore: 
Mr. President, why is Title VI necessary to the civil rights bill…? Let me 
explain. In the community of Greensboro, N.C., there are two excellent 
hospitals. They are numbered among the most modern in the area. This is due, 
in part, to Federal financial assistance…Their modern medical care was 
denied to those whose skin was colored…the Negro in need of care could not 
get it at these hospitals simply because he was a Negro…That is why we need 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act…to insure once and for all that the financial 
resources of the Federal Government – the commonwealth of Negro and white 
alike – will no longer subsidize racial discrimination.160 
The reason that the objects of discrimination were not more clearly defined in 
the language of the law, concluded Silberman, was “because the evil Congress was 
addressing in Title VI was so clear, there was no occasion for Congress to define 
precisely what was permissible under law.”161  The administration of Title VI was left 
to the states, and “the debates are replete with statements suggesting that while the 
bill did not require such programs [as the one under consideration in Bakke] it did not 
forbit them either.”162  
Comfort’s review of the circulated memoranda favored Marshall’s 
interpretation of legislative history.  Comfort took Stevens’ legislative history to task 




for “lift[ing]” quotes “out of context,” before concluding, “I think Congress would be 
quite surprised to discover that in enacting Title VI it had prohibited programs such as 
Davis Medical School’s Task Force program.”163  Taken at face value, argued 
Comfort, each quote “appears to be addressed to a concept of ‘color-blindness’ that 
might include proscription of the Task Force program. Without exception, however, 
each of these color-blindness statements was directed, in context, to the elimination of 
the segregation then thought to be prevalent in the operation of many federally funded 
programs.”164  This a-contextual, literal interpretation gets the Court nowhere, 
Comfort concluded: the Stevens chambers memo revealed only that “there is no more 
warrant in the legislative history for reading Title VI literally than for reading the 
Fourteenth Amendment literally.  Both addressed the problem of discrimination 
against particular, obviously disadvantaged groups; discrimination in favor of those 
groups seems not to have been addressed in any specific sense.”165 
In the circulated memo addressing Title VI, Powell offered four reasons why 
they should neither ask the parties for supplemental briefs on the issue nor limit their 
decision to a statutory declaration.  First, Powell argued against Stevens’ appeal to a 
precedent entitled Ashwander v. TVA (1936), in which Justice Louis D. Brandeis 
posited that it is institutionally prudent to resolve cases under statutory questions 
instead of via constitutional interpretation.166  To this point, Powell argued that 
Ashwander was “not a rigid restriction on the power of the Court to make decisions it 
thinks proper,” and that “viewing the matter in a prudential light, the arguments on 
both sides of the Fourteenth Amendment issue are as fully developed as they will ever 
be.”167  Additional briefings would be futile, argued Powell, because “the Howard 




University amicus brief about covers the field,” and because neither party to the case 
had mentioned the Title VI issue.  Relying on Title VI would bring forth the necessity 
to address other complicated issues, including “an implied private right of action 
under Title VI, whether such a right would entail private remedies, and whether it 
would require exhaustion of administrative remedies.”168  More importantly to legal 
traditions, argued Powell: 
This avoidance technique risks not only indefensible statutory interpretation 
but also irresponsible constitutional adjudication. There may be temptation to 
strain for a meaning in the statute beyond that fairly possible in order to avoid 
constitutional interpretation. Yet constitutional interpretation may not be 
wholly avoided:  tentative interpretations may be ventured in the very process 
of stating what constitutional issues are being avoided; there may be 
temptations to launch constitutional trial balloons and indulge in free floating 
constitutional law dispositive of the case.169 
In addition to matters of judicial prudence, Powell reminded his fellow 
justices of a crucial audience to whom they were writing – the public – and the 
enormous stakes – the Court’s credibility. Given the prevalence of affirmative action 
programs, the scarcity of student seats, the media interest, and the fact that they were 
facing this question again, so soon after having avoided it, would likely mean that 
“any action by us that may be perceived as ducking this issue for the second time in 
three years could be would be viewed by many as a ‘self-inflicted wound’ on the 
Court.”170 Furthermore, he argued “a decision that Title VI forbids the program, made 
merely to avoid a decision that the Fourteenth Amendment may permit it, would be 




futile.  Futile, because the next case will present the Fourteenth Amendment issue 
anyway.”171  Finally, Powell argued that the interpretation that “Congress in enacting 
Title VI was contemplating a departure from the Fourteenth Amendment would be 
quite a judicial tour de force.”172 
Despite Powell’s attempts to drag his colleagues into addressing the 
constitutional issue directly, the conference of December 9, 1977, saw little 
movement.  The movement he did see was in favor of deciding on Title VI, as by that 
time the Court had requested and reviewed supplemental briefs on the issue.  Powell’s 
notes during conference reflected the movement.  Burger, as Chief Justice, announced 
his views first, and he said that he could “affirm [the lower court’s decision] on either 
or both grounds,” was “now satisfied that a private citizen has standing to raise [a] 
Title VI claim,” and thus “could decide [the] case on VI [because] violation of VI is 
absolutely clear.”173  Rehnquist would affirm, too, but could affirm under either Title 
VI or the Fourteenth Amendment: race should never be a consideration, according to 
Rehnquist, finding a narrower interpretation of racial considerations than even Bakke 
himself.  Stevens, the leader of the push to decide under Title VI, had different 
reasons for supporting it.  The problem with the constitutional issue, argued Stevens 
in conference, is “that their [universities’] programs may not be permanent.” Stevens 
approved of quota systems as temporary measures, but was unsure about the need for 
them as permanent measures.  Marshall rejected such a narrow approach to the 
question before them, asserting that the “legality of affirmative action simply could 
not be resolved without consideration of the historical, legal, and sociological context 
of past racial policies and practices.”174 




Convinced that he could not motivate consensus, or even further movement, 
between the two camps, Justice Powell’s solution was to use both a story of growth, 
and one of limits: thus, he both expanded and constricted the scope and utility of the 
Equal Protection Clause as he worked toward his final opinion.  Early in his 
description of the clause, Powell characterized the language as highly malleable:  “the 
concept of ‘discrimination,’ like the phrase ‘equal protection of the laws,’ is 
susceptible to varying interpretations,” a fact that allowed it to “flourish as a 
cornerstone in the Court's defense of property and liberty of contract.”175  Yet, Powell 
limited such open interpretation by stressing the dangers of interpreting statutes in 
light of social issues:  “By hitching the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to 
these transitory considerations, we would be holding, as a constitutional principle, 
that judicial scrutiny …may vary with the ebb and flow of political forces.”176  
 Constructing and Limiting Authority 
The institutional role of the Court was undergoing an internal shift, and the 
nature of the “racial problem” was highly disputed subject among the justices as it 
was in the nation.  The Warren Court had taken a leadership role in proclaiming the 
primacy of the Constitution in the governmental ability to protect individual and 
group civil liberties, wherein “justices spoke of constitutionally derived mandates to 
maintain a sometimes precarious balance between the three branches of 
government.”177  However, the Burger Court adopted “an increased tendency to adopt 
the language of deference in cases involving civil liberties,” characterized by a 
rhetoric of efficiency reflecting a view of democracy as “a political process in which 




‘decision by an elected legislature and elected executive officials is the only 
legitimate means for making fundamental moral choices.’”178 
This shift heightened its members’ sensitivity to the perceived limits of 
“judicial competence,” an argument made in Bakke’s brief and a concern shared by 
Burger, who in his charge to the Court insisted that “we have far more competence to 
say what cannot be done that what ought to be done.”179  The fluidity of race would 
ultimately make it difficult for an inherently conservative institution like the Supreme 
Court, made more judicially conservative in the post-Warren Court years, to define 
with what they saw as timeless constitutional principles.  However, this limited view 
of judicial competence also allowed Powell to argue that the Court lacked the 
authority to determine the educational needs of a student body – such as diversity. 
Comfort had proposed in the bench memo that, if discrimination was assumed 
by the Court to have occurred, then voluminous precedents and associated legal 
doctrines could be used to support the conclusion that the task force program was 
constitutionally sound in its remedial goals.  Yet the university had not offered 
evidence that it discriminated against the racial and ethnic groups it was soliciting, 
and Powell was concerned with the “anti-democratic” nature of the admissions 
deciding body.  Had the legislature declared societal discrimination a reality, then the 
Court could claim to be following the legislative branch’s findings in its ruling.  Such 
evidence was not forthcoming, and Powell could not agree with the four justices who 
found this justification to be appropriate because, he argued it “could be justified only 
by a basic judgment about the nature of the racial problem in this country and the 
institutional role of this Court.”180  




Manifest and latent characterizations of the value of racial identity were 
pulled through many of the briefs as each side framed the question of race to support 
their arguments about the fairness of the UC-Davis affirmative action plan, and the 
ability of the Supreme Court to speak to it.  For Bakke and his supporters, individual 
agency trumped any consideration of race – especially in a competitive admissions 
system at a time graduate school seats were scarce.  For UC-Davis and supporters of 
affirmative action programs, race consciousness was a necessary and laudable 
component of higher education:  they argued that racial classifications must be 
allowed in order to remediate societal discrimination and to promote the academic 
benefit of a diverse student population.  
As these arguments reached the Supreme Court, they encountered another 
layer of rhetorical history:  prior Supreme Court cases and interpretive traditions with 
the laws and constitutional language under question.  Yet filtering the arguments 
through the legal topoi does not mean that they lose their ideological force, nor 
separation from the justices’ ideological leanings and lived experiences.  For instance, 
a primary justification for the affirmative action program at UC-Davis was the legacy 
of societal discrimination, which was rectified through the special admissions 
program.  As Comfort noted in the bench memo, this justification would be perfect – 
if a majority of the justices agreed that discrimination indeed existed.  There were 
plenty of Supreme Court cases to rely on as precedent for this type of justification.  
Yet this question would evoke conceptions of race which varied widely among the 
justices, as well as different articulations of American racial histories and self-
imposed legal standards of proof that limited the ability of the Court to authoritatively 




account for those histories or to speak to their contemporary manifestations.  In fact, a 
majority of the justices found that it was Bakke who was discriminated against, 
belying notions of race sympathetic to the arguments of “reverse discrimination” and 
drawing an embittered response from Marshall. 
Comfort’s assessment about the problems with granting “societal 
discrimination” as appropriate justification was mirrored in memos and conference 
discussions by four other justices.  Although Burger was open to suggestions about 
how to avoid declaring all considerations of race unconstitutional, he found the 
particulars of the case to be a barrier:   
The basic facts are not subject to dispute. (1) Bakke was not allowed to 
compete for any of the 16 seats reserved for the Regents’ Program solely 
because of his race.  (2) Bakke…would have been admitted if all 100 seats 
had been open and free from any arbitrary exclusion based on race. (3) The 
university evaluated minority applicants as a separate group and did not 
compare their individual qualities with those of other applicants.181   
Thurgood Marshall found the basic “facts” asserted by Burger to be very much in 
dispute.  “The decision in this case,” Marshall posited, “depends on whether you 
consider the action of the Regents as admitting certain students or as excluding 
certain other students.   
If you view the program as admitting qualified students who, because of this 
Nation’s sorry history of racial discrimination, have academic records that 
prevent them from effectively competing for medical school, then this is 
affirmative action to remove the vestiges of slavery and state imposed 




segregation by ‘root and branch.’  If you view the program as excluding 
students, it is a program of ‘quotas’ which violates the principle that the 
‘Constitution is color-blind.’…If only the principle of color-blindness had 
been accepted by the majority in Plessy in 1896, we would not be faced with 
this problem in 1978….This case is here now because of that sordid history… 
We are not yet equals, in large part because of the refusal of the Plessy Court 
to adopt the principle of color-blindness.  It would be the cruelest irony for 
this Court to adopt the dissent in Plessy now and hold that the University must 
use color-blind admissions.182 
Stewart, on the other hand, concluded that any use of race was discriminatory, 
asserting during conference that, “If the Equal Protection clause does nothing else, it 
forbids discrimination based along on a person’s race.  That’s precisely what the 
Davis program does…No state agency can take race into account.”183  Rehnquist 
agreed with Stewart’s conclusion, but not his means of getting there.  He found both 
the arguments for diversity and past discrimination to have promise as general 
propositions.  “It may be both important and desirable to have more members of 
racial minorities in the student body because such people, simply by the fact of their 
minority status, have a different, valuable perspective,” Rehnquist contemplated, and 
“past societal discrimination…is not an unappealing rationale.”184  However, 
Rehnquist concluded, the “factual elements” of “the University’s admissions 
policy…make its ‘affirmative action’ program as difficult to sustain constitutionally 
as one conceivably could be.”185  Against the diversity argument, Rehnquist 
employed a Posnerian colorblind view of racial classifications, which considers race 




“unrelated to ability, disadvantage, or moral culpability” or social attributes such as 
“culture, education, wealth, or language,” and which finds it racist to assume such an 
association.186  As valuable as diversity might hypothetically be, argued Rehnquist, “I 
would think that the Fourteenth Amendment holds that for governmental purposes 
nobody ‘has’ anything simply by virtue of their race.  Members of minority groups 
are not less valuable human beings simply because of their minority status and, it 
would seem to me, are not more valuable either.”187  Rehnquist’s reservation about 
the societal discrimination argument, like Powell’s, stemmed from the source it came 
from:  university faculty and administration.  “[I]t should not be enough here…to say 
that the applicants admitted under the minority program were victims of generalized 
past discrimination,” argued Rehnquist.188 Additionally, one could not assume that 
the diversity rationale “is not bottomed simply on a rationale of administrative 
convenience.”189  
 Negotiating the Written Opinion 
Without consensus on interpretive doctrine, legislative history, sources for 
authority, or precedents to rely upon, Powell was assigned the task of writing the final 
opinion on May 2, 1978.  He was not waiting for these issues to work themselves out, 
however; his chambers had begun drafting an opinion in October 1977.  Powell said 
during 1990 interview that:   
Some people have said I waited to see how the other Justices would vote, but 
that’s not so. The year before Bakke was argued, we had a case named Defunis 
that came up from the University of Washington. It presented basically the 
same issue, that is, the validity of a university’s setting aside a specific 




category, be it blacks or Chicanos or Eskimos. The Defunis case had been 
argued, but the case became moot…the case didn’t have to be decided. 
That summer, knowing we had granted Bakke certiorari in order to address 
the issue, I spent a fair amount of time… thinking how I should vote in Bakke 
and, if I wrote the opinion, what I should say. The fact that I had been 
interested in education, I think, helped me…I was very conscious of the fact 
that in our society diversity was critically important, so I had generally 
decided how I would write Bakke before the case was argued.  Nevertheless, it 
was a difficult opinion to write.190  
Before sending it to the conference, Powell edited Comfort’s attempts at 
drafting the opinion, removing ambiguous phrases and passive voice, questioning 
characterizations, and suggesting additions.  Powell changed most of Comfort’s 
references about “the question” before the Court – a characterization implying 
choices and options – into the language of duty and obligation.  In the first sentence 
of the second internal draft, Powell changed “This case presents the Court, for the 
second time, with a question of great constitutional moment” to “…with an issue of 
great constitutional moment.”191  Similarly, he crossed out the first part of Comfort’s 
second sentence – “Before us is the question whether the guarantees to the 
Constitution of the United States extend to each individual regardless of color or 
national origin,…” – and changed it into “We must decide whether the 
guarantees…”192 
Powell also made suggestions for additions that would reflect public 
arguments about the case: 




2. I’d like to cite in a note somewhere the leading law review articles – to 
indicate they were not overlooked. 
3. Any ideas from media commentary? 
4. Have we made appropriate use of Carnegie study?193 
 Powell coached Comfort on the art of crafting a Supreme Court opinion – 
ordering and characterizing the facts and questions so as to naturalize the answers that 
they would give.  In a note entitled “Comments on Bakke draft,” Powell offered the 
following tips: 
1.  State the Q[uestion] in 1st paragraph. Then move to Part I in which the 
facts + decisions below should be stated…  
2.  The 2nd paragraph under Part II…moves directly to the Q of the level of 
scrutiny….I think it would be better to commence the Court analysis by 
stating that it is conceded that we have a racial classification placing several 
categories of minorities in one class and all whites in a separate class. The 
classes are structured on a group – racial group – basis. 
Move then to Q whether, as Resp contends + Calif S/Ct held, the 14th Amend 
guarantees personal or individual rights. The cases clearly establish this.  Thus 
we have a racial classification + also one structured on a group basis.  At this 
point talk about standard or level of E/P analysis – along lines of the discourse 
in Part III.194 
Powell also forewarned Comfort about the trouble that “strict scrutiny” might cause 
in gaining support from Brennan, suggesting more ambiguous language to 
accommodate their differences: 




Part II addresses primarily the level of scrutiny issue. Without Brennan it is 
sometimes difficult to obtain majority consensus on standards (perhaps 
terminology) of E/P analysis.  Altho [sic] I think all racial clarifications must 
be subjected to same level of scrutiny, I would like to minimize the repetitive 
use of phrases such as ‘strict scrutiny.’ Racial classifications are ‘suspect’; 
therefore they may be sustained only when the…state interest is substantial 
enough to be deemed compelling in the public interest.195 
 Powell’s assessment of Brennan’s distaste for the blanket “strict scrutiny” 
application was accurate.  A good deal for time was spent forging an agreement with 
Brennan, who like Powell was willing to collaborate, but who had to mediate the 
rather disparate concerns that Marshall, Blackmun, and White had with Powell’s 
opinion.  As in earlier stages of the inventional process, the law clerks’ role was 
important; they offered analyses and suggestions for strategy as memos circulated, as 
well as serving as intermediaries between chambers via the other justices’ law 
clerks.196   
 As mentioned previously, the Brennan bloc argued that societal discrimination 
was a valid justification for the consideration of race, and were comfortable with 
upholding the two-tiered program at UC-Davis.  Powell – and the Stevens bloc – 
found the use of race always to trigger the most exacting standard of scrutiny, and 
further argued that the UC-Davis program would fail because it denied Bakke the 
right to compete for all slots based on his race.  However, Powell felt that the use of 
race was not fatal to a program, and from early in the drafts had referenced the 
Harvard admissions program that considered race as one factor among many that 




might contribute to a diverse student body as evidence of how properly to consider 
race.  In a December 14, 1977, memo to Powell, Comfort indicated that Brennan was 
interested in this argument, which might benefit them: 
Justice Brennan seems to have expressed his willingness to reverse in part 
along the ‘Harvard’ lines of our memorandum.  If Justices Marshall and White 
were to take the same tack, it would be an important step, for it would 
establish what we take to be the central issue of the case: all racial 
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny…I suppose that they could reach 
the same reversal in part by applying a form of middle tier scrutiny, but 
Justice Brennan does not raise that possibility in this memo. Thus, there is 
movement.197 
Comfort doubted, however, that they would join entirely with Powell’s 
opinion.  “From their point of view,” argued Comfort, “even if they join our 
‘Harvard’ position, it is politically very desirable to reverse the judgment below, if 
only in part.”198  However, this movement was still good news for the Court, 
according to Comfort, because, “assuming that they would be willing to recognize the 
basis of the ‘Harvard’ discussion (that strict scrutiny applies), and a Court could be 
obtained on that point [strict scrutiny] and on the permissible uses of race, an 
important victory would have been won without regard to the form of the 
judgment.”199 
Looking for additional ways to obtain a judgment of the Court while 
accommodating the differences of opinion, Powell proposed to the conference the 




possibility of deciding separately the different parts of the lower court’s decision.  
Powell wrote:   
I had not [previously] considered the scope of the trial court’s injunction.  If it 
can be read as enjoining Davis from ever including race or ethnic origin as 
one element, to be weighed competitively with all other relevant elements in 
making admissions decisions (i.e., from adopting what I shall refer to herein 
as the “Harvard’-type admissions policy), then – as I stated – I would certainly 
favor a modification of that injunction…Thus, in the unlikely but welcome 
event that a consensus develops for allowing the competitive consideration of 
race as an element, I think we should affirm as to the Davis program, but 
reverse in part as to the scope of the injunction.200  
Comfort’s subsequent memorandum to Powell, entitled “Possible Common 
Ground with Justice Brennan on Bakke” on February 8, 1978, reveals inter-chambers 
negotiation between clerks as Comfort sought to test his earlier judgment:   
I explored this issue informally with Dave Carpenter today.  After our 
conversation, I was pessimistic about the possibility that Justice Brennan 
would join substantial portions of an opinion you authored.  I should make it 
clear, however, that David has not sounded Justice Brennan out on this issue 
for some time.  Also, I get the impression that Dave may be less flexible in his 
approach to making up a Court opinion than Justice Brennan himself might 
be.  If anything breaks in their Chambers, Dave will let us know.201 
Comfort’s conversation with Brennan’s law clerk also indicated that Brennan 
supported Powell writing the final opinion: 




Dave says that it is Justice Brennan’s belief that you will be assigned the 
opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, assuming that Justice 
Blackmun ends up somewhere on your side of the fence.  This belief is based 
on the fact that yours would be the narrowest ground for reversal, and it would 
be reversal only in part. Because of that fact, Justice Brennan concludes that it 
would be your opinion to which courts and schools would look for guidance, 
since you would state the actual judgment and ratio.  For that reason, says 
Dave, Justice Brennan is eager to join as much of your opinion as he can.  Yet 
Dave gave little indication that his boss could join anything of significance in 
your memo as it now stands.202 
 On April 12, 1978, Powell dispatched a personal memo to Burger, in which he 
outlined his thoughts for the final opinion in Bakke.  Reflected in it were the 
reflections about race, his fellow justices, the institutional role of the Court, the 
concerns for their audience, and, in the end, the best solution he could come up with 
for balancing all of these factors. 
 “Dear Chief,” Powell began: “Following your visit on Monday and our 
discussion of the current deadlock on this troublesome case, I have reviewed the 
situation to see whether I could identify a way to break the present deadlock ... My 
review has not been fruitful.”203  Currently, Powell continued, there were four votes 
to hold that UC-Davis’s consideration of race was improper: Stevens, Stewart, 
Rehnquist, and Burger.  There were also four who would vote that race might be 
considered: Brennan, White, Marshall, and himself.  Blackmun, who had been ailing 
for most of the deliberations, still had not cast a vote.  Despite the seeming deadlock, 




Powell reported, “we do stand five to three on affirmance of the portion of the 
California Supreme Court order that Bakke be admitted to medical school.”204  “It 
seems like we agree on a vote,” offered Powell, but “have parted company…on how 
the opinion should be written.”205 
Powell then outlined the possibilities for a decision.  “There are four possible 
answers to the question before us,” said Powell: “(i) no consideration of race is 
permissible…; (ii) race may be given unlimited and controlling weight…; (iii) maybe 
race can be considered, but give not guidance other than to say that a quota system is 
out; and (iv) to go my route, which would be clear and unambiguous, affording both 
guidance and counseling restraint.”206  
I could never agree with either answer (i) or (ii), although they do have the 
virtue of being unambiguous. Nor can I, in good conscience, merely hint that 
race may be considered in some circumstances and at the same time leave Part 
(ii) of the California court’s judgment standing.  If you think some 
consideration of race is permissible (as I understand you do), I continue to 
hope you will join me in an opinion that resolves the issue with guidance for 
the universities and colleges.207  
“It was in light of the foregoing that I [have] concluded to cast…a split vote,” offered 
Powell. Such a vote would “affirm so much of the California’s court order that would 
reinstate Bakke, but reverse the portion thereof that enjoins the medical school from 
considering ‘the race of any other applicant in passing upon his application for 
admission.’ Thus, at the end of my opinion the bottom line would be: ‘Affirm in part 
and reverse in part.’”208  This would affirm Powell’s commitment to the principle of 




individual competition, while upholding some sense of academic freedom, or in 
Powell’s words: “Bakke would win his case, but the medical school would be free to 
consider race as one element in its admissions determinations, with all places open to 
competition.”209 
Not deciding is not an option, concluded Powell; this would incur the rightful 
wrath of the public, and would do no good. “We will never be better informed on the 
issue” than we are presently, Powell reminded the chief justice: “With perhaps a total 
of 75 or more briefs filed in DeFunis and Bakke, and with distinguished counsel 
having argued, carrying the case over would be viewed as an irresponsible failure to 
do our duty…however [t]his vote may go, the country will then have its answer.” 210  
 The lack on answer came largely from two factors:  first, Blackmun had been 
away from the Court recovering from surgery, and had been completely silent on 
which way he would vote.  Second, the four justices who agreed that using race as a 
factor was not per se unconstitutional (Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and White) were 
divided on “what standard should be used to determine the validity of various 
affirmative action programs.”211  Finally, on May 1, 1978, Blackmun circulated a 
memorandum stating his opinion: he would join with Brennan, Marshall, and White.  
He acknowledged the influence that Marshall’s narrative had on his decision:  “There 
is much to be said for Marshall’s ‘cruelest irony’ approach as set forth in his 
memorandum of April 13.”212  Blackman also acknowledged the merits of 
Rehnquist’s appeal to colorblindness, but characterized it as idealistic, and thus 
insufficient: 




Title VI, as with the Fourteenth Amendment, was concerned with the 
unconstitutional use of race criteria, not with the use of race as an appropriate 
remedial feature…The original aims [of the Fourteenth Amendment] persist. 
And that, in a distinct sense, is what affirmative action, in light of the proper 
facts, is all about. To be sure, it conflicts with idealistic equality in the sense 
that Bill Rehnquist proposes, but if there is tension here it is original 
Fourteenth Amendment tension and a part of the Amendment’s very nature 
until equality is achieved…It is the unconstitutional use of race that is 
prohibited, not the constitutional use.213 
Now that he has a sense of where everyone stood, Powell circulated to the 
conference the first draft of his final opinion on May 9, 1978.  He explained this stage 
of the process to his law clerks in an office manual:  “You then wait anxiously to see 
what reaction this initial draft will prompt from other Justices. Subsequent drafts may 
be sent around to reflect stylistic revisions, cite checking changes, or 
accommodations made in the hope of obtaining the support of other Justices.”214  The 
disappointing news came via memo the next day:  Brennan was not convinced by 
Powell’s opinion.  “Dear Lewis,” Brennan wrote: “I have read your opinion very 
carefully and have regretfully come to the conclusion that I should write out my own 
views. I think those views as reflected in my memorandum of November 23 differ so 
substantially from your own that no common ground seems possible.”215  In actuality, 
there was a bit of common ground to be had – Powell’s notes on the memo 
summarized that “Bill plans to join Judgment + the first 14 pages.”216  Brennan 




reiterated this limited agreement, and hinted at more, in another memo sent six days 
later:   
Dear Lewis: Supplementing my note of May 10, I can join pages 1 through 
the top of page 14 and also subdivision (B) at 14 through 17 except that I may 
join Byron’s treatment of Title VI if he writes a more expanded treatment.  I 
have also considered whether I might agree with your subdivision (E) at page 
46 [the section about diversity] and think that I should reserve decision on that 
until my own writing is concluded. The reason is that there may be other 
reasons besides educational diversity that will support competitive 
consideration of race and ethnic origin.217 
Brennan circulated his own opinion, which Marshall, Blackmun, and White 
planned to join, forging the bloc who would overturn the lower court’s ruling on the 
unconstitutionality of race-conscious admissions.  As drafts arrived in Powell’s 
chambers, Comfort analyzed them to see if anything merited changes in Powell’s 
opinion.  He paid particular attention to the final draft, to which he concluded, “I 
don’t think any of the changes [from Brennan’s earlier stance] require action on our 
part.”218  Brennan had decided to join with the “strict scrutiny” standard, although his 
definition was a bit looser than Powell’s, reported Comfort. “He still has silly 
footnote 13, which takes us to task for our ‘rival group’ analysis,” Comfort noted, but 
“I don’t think we need to respond to this rather silly attack, because our point is clear 
to anyone following the progression of our argument.”219 
Brennan also held to the remediation justification, and he did not share the 
concern with a university making the judgment about social discrimination.  In fact, 




Comfort summarized, “WJB argues that States are free to distribute power as they 
wish, and that if the State legitimately could do this, so can the medical school.  We 
suggest, however, that even the State could not have done this without findings and 
criteria.”220  Again, Comfort found no benefit to changing Powell’s opinion, because 
“our section on this point was the one that we changed in anticipation of this 
footnote...I think that we are probably okay here with the changes we finally agreed 
upon.”221  The same assessment was given for Brennan’s “flight of fancy concerning 
Davis’ ‘real’ reasons for enacting the preference and the discrimination faced by 
minorities in medicine, detached from any reference to the record.  It’s the same 
social essay contained in the previous drafts…we need say nothing about it.”222 
 With the votes in, the opinions circulated, and no more movement to be made, 
there was a final decision left:  to articulate what the binding judgment of the Court 
actually was.  Brennan agreed with Powell’s conviction that the Court be clear about 
what was and was not allowed under its ruling, although they disagreed about what 
that was.  Powell was voting to affirm in part and reverse in part, an act that bridged 
the judgments of the Brennan and Stevens blocs of votes, so his was the “official” 
holding of the Court. Yet the personal memo that Powell wrote to Brennan, just five 
days before the opinion was announced to the public, evidences the negotiation of 
who gets to declare the judgment: 
Since your telephone call I have given further thought…to your question 
whether the following sentence on the first page of your opinion is accurate as 
to my opinion as well as yours:  ‘Government may take race into account 




when it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy 
disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice.’ 
Your opinion states that the foregoing reflects the ‘central meaning of this 
Court’s judgment.’ If your statement is read literally, I doubt that it does 
reflect accurately the judgment of the Court. In terms of ‘judgment’, my 
opinion is limited to the holding that a state university validly may consider 
race to achieve diversity.  
But my opinion recognized broadly…that consideration of race is appropriate 
to eliminate the effects of past discrimination when appropriate findings have 
been made by judicial, legislative or administrative bodies authorized to act.223 
Stevens was right, Powell argued, when he declared the judgment itself not to go 
beyond the diversity rationale. But Powell expressed discomfort with negating 
different characterizations of his own opinion: 
Despite the foregoing I have not objected to your characterization of what the 
Court holds as I have thought you could put whatever ‘gloss’ on the several 
opinions you think proper.  In sum, while I might prefer that you describe the 
judgment differently, I have no thought of making any response on this point 
beyond what I have already circulated.224  
Conclusion 
Powell’s measured decision-making in Bakke reflects Neil MacCormick’s 
argument about the rhetoricity of legal reasoning:   
it is all too often a matter of choosing between two strongly arguable and 
strongly argued cases, in a dialectical situation in which each argument made 




by either party is firmly countered by a good argument proposed by the other.  
Perhaps…it is only by reference to considerations of ideology extraneous to 
law that one can come to a justified decision at all.  Then the ultimately 
justifying ground is a particular ideology, not law as an ideologically neutral 
ultimate ground of appeal.225 
 As frequently as Powell used the language of prudence and pragmatism to 
justify his reasoning, then, to bridge different interpretations is ultimately to choose 
an ideological path.  The result of Powell’s inventional process was to uphold “an 
ideological principle” of diversity – but a version of diversity dissociated from the 
robust race-consciousness of the pro-Davis briefs, and replaced with an 
individualized racialism. This outcome defined race as an individual characteristic, 
separating race consciousness from its group identity and coalition-forming potential, 
and toward a characterological feature.  This balance “shows all the tensions created 
by the desire to conciliate stability with change, the need for continuity with 
adaptation, and security with equity and the common good” evident in legal 
reasoning, argues Chaїm Perelman.226   
Yet by separating the consideration of race from any group history associated 
with it, Powell individualized and privatized the notion of race, thus making race 
“decontextualized so that it becomes an institutional value rather than a complex 
social construct.”227  Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca describe this 
argumentative technique of dissociation as an act which “take[s] the form of showing 
that a link considered to have been accepted…does not exist, because there are no 
grounds for stating or maintaining that [the]…phenomena under consideration 




exercise an influence on those which are under discussion and that it is consequently 
irrelevant to take the former into account.”228  On a practical level, they argue, “the 
dissociation of notions amounts to a compromise, but, on the theoretical level, it leads 
to a solution that will also be valid for the future, because, by remodeling our 
conception of reality, it prevents the reappearance of the same incompatibility.”229  
Justice Powell’s decision was seen as a partial victory and partial defeat for 
most interested parties.  An Associated Press story, released on the morning the 
decision was announced, explained:  “The 5-4 decision was a clear victory for Bakke 
but without clear guideposts for the future use of quotas or goals in programs 
designed to aid minorities.  And while the court ruling was on college admissions, its 
decision could affect minority hiring practices by hundreds of businesses and 
government agencies under affirmative action programs developed over the past 15 
years.”230  The Washington Post declared Bakke “A Ruling with Something for Every 
Group,” and the New York Times announced that “No One Lost.”231  The NAACP 
called the Bakke decision “a major disappointment,” whereas the Congressional 
Black Caucus thought Bakke promising because it upheld the use of race in 
admissions.232  University of California President David Saxon called the decision an 
“overall victory” for the university, because “despite the flaws of the U.C. Medical 
School at Davis, ‘the overwhelming bulk of our admission program appears to be 
entirely lawful.’”233  The Chicago Sun-Times headlined “White Student Wins Reverse 
Bias Case,” followed by a small font-type qualifier:  “Justices OK some racial 
preferences.”234  Time Magazine reported, “Quotas, No; Race, Yes.”235   Newsweek 
writer Peter Goldman found broader significance in the decision’s careful ruling:  “A 




fragile 5-to-4 majority of the Court did leave ample room for the survival of most of 
the affirmative-action programs now pervasive on campus and in the marketplace as 
well.  But the Court substantially narrowed the ground for preferred treatment of 
blacks, and so mirrored a spreading national Spirit of ’78 – a will to be left alone.”236  
Future Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork read the decision as “at bottom a 
statement that the 14th Amendment allows some, but not too much, reverse 
discrimination,” at the same time that Allan Bakke spoke through his lawyer to 
declare that he was pleased with the results.237  Law professor and lawyer Alan 
Dershowitz said that Bakke would:  
go down in history not for what it did but for what it didn’t do.  It neither 
legitimized racial quotas nor put down affirmative action programs.  The 
decision will make the job of admissions officers a lot harder.  It will make 
them look at people as persons, not as members of a group and not as 
computerized ciphers.238 
Mark Tushnet shares this tepid interpretation of Powell’s decision in Bakke, 
an approach that he finds reflective of Powell’s overall jurisprudence of centrism.  “If 
a judge adheres to a jurisprudence of balancing, as Powell did, it would be desirable 
for that judge to have a capacious social vision.  Judges who lack such a vision may 
not do a good job in balancing competing interests because they do not fully 
appreciate the range of interests at stake.”239  Without a strong social vision to 
motivate this balancing, the public ends up only the timid decision, not the sense of 
struggle and balance that comes from Powell’s inventional process.  As Tushnet 




asserts: “Powell's desire to achieve balance meant that the law he articulated reflected 
the balance he struck, not a balance accessible to any fair reader of the cases.”240 
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The Rhetorical Supreme Court and the Legacy of “Diversity” 
 
The classical notion of kairos – a focus on the right moment or the opportune, 
taking creative advantage of the particularities of the situation – is the missing link in 
contemporary inventional processes, according to Eric Charles White.1  Driven by 
impulses toward formalism, positivism, and realism, legal invention is particularly 
susceptible to an arhetorical ignorance of kairos.  At the same time, despite the best 
efforts of judicial rhetors, the judicial decision-making process cannot avoid in 
practice the contextual and ideological situatedness in which it is immersed.   
Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.’s decision to rely on racial diversity as a 
compelling justification for the continuance of some affirmative action programs was 
the result of such a kairotic moment, found in the exploration of topoi with his law 
clerk, Bob Comfort, and through the convergence of social and political forces, the 
tensions between the justices’ blocs of votes, and the particulars of the Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke case.  The ongoing push and pull of the rhetorics of 
integration and cultural pluralism, the widespread use of affirmative action programs 
in university life and in other federally funded programs, Powell’s history on 
educational boards, the Regents’ decision to concede Bakke’s argument about 
admission, the Burger Court’s fragmented membership and the conservative 
pragmatism of its leaders, the numerous amicus briefs – all constrained options for 
decision-making in general, but also brought to the foreground the possibilities 
inherent in a limited concept of diversity as both a value and a policy.  




Contemporary legal education rejects the rhetorical basis of legal knowledge 
in favor of legal doctrine, reliance on precedent, legislative histories, and other 
starting places of arguments aiming to rid judicial decisions of their subjectivities. I 
have argued in this study that, in practice, opinion writers use these resources in 
rhetorical ways (wrestling with contingencies and arguing in probabilities), and 
toward rhetorical ends (using the linguistic resources of the public sphere to address 
specific audiences about public issues).  The starting places of legal arguments are 
themselves ideological containers of meaning, filled with the specifics of each case 
and chosen to meet the goals of the justices and the institutional needs of the Court.   
In Bakke, legal doctrines such as the application of “strict scrutiny” and the 
discernment between benign and invidious forms of discrimination carried within 
them assumptions about the harms and values of race consciousness.  Thus, when 
Justice Powell insisted on using strict scrutiny, he also was insisting on the treatment 
of race as something potentially dangerous to the American community.  Likewise, 
when Powell cited precedential support for academic freedom, he was also 
reaffirming the limited role of the Supreme Court in decisions about public policy and 
social justice.  
I have also argued that, in addition to legal doctrines and precedents, justices 
and their clerks involved in the Bakke decision considered the practical needs of their 
audiences, the beliefs of their colleagues, and the opinions of the public at large both 
when deciding how to decide and how to justify those decisions.  Powell and Comfort 
searched through the available arguments in the Bakke case for ways to avoid 
negating affirmative action policies altogether while avoiding the balkanization that 




several amici and public actors had warned of, and about which Powell was 
concerned.  They insisted on giving a clear answer to the question of how to offer a 
constitutional affirmative action policy:  a question not formally presented to the 
Court by the parties, but which was rampant in the amicus briefs and in public 
discourse.  They chose among the possible justifications those lines of argument that 
would mediate the most concerns of the parties, the public, and the other justices, 
resulting in a split vote which struck down “quotas” like the UC-Davis task force 
program, but which also created space for the consideration of race in university 
admissions.  That Powell constructed the final opinion in the Court’s rhetoric of 
inevitability does not detract from the many choices that he made in getting there, nor 
does it mean that the ideas, values, or language were his alone. 
The practice of authorship is an epistemologically social activity, and this 
study asserts that the “final texts” of the opinions in Bakke are better seen as 
fragments of the wider rhetorical environment from which they emerged.  Chapter 
Three posited the overlapping ideologies manifest in arguments for and against 
affirmative action policies in Bakke: on one side, race-consciousness, cultural 
pluralism, and remedial social justice; on the other, individualism, meritocracy, and 
colorblindness.  The Court’s fragmented decision – with six separately written 
opinions – reflects the ambivalence and discord that the American public felt about 
the need for and value of affirmative action policies.  The ideology of individual 
agency as a source of power, embedded in the cultural narrative of the American 
dream, was being challenged by the limits of that narrative, wherein, as Christopher 
Newfield reminds us, “democracy depended on the recognition of the political and 




economic realities created by…group life—by systemic racial inequalities, by 
ongoing racial disparities, by racism past and present.”2  Powell’s pragmatic judicial 
style motivated a narrative that combined the primacy of the individual with the value 
of multiculturalism, making race an individual asset within the university community.  
Because legal appeals for equal access to education had long been the field on 
which battles over racial inequities had been fought, I have also read the Bakke case 
as the scene for a larger struggle.  In past Supreme Court cases, the most successful 
arguments for increasing minority student access to education had been integrationist 
arguments reliant on an individualist ideology of self-help and growth of agency.  
Whereas in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries rhetorics of assimilation were 
responses to overt exclusionary practices, by the mid- to late-twentieth century, this 
rhetorical strategy was markedly conservative when juxtaposed with the re-
emergence of cultural pluralism as a positive American value.  Similarly, whereas in 
the early twentieth century rhetorical strategies deemphasized race in order to gain 
entrance into “white” institutions, the focus in the post-Civil Rights Acts decades 
centered on solutions to racial disparities that existed in fact, although no longer in 
law.  This meant highlighting the differences in the lived experiences of people of 
color who had been marginalized.   
The value of cultural pluralism, enacted in Bakke through the arguments for a 
diverse student body, offered to fill a rhetorical void.  Examining the topoi in Bakke 
as they worked up from the larger rhetorical environment, were pulled through the 
party and amicus briefs, and were sorted through the starting places of judicial 
argument, allows for an understanding of the shifting ideological alliances at work in 




the decision.  Through this lens, new legal principles, like the value of racial diversity 
as a facet of academic freedom, are evident within the act of inventional playfulness 
and judicial co-authorship, often combining strains of existing ideologies into subtly 
different manifestations.  As evidenced in the statements of the Court below as well 
as the circulation and recirculation of these arguments, these moves are seldom 
uncontested.   
The Final Opinions in Bakke 
Justice Lewis Powell announced the judgment of the Court for Regents of the 
University of California v. Allan Bakke on June 28, 1978.  He prepared two drafts of 
the announcement, which he scripted for reading aloud. The tone of his 
announcement reflected weariness: “I am authorized to announce only the judgment 
of the Court,” said Powell before a packed courtroom. “There is no opinion joined in 
its entirety by five members of the Court.”3  Four of his fellow justices – Stevens, 
Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall – also announced their views, a process that took 
over an hour.  Powell explained to the audience:  
This case was argued some eight months ago, and as we speak today with a 
notable lack of unanimity, it may be fair to say that we needed all of this 
advice. In any event, it will be evident from our several opinions that the case 
– intrinsically difficult – has received our most thoughtful attention over many 
months. 
So much for an introduction. As there are six separate opinions, I will state 
first the Court’s judgment.  Insofar as the California Supreme Court held that 
Bakke must be admitted to the Davis Medical School, we affirm.  Insofar as 




the California Court prohibited Davis from considering race as a factor in 
admissions, we reverse.  I will now try to explain how we divided on these 
issues.  This may no be self-evident from a hurried examination of our various 
opinions.4 
Powell separated the “questions before the Court” into two issues as he 
continued with the announcement.  There was not even consensus on the questions.  
The first, which Powell called the “Bakke admissions question,” addressed whether 
or not the UC-Davis task force program had unlawfully discriminated against Bakke.  
Justice John Paul Stevens argued in his separate announcement to the Court that, 
apart from Bakke’s lawsuit against the UC-Davis medical school, “no other issue 
remains in the case…It is well settled that this court reviews judgments, not 
statements in opinion…not withstanding the pressure that tempts us to speak about 
other issues, well-settled principles dictate a course of judicial restraint.”5  Thus, this 
was the only question considered by the group comprised of opinion author Stevens 
and joined by Rehnquist, Burger, and Stewart, and they argued that Bakke had indeed 
been discriminated against, based on a private cause of action conferred under Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Powell agreed with their judgment – that the 
school had discriminated against Bakke – but disagreed with grounds on which they 
decided it.  Still, this meant that there were five votes invalidating the task force 
program.   
The second question was broader, asking whether or not race could ever be 
considered during the admissions process.  Brennan wrote the plurality opinion that 
included Marshall, Blackmun, and White, although each of the later three wrote 




separate opinions as well.  The Brennan plurality argued that the Constitution allowed 
for the consideration of race in college admissions, although strict scrutiny was 
necessary to determine if its use was appropriate.  Powell agreed with this judgment, 
as well.  But as with the other question, he disagreed with the reasons that they 
offered, as well as the scope of their judgment. Whereas the Brennan group found that 
the university’s goal of alleviating the effects of societal discrimination was 
constitutionally permissible, Powell announced that “the only state interest that fairly 
may be viewed as compelling on this record is the interest of a university in a diverse 
student body.”6 
After Powell finished his explanation, Stevens read portions of his opinion.  In 
it, he reiterated the legislative history narrative circulated and debated between the 
justices.  The opinion of the Stevens plurality was a story of limits, written in a 
rhetoric of deference to the legislature, to the lower court’s decision, to the “plain 
language” of the statute they decided under, and to legal doctrine that disallowed 
them to reach the constitutional issue.  “The University, through its special 
admissions policy, excluded Bakke from participation in its program…because of his 
race. The University also acknowledges that it was, and still is, receiving federal 
financial assistance. The plain language of the statute therefore requires affirmance of 
the judgment below.  A different result cannot be justified unless that language 
misstates the actual intent of the Congress that enacted the statute…The legislative 
history reinforces this reading.”7  Even though “[b]oth petitioner and respondent have 
asked us to determine the legality of the University's special admissions program by 
reference to the Constitution,” argued Stevens, “[o]ur settled practice…is to avoid the 




decision of a constitutional issue if a case can be fairly decided on a statutory 
ground.”8  Thus, Stevens concluded, UC-Davis violated Title VI of the Civil Right 
Act of 1964, and “[i]t is therefore our duty to affirm the judgment ordering Bakke 
admitted to the University.  Accordingly, I concur with the Court’s judgment insofar 
as it affirms the judgment of [the lower court]. To the extent that it purports to do 
anything else, I respectfully dissent.”9 
Brennan gave his bench speech next. He and Powell had a less than amicable 
end to the opinion writing process, and Powell wrote a note for his permanent file 
explaining: 
In the fifth draft of my opinion, I added footnote 34, the second paragraph of 
which alludes to discrimination against Jews early in this century because of 
their perceived capability of dominating the universities. My reason for 
including this reference, and the citation to Steinberg, is that it seems to me 
that the rationale of the Brennan plurality opinion would require approval of 
the quotas imposed upon the admission of Jews.  
Bill Brennan called me, following circulation of my fifth draft and was 
quite upset by this portion of footnote 34. He characterized it as ‘personally 
offensive,’ saying that his respect and admiration for our Jewish citizens was 
widely known. He thought that my reference to the former mistreatment of the 
Jews would be quoted against him – and against his opinion in this case – to 
his embarrassment.  
I stated that I would omit anything from any opinion where a Justice of 
the Court requested me to do so on the ground that what I had written was 




‘personally offensive.’ This portion of the note was removed in the sixth and 
final draft. 
Pulling partly from his opinion, and partly from his own words, Brennan now offered 
his explanation for what the Court’s decisions meant: “…in consequence, only five 
members of the Court address the constitutional question of unique paramount 
importance that this case presents: What race conscious programs are permissible 
under the Equal Protection Clause?…It is no secret that the Court took this case as the 
vehicle for confronting that issue, after avoiding it in lieu of these grounds in the 
defendant’s case.”10  Nevertheless, Brennan argued in the opinion, the lack of 
unanimity “should not and must not mask the central meaning of today's opinions: 
Government may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult any 
racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice, 
at least when appropriate findings have been made by judicial, legislative, or 
administrative bodies with competence to act in this area.”11 
 Brennan characterized arguments about constitutional colorblindness as naïve 
and historically inaccurate.  In addition to detailing a legislative history of Title VI 
similar to that circulated by Marshall’s chambers in response to Stevens’ memo, 
Brennan extended the narrative timeline of the constitutional debate to its origins.  It 
is true, said Brennan, that “our Nation was founded on the principle that ‘all Men are 
created equal.’ 
Yet candor requires acknowledgment that the Framers of our Constitution, to 
forge the 13 Colonies into one Nation, openly compromised this principle of 
equality with its antithesis: slavery…[I]t is well to recount how recent the time 




has been, if it has yet come, when the promise of our principles has flowered 
into the actuality of equal opportunity for all regardless of race or color. The 
Fourteenth Amendment…, has been the law of our land for only slightly more 
than half its 200 years. And for half of that half, the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Amendment was largely moribund. Against this background, claims 
that law must be “colorblind” or that the datum of race is no longer relevant to 
public policy must be seen as aspiration, rather than as description of 
reality…This is not to denigrate aspiration…Yet we cannot…let color 
blindness become myopia which masks the reality that many “created equal” 
have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior by both the law and by their 
fellow citizens.12 
 Furthermore, although the Brennan plurality joined the part of Powell’s 
decision which found the consideration of race to be constitutional, they could not 
find a meaningful difference between the UC-Davis program that the Court struck 
down, and the Harvard plan that Powell attached to his opinion as an appendix as an 
example of a proper affirmative action program.  “We think that for purposes of 
constitutional adjudication there is simply no difference between the two 
approaches,” argued Brennan.  
It is inescapable that in any admissions program which extends a preference to 
disadvantaged racial minorities a decision must be made as to how much of 
the preference is to be given and any given preference that results in the 
exclusion of a white candidate is no more or less constitutionally acceptable 
than a program such as that at Davis…there is no basis for preferring a 




particular preference program simply because in achieving the same goals that 
the Davis Medical School is pursuing, it proceeds in a manner that is not 
immediately apparent to the public.13 
 Justice Harry Blackmun offered a contextualist reading of the questions 
before, and the holding of, the Court. “Mr. Justice Powell has stated that this case is 
intrinsically difficult; perhaps so, perhaps not,” Blackmun began in his statement to 
the Court.  
I suspect that for those four members of the Court who find the Title VI issue 
controlling, the case really is not very difficult. But for the five of us who feel 
that Title VI does not provide the answer, the case has much deeper and more 
profound ramifications… This case, like the death penalty issues that have 
been before the Court in years past, like the abortion cases, like the school 
desegregation cases, has caught the popular interest and the people’s deep 
concern. Like each of those it finds the people, as well as Justices, divided in 
their innate reactions. Strands of heritage and strands of emotion and strands 
of presumption, all are plucked.14  
Next, Blackmun offered a backdrop against which the opinions should be judged:  
…until a few years ago…less than 2% of all the physicians and all of the 
attorneys and all the students in medical and law schools in this country were 
members of what we refer to as minority groups…if ways are not found to 
remedy that kind of situation the country will never achieve its professed goal 
of a society that is not race-conscious…I am optimistic that remedy will be 




forthcoming, and…when it comes, the affirmative action, so-called, or 
‘reverse discrimination’ will be a thing of the past.15  
Blackmun also critiqued the reliance on meritocracy evoked in the case, which 
ignored other preference-based admissions criteria already in place at most 
universities. “It is somewhat ironic to [be] so deeply disturbed by this case,” said 
Blackmun, “which concerns a program where race is an element of consciousness, 
and yet for all of us to be aware of the fact…that our institutions of higher learning 
have long given…conceded preference…to accomplished or promising athletes, to 
children of alumni, to the affluent and to those who have connections with celebrities 
and the famous and the powerful.”16 
Blackmun agreed with Powell’s proclamation that the Fourteenth Amendment 
has “expanded beyond its original 1868 concept” to embrace a broader principle than 
protections of African Americans only, but rejected the conclusions that Powell had 
drawn from that expansion. “This enlargement does not mean for me, however, that 
the Fourteenth Amendment has broken away from its moorings and its original 
intended purposes,” argued Blackmun in his opinion. “Those original aims persist. 
And that, in a distinct sense, is what ‘affirmative action,’ in the face of proper facts, is 
all about. If this conflicts with idealistic equality, that tension is original Fourteenth 
Amendment tension, constitutionally conceived and constitutionally imposed, and it 
is part of the Amendment's very nature until complete equality is achieved in the 
area.”17 
 Marshall was the last of the justices to speak about the Bakke decision.  As 
with Brennan, he and Powell had ended the writing process with some personal 




animosity.  In the second-to-last draft of his dissent, Marshall had offered a harsh 
critique of Powell’s claim that “[i]t is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal 
protection to all persons permits the recognition of special wards entitle to a degree of 
protection greater than that accorded others.”18  Marshall had noted in his circulated 
opinion that  “His words bear a discomforting relationship to those of the Court in the 
Civil Rights Cases, supra; the Court there wrote that the Negro emerging from 
slavery must cease ‘to be the special favorite of the laws.’”19  In the margins next to 
this line, Powell’s law clerk Bob Comfort had written, “This is a not-so-subtle 
suggestion that you are a racist, but I’m not sure we should dignify it by replying,” 
and, in different ink, “I called Ellen S. [Marshall’s law clerk] and she said they will 
take this out. B.”20  On the first page of the memo, Powell wrote “Bob – on his own 
called TM’s clerk. I would not have responded. LFP.”21 In his final opinion, Marshall 
removed Powell’s name, but kept the point:  
In the Civil Rights Cases, this Court wrote that the Negro emerging from 
slavery must cease ‘to be the special favorite of the laws.’ We cannot, in light 
of the history of the last century, yield to that view. Had this Court been 
willing in 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson to hold that the Equal Protection Clause 
forbids difference in treatment based on race, we would not be faced with this 
dilemma in 1978.  We must remember, however, that the principle that the 
Constitution is colorblind appeared only in the dissenting opinion.22 
Although Marshall had agreed to take out the direct reference to Powell, the 
remainder of his dissent went unchanged, and he read portions of it to the Court.  He 
offered a history similar to Brennan’s, then offered an ironic reading of the current 




holding of the Court in light of that history and the current state of affairs stemming 
from them:  
It must be remembered that, during most of the past 200 years, the 
Constitution as interpreted by this Court did not prohibit the most ingenious 
and pervasive forms of discrimination against the Negro. Now, when a State 
acts to remedy the effects of that legacy of discrimination, I cannot believe 
this same Constitution stands as a barrier…  
The position of the Negro today…is a tragic but inevitable 
consequence of centuries of unequal treatment. Measured against any 
benchmark of comfort of achievement, meaningful equality remains a distant 
dream of the Negro. The Negro child today has a life expectancy which is 
shorter by more than five years than that of the white child. That’s today…For 
Negro adults, the unemployment rate is twice that of whites, at least twice. 
And the unemployment rate for Negro teenagers is three to four times that of 
white teenagers. I’m talking about today. The relationship between these 
figures and the history of unequal treatment offered to the Negro cannot be 
denied. And I haven’t heard it denied. 23 
Appeals to Isreal Zangwill’s melting pot society are not enough, concluded Marshall: 
“In light of this sorry history of discrimination and the devastating impact on the lives 
of our Negroes, bringing the Negro into the mainstream of American life should be a 
state interest of the highest order…the dream of America as a great melting pot has 
not been realized for the Negro. Because of his skin color, he never even made it into 
the pot.” Thus, Marshall concluded, “It is a little ironic that, after several hundred 




years of class-based discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold 
that a class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible.”24 
Bakke’s Legacies 
Attorney General Griffin B. Bell held a press briefing on the Bakke case 
several hours after the decision was announced by the Supreme Court.  Powell and 
his law clerk, Bob Comfort, had found little of use in government’s brief during the 
inventional process:  “On the whole,” Comfort had written, “I think the Brief is 
disappointing. It assumes, with little analysis, that a middle tier scrutiny ought to be 
applied…once that conclusion is reached, the ball game is over.”25  Bell, however, 
declared the Bakke opinion “very helpful,” especially once the public realizes that 
“the law of discrimination is complex” and that the Supreme Court had never 
addressed the issue of college admissions to professional schools.26   
Under our system of common law where the law evolves on a case-by-case 
basis, you can’t have just one decision that solves everything for all 
time…[This opinion] is a very good start.  Justice Powell did what I thought 
was a very good thing. He not only wrote an opinion, but then he gave as an 
example a plan which he said was constitutional, legal. He used a Harvard 
admissions plan….So he has told everyone what the law is and then he said, 
‘Here is a plan that is legal.’ So I think that is settled, yes.27 
Asked what President Jimmy Carter thought about the decision, Bell replied, “He was 
pleased that the affirmative action position that we took was upheld. This was his 
main interest in the case…This case came out a little different from our position on 




Mr. Bakke, but we wish him well. But the main thing we are looking at is what was 
going to happen to all our affirmative action programs.”28 
 Catherine L. Horn and Patricia Marin concluded that Powell’s opinion in 
Bakke was indeed helpful to colleges and universities:  “Bakke has provided 
educational institutions with the language to clearly articulate some of their most 
central goals and practices and has contributed to the discussion about the purpose 
and benefits of higher education and access to education at all levels.”29  Powell was 
not the first public actor to do so, but his opinion was an authoritative one, continue 
Horn and Marin: “Bakke was not a watershed moment but, instead, initially a 
codification of practice across a range of policies.”30  Universities that already used 
affirmative action programs either modified them to consider race as one factor of 
admissions criteria or kept their programs as they were, and private industry and 
government appeared to do the same.31  In the short-term, African-American and 
Hispanic enrollments in medical schools stayed at the same level, with neither 
substantially increasing nor decreasing enrollments.32   
The Association of American Law Schools described the Bakke case as a 
“cause celebre in the higher education world.”33 Yet it was law schools in particular, 
which had and continue to have vastly larger concentrations of Latino and African 
American graduates than do any other professional school programs, that reaped the 
greatest benefit of Bakke.  Henry Ramsey’s 1979 survey of 100 law schools found 
that 72% of American law schools reported having affirmative action programs.34  
Susan Welch and John Gruhl argue that Bakke established the legitimacy of pre-
existing affirmative action programs at universities who already had them, rather than 




motivating the creation of new programs.35 Law schools programs, who had filed the 
majority of the amicus briefs in Bakke and who were arguably the most directly 
impacted by its decision, would continue to be the grounds for challenging Powell’s 
judgment, as well. 
In the longer term, more students attend post-secondary schools in general, 
but the gap between the attendance of white students and African American and 
Latino students has remained.  According to the National Center of Education 
Statistics: “In 1975, 44.3% of Whites age 25 to 29 had some postsecondary schooling, 
compared with 27.5% of Blacks and 21.95 of Hispanics in the same age group. In 
2000, 64.7% of Whites age 25 to 29 had some postsecondary schooling, compared 
with only 51.9% and 32.3% of Blacks and Hispanics, respectively.” 36  As significant 
to Michael Kurlaender and Erika Felts is the economic impact on postsecondary 
school attendance: “Among the high school class of 1992, 94% of students in the top 
socioeconomic quintile attended some postsecondary institution, but only 54% of 
those students in the bottom quintile went on to postsecondary schooling.”37 
 The correlation between socioeconomic status and race, a legacy of de jure 
and de facto discrimination, had been one of the primary concerns of the Regents of 
the University of California, as well as the amici supporting them in the Bakke case.  
No single brief supporting affirmative action programs in Bakke had separated 
support for affirmative action from the remediation argument – yet Powell did in his 
opinion.  His judgment in Bakke negated remedial considerations, except when either 
the university or the state legislature provided evidence of the history of 
discrimination.  Although Bakke did not disallow the quest for social justice, it 




provided an alternative process – and a corresponding vocabulary – that made it 
easier for educational institutions not to pursue such a goal.  In particular, “Justice 
Powell’s opinion reshaped the discussion of race/ethnicity in college admissions from 
one of remedies for the present effects of past institutional discrimination to one of 
educational benefits of diversity, establishing a philosophy that continues to drive 
admission practices today,” argue Horn and Marin.38 
In this sense, Powell’s decision in Bakke had broader ramifications than its 
ability to offer a practical example for how to enact a lawful affirmative action 
admissions program.  By legitimizing the Harvard admissions plan and its educational 
goal of a diverse student body, Powell’s opinion performed an ideological function: it 
privileged the commitment to diversity, broadly defined, over the commitment to 
social justice.  The longer-term consequences of the diversity rationale included a 
wider lacuna between the consideration of racial identity and the struggle for social 
equality.  In their book examining the legacy of the Bakke decision, Marin and Horn 
remind legal scholars and higher education attorneys that remedying past institutional 
discrimination remains a valid justification for affirmative action.39  Powell’s 
rejection of this defense was based on the lack of evidence provided by either the 
university or a legislative body to “prove” the effects of past discrimination.  Neither 
he nor any other justice discounted this goal entirely, and Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor reaffirmed this option in her majority opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger 
(2003).  
What the justices in Bakke did affirm, however, makes it less likely that the 
remediation argument would be acceptable.  Powell’s articulation of diversity was not 




limited to race, and more importantly, it was tied to the principle of individualism. 
Argues Martin D. Carcieri: 
To acknowledge the legitimacy of educational diversity…and the possibility 
that it remains a compelling state interest is to acknowledge only part of 
Justice Powell’s opinion….There is another quintessential liberal principle 
that Justice Powell elaborated in Bakke and at much greater length than he did 
the diversity rationale. It is that rights under the equal protection clause are 
held by the individual human being and not by groups of human beings. 
Moreover, while the rest of the Bakke Court was silent on diversity, it 
unanimously acknowledged the force of this individualist principle. This is 
not surprising as the Court had clearly acknowledged the individual locus of 
equal protection for decades before Bakke and has reaffirmed it for decades 
since.40 
Although discourses about the benefits of race conscious policies like 
affirmative action had long preceded the Bakke case, Powell’s jurisprudential 
tendency of pragmatic conservatism – supporting that which is necessary to fix 
problematic situations, but avoiding using the Court to shift social norms or otherwise 
cause upheaval – motivated a novel combination of the rhetoric of multiculturalism 
with the agent-centered justification of individual rights.41  Robert K. Fullinwider and 
Judith Lichtenberg said of the case: “the main moral and legal positions on 
affirmative action mirror the various opinions…delivered by the justices of the Court 
in Bakke.  Thus, in closely rehearsing the arguments in Bakke for and against the 
medical school’s policy, we see the main lines of contention and the broad principles 




to which the protagonists and antagonists of affirmative action, past and present, have 
pinned their arguments.”42  Yet Powell’s articulation of the diversity rationale bridged 
several of these broad principles, as “he was determined both to achieve a pragmatic 
accommodation of the social necessity of affirmative action and to extract a patent 
symbolic commitment to the values of individualism.”43 
This project evaluated the rhetorical invention process that led Powell to his 
decision to rely upon diversity as the linguistic umbrella under which he could solve 
the problem that he saw college and universities undergoing, while blocking the two-
tiered admissions systems that he found onerous to individual rights.  That two-tiered 
system had been justified by its advocates with an argument about societal 
discrimination, but a pragmatic conservative such as Powell had trouble articulating 
such a broad history from his seat at the Supreme Court.  What he did, instead, was 
rhetorically fragment the concept of a “white majority,” problematizing the 
distinction between white and minority groups.  The resulting complexity allowed 
Powell to declare distinctions based on previous social wrongs functionally 
impossible. It was thus necessary to focus on individual freedoms instead of group 
protections, privileging the ideal of liberal individualism above contextual exigencies.  
To articulate this distinction, Justice Powell constructed a narrative of the nation that 
pulled upon a collective memory of a United States that, since the Equal Protection 
Clause, has become a multiplicity of equally-advantaged minority groups.  
Collective memory moves beyond history because it provides an interpretive 
lens through which the community reflects on the past.44  It need not be “true” in 
order to be persuasive: the rhetorically constructed nature of histories assures us that 




any view of history will be partial.  The force of collective memory, especially when 
evoked by public figures such as Powell, is its ability to “fabricate, arrange, or omit 
details from the past as we thought we knew it.”45  Powell’s narrative pulled upon a 
long-lasted fallacy of homogeneity, casting United States’ racial history as one of 
occasional spurts of immigration, followed by rapid assimilation.  Powell used this 
partial racial history to portray the contemporary United States as mostly minority, 
making it illogical to consider minority status as still in need of protection. He wove 
this image of a rapidly turned multiculturalist society into the history of the Equal 
Protection Clause, thus embedding the fallacy in legal history: 
During the dormancy of the Equal Protection Clause, the United States had 
become a Nation of minorities…. As the Nation filled with the stock of many 
lands, the reach of the Clause was gradually extended to all ethnic groups 
seeking protection from official discrimination. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (Celtic Irishmen) (dictum); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356 (1886) (Chinese); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) (Austrian 
resident aliens); Korematsu, supra (Japanese); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 
475 (1954) (Mexican-Americans).46 
Because “the white ‘majority’ itself is composed of various minority 
groups,”47 Powell argued that one cannot “benignly” distinguish which group should 
receive preferences over another.  Employing metaphors of movement and stability, 
Powell rejected the remedial attempts at social equality in favor of a constitutional 
interpretation of individualism.  As Stern argues about metaphors, the contexts in 
which they are used provide particular interpretations of certain words, giving them 




positive or negative connotations.48  Within Powell’s opinion, his construction of the 
“shifting” nature of race makes it a weak constitutional – and thus judicial – “target,” 
whereas the stability of the individual is “rooted” in the First Amendment.   
Powell described the troubled nature of “benign” racial classifications, due to 
the fact that they ask individuals to carry the burden of forwarding the general group 
interests (even if that “group” is their own) and that it is judicially problematic to ask 
“innocent” individuals to bear the burden of “redressing grievances not of their 
making.”49 Powell analogizes what he considers to be such unreasonable grounding 
that “hitching the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to these transitory 
considerations” has the effect of imbalance: “we would be holding, as a constitutional 
principle, that judicial scrutiny of classifications touching on racial and ethnic 
background may vary with the ebb and flow of political forces.”50 
Only after Powell constructed a fractured racial and ethnic U.S. citizenry, 
relocated that citizenry within individual freedoms, and banished social goals that 
punish innocent individuals for the sake of “amorphous” injuries, could he conclude 
that all individuals could benefit from the diversity offered by individuals from 
different backgrounds.  In so doing, Powell shifted the constitutional safeguards 
against racial discrimination and guaranteeing equality articulated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the individual freedoms asserted by the First Amendment, and the 
academic freedom implicit in it, to find that “diversity” is a compelling enough 
interest to consider race as a factor.  He found “academic freedom, though not a 
specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special 
concern of the First Amendment.”51  By relocating race within the individual, Powell 




found a justification for the consideration of race that was commensurate with a 
“national commitment” to freedom.  Out of the “nation of minorities,” Powell found a 
freedom “which is of transcendent value to all of us.”52  Individualism, seen this way, 
is more than a constitutional principle: “Rather, individualism is an effect of the 
invisibility of (white) collectivism, and merit is an effect of the invisibility of (white) 
preference.”53   
By not considering societal injury, but instead focusing on race as one “plus” 
factor in the admissions process, race can, presumably, be “factored” in or out of 
consideration.  This construction of race denies its historic foundation and social 
construction of meaning, equating it instead with “playing the piano” or “leadership 
skills.”54  By framing race or ethnic background as a positive factor to consider as a 
contribution to all racial categories, Powell called for a celebration of the benefits that 
an introduction to different cultural backgrounds yields.  Yet that celebration is not as 
liberating as some other forms of cultural pluralism.  Celeste Condit and John 
Lucaites have asserted that such movement away from “oppositional heterogeneity” 
toward a “democratic heterogeneity” that rejects group rights in favor of individual 
opportunity alleviates potential backlash against “special privileges” that reifies 
perceived racial inequalities.55  The celebration of differences without the 
acknowledgement of the exigency for some of those differences denies a painful but 
real aspect of race that is only told in the dissents of Bakke.   Accommodating the 
backlash against “special privileges” in such a way that lets the majority share in the 
benefits, at the expense of acknowledging a concession of lingering social 
inequalities, one relinquishes the power to the whim of the majority to determine if 




they are still receiving the benefit of academic freedom and cultural diversity that 
Powell articulated.   
Powell’s separation of diversity from ideals of social justice need not be 
purposeful in order to be meaningful. In fact, Powell claimed to have been willing to 
grant “societal discrimination” had the university or the state legislatures made any 
attempts to support this argument with evidence.  Prior strains of discourse influenced 
the pathway he would take in Bakke, just as his judgment in Bakke would provide a 
starting place for subsequent arguments widening that divide.  Powell did not invent 
the “diversity” rationale whole cloth – this ideological commitment was circulating in 
public discourse, and in different articulations had been an American value since its 
inception. 
Powell’s choices were motivated and constrained by the expectations of 
judicial reasoning, by the co-authors of the opinion, and by his own conceptions of 
law and its role within the American political system, college admissions process, and 
the struggles to define and alleviate social inequities.  Many of these factors were 
articulated during the inventional process, but always not written into the final 
opinion.  This is because the judicial opinion-writing genre is written in the language 
of inevitability, subsuming doubt in the monologic voice of the opinion.56 As Robert 
A. Ferguson describes about the judicial opinion genre: “The goal of judgment is to 
subsume difference in an act of explanation and a moment of decision.”57 
While written in the technical language of law, Powell’s opinion in Bakke 
reflected public assumptions about, and ideological embodiments of, race.  His 
insistence on the application of strict scrutiny reflected a larger resistance to the 




benefits of race consciousness.  The vastly different legislative histories told by 
Justices Stevens and Brennan reflected both colorblind ideologies and race conscious 
pragmatism. Whereas legal scholars “often decry the notion of ‘legal storytelling,’” 
David Breshears suggests that “the primary distinction between the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Bakke…can be reduced to the respective stories each tells 
about the history of race in America.”58   Likewise, Powell’s handwritten notes to his 
law clerk reflected President Woodrow Wilson’s distaste for the “hyphenated 
American” that revealed his strong sympathies toward proponents of colorblindness, 
even as he argued for race to be a consideration in college admissions. 
These strains of public discourse came together in Powell’s opinion in a 
manner that trivializes more robust articulations of race.  Public discourses 
celebrating multiculturalism as moral and necessary for contemporary American life 
were used in the Bakke decision to become one more feature in a competitive free 
market, mediated by an individualist ideology that made group power impossible and 
white privilege invisible.  This, too, reflects the context in which multiculturalism 
was articulated: it matters that an economic downturn spurred an increase in graduate 
school applications, and that it motivated arguments about affirmative action using 
the rhetoric of scarcity.  That Powell, whose free-market leanings motivated him to 
write a letter to the Chamber of Commerce, warning them of the dangers of liberal 
thinking within the academy, was taken with the diversity rationale reveals the 
conservative possibilities in a traditionally liberal ideology.   
As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, discourses about race have been 
linked in complex ways to economic conditions.  Although Attorney General Bell 




stated during the 1978 press conference that he was pleased with the Bakke decision, 
he would comment at a 1997 conference that “Powell had ‘obfuscated’ the 
problem.”59  Bell believed that “affirmative action programs should favor only the 
economic ‘underclass’ in order to encourage their ascent into the middle class, stating 
that ‘the quicker we move to an economic test, the better off the nation will be.’”60  
Martin Luther King Jr., who had invoked a metaphor linking racial injustice with 
economic fraud in his I Have a Dream speech and who advocated for boycotts of 
stores as a part of nonviolent protest, was assassinated when he visited Memphis 
sanitary workers during what he called the Poor People’s Campaign, an effort to 
resolve economic injustices in the country.  In his book Where Do We Go From Here: 
Chaos or Community?, King advocated a nationwide guaranteed income, asserting 
that poverty crosses racial boundaries:  “In the treatment of poverty nationally, one 
fact stands out: there are twice as many white poor as Negro poor in the United 
States…I hope that both Negro and white will act in coalition to effect this change, 
because their combined strength will be necessary to overcome the fierce opposition 
we must realistically anticipate.”61 Piecemeal solutions to poverty, like tackling lack 
of education, poor housing conditions, and family counseling, are inefficient, argued 
King, because “each seeks to solve poverty by first solving something else.”62  
Yet social scientist Nathan Glazer declared in 1997 that “We’re all 
multiculturalists now,” calling attention to the ways “in which all Americans—
regardless of race, religion, political affiliation, lifestyle, or moral orientation—have 
come to speak the language of tolerance and respect for cultural diversity in the 
contemporary, post-civil rights era.”63 The tradeoff for such tolerance, say Douglas 




Hartmann and Joseph Gerteis, is that “the discourse of multiculturalism has diverted 
attention away from more fundamental structural problems of racism and social 
inequality that have landed disproportionately and unjustly on African Americans.”64  
Walter Penn Michaels asserts that the problem with appreciating racial diversity is 
that, “that we love race—we love identity—because we don’t love class.”65  This 
bifurcation is unnecessary, argues Michaels: “we don’t need to purchase our progress 
in civil rights at the expense of a commitment to economic justice.”66 
 Indeed, because ideological commitments are amorphous in nature, changing 
in meaning between communities, in context, and across time, Powell’s articulation 
of diversity is not codified: rather, it is an artifact of the Supreme Court’s continuous 
negotiation between the nation’s democratic ideals and its racial histories.67  “The fact 
that symbols predate [particular group interests], or may have inconsistent aspects, is 
irrelevant to their utility,” asserts Robert Downey, “as the ambiguities existing in any 
ideological construct are sufficient to allow substantial semantic shifts without 
abandoning the construct itself.”68 In fact, argues Downey:  “an analysis of [an 
ideological construct] should begin by taking seriously its ambiguity—its 
multivalence—as essential to its symbolic role.”69  More recent challenges to the 
Bakke decision, and to Powell’s “diversity” rationale, reflect those semantic shifts. 
In 1995, the Board of Regents of the University of California who had fought 
Alan Bakke’s lawsuit voted, against the views of faculty, students, administration, 
chancellors, and public demonstrators, to end affirmative action in its public 
institutions.70  The resolution declared that it did so in response to an Executive Order 
from California Governor Pete Wilson, entitled “End Preferential Treatment and to 




Promote Individual Opportunity Based on Merit.”71  In 1996, the state of California 
passed Proposition 209, an amendment which reflected the reasoning seen in Powell’s 
opinion, and against which Brennan had argued: that stigma need not attach to racial 
classifications in order for them to be suspect.  Proposition 209 “prohibits the state, 
local governments, districts, public universities, colleges, and schools, and other 
government instrumentalities from discriminating against or giving preferential 
treatment to any individual or group in public employment, public education, or 
public contracting on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin.”72  By 
1998, the California Board of Regents had stopped all its state universities from 
considering race and ethnicities in their college admissions decisions.   “At a stroke,” 
argues Robert Post, “the landscape of higher education had changed. Assumptions 
about race and ethnicity that had for decades guided policy were suddenly stripped of 
the armor of institutional inevitability.”73 
The results were seen immediately: at UC Berkeley and UCLA, where in 
previous years enrollments of African American students had ranged between 6 and 7 
percent, in 1998 dropped to 3.3 percent and 3.6 percent, respectively.74  Enrollments 
among African American California residents dropped on the whole.75 Additionally, 
the “colorblind” policy had what Fullinwider and Lichtenberg call a “cascading” 
effect, meaning that “the black students who lost out a Berkeley and UCLA after 
1998 didn’t necessarily leave the University of California system; they just dropped 
down to less selective campuses like Riverside or Irvine.”76  In turn, the students who 
would have gotten into Riverside and Irvine attended one of the California State 




University campuses, and the students who would have otherwise gone to those 
campuses went to the state community colleges.   
In 1996, the case of Hopwood v. State of Texas reached the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals.  Cheryl Hopwood had filed a lawsuit after being rejected from the 
University of Texas Law School.77  The law school’s admissions policy was 
established based on the Texas Office of Civil Rights’ goal of ten percent Mexican 
American students and five percent African American students, a goal based on the 
state’s existing college graduate numbers and justified based on the state’s sorry 
history of resisting desegregation.78  The Fifth Circuit Court reversed the district 
court’s decision that the history of racial discrimination in Texas merited the 
affirmative action program that the University of Texas used, claiming that “the 
beneficiaries of this system are blacks and Mexican Americans, to the detriment of 
whites and non-preferred minorities.”79  As a result of this case, the state of Texas 
adopted a “race neutral” admission policy for its colleges and universities, which 
would admit the top four percent of its high school classes.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
declined to hear the case because the University of Texas changed its admissions 
policy; thus the case did not represent a “live controversy,” a mandatory standard for 
judicial review.     
On April 1, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court heard two cases that considered 
whether diversity is a compelling interest sufficient to pass the strict scrutiny 
standard.80  Both of these cases invited the Court to reexamine Bakke in search for the 
definitive answer on affirmative action in higher education.  The first case, Gratz and 
Hamacher v. Bollinger, challenged the admissions policy of the University of 




Michigan’s College of Literature, Science, and the Arts.  This undergraduate 
admissions policy awarded a set number of extra points to each minority applicant’s 
admissions score.  Grutter v. Bollinger questioned the admissions policy of the 
University of Michigan’s Law School, which considered race and ethnicity during the 
admission process in accordance with its “commitment to racial and ethnic diversity 
with special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been 
historically discriminated against, who without this commitment might not be 
represented in the student body in meaningful numbers.”81  The petitioner in the case 
had a similar story to Alan Bakke’s:  Barbara Grutter was a white 43-year-old female 
who applied for admission into the fall 1997 class of the University of Michigan Law 
School with a 3.8 undergraduate grade point average and an LSAT score of 161, 
falling in the 86th percentile nationally. The Law School first placed Grutter on the 
“wait-list,” and then denied her admission.  Grutter sued, charging that the Law 
School’s admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The Law School admitted 
during oral arguments for the Sixth Circuit Court that Grutter probably would have 
been admitted had she been a member of one of the racial minority groups to which 
the law school gives a preference. 
 The Sixth Circuit Court relied on the precedent and subsequent doctrine 
established by Marks v. United States (1977), to interpret Bakke while deciding the 
Grutter case.  Marks – an opinion written by Powell, as well – held that if there is no 
clear single rationale for a majority opinion, then the Court could be viewed as having 
concurred with the judgment on its “narrowest grounds.”82  Because Powell argued 




for “strict scrutiny,” the Sixth Circuit decided that Powell’s decision met the 
narrowest grounds, and that his approval of diversity as a compelling interest in 
university admissions would be taken as the opinion of the Court.  Grutter appealed. 
 In her petition requesting that certiorari be granted by the Supreme Court, 
Grutter asked: “If universities may select the racial groups to which they give 
preferences based on ‘underrepresentation’ of these groups in the student body, how 
is diversity different in principle from objectives of simple racial balancing or 
remedying the lingering effects of societal discrimination?”83 The petition argued that 
the law school plan is faulty because the preferences are of unlimited duration, 
because the assumption that a diversity of viewpoints and perspectives will be 
achieved by selecting students based on their race amounts to impermissible 
stereotyping, and because race-neutral alternatives to the preferences have not been 
meaningfully considered.  Diversity was especially problematic for Grutter, because 
“[i]t is a rationale that gives essentially un-checked authority to admissions officers to 
define what ‘diversity’ … mean[s]; which racial and ethnic groups, among many, are 
to be considered ‘underrepresented’ or are to receive preferences…and their 
duration.”84  Indeed, Neil Gotanda also pointed out the lack of clarity embedded 
within the diversity argument: “A goal of public sphere diversity has its social price. 
Diversity in its narrow sense does not truly challenge existing racial practice, but 
rather seeks to accommodate present racial divisions by casting them in a positive 
light.”85 Moreover, Grutter argued that the generalized goals of diversity mean that 
affirmative action policies can continue indefinitely, unlike remediation policies. To 
this end, Grutter cited a 1998 DC Circuit Court decision in her brief, noting “‘how 




much burden the term ‘diversity’ has been asked to bear in the latter part of the 20th 
Century’ and that ‘[it] appears to have been coined both as a permanent justification 
for policies seeking racial proportionality in all walks of life (‘affirmative action’ has 
only a temporary remedial connotation) and as a synonym for proportional 
representation itself.’”86  
Yet on June 23, 2003, the Court followed Bakke closely as it handed down its 
decisions.  Gratz and Hamacher v. Bollinger, the undergraduate case, was found 
unconstitutional because it did not narrowly tailor its consideration of race to fit its 
needs and that it had essentially established a quota system.  Grutter v. Bollinger, the 
law school case, was narrowly upheld on the same grounds that Powell found 
Harvard appealing – it used race as one of many factors to consider for admissions, 
thus considering diversity as a compelling enough interest to maintain it.  The 
longevity of Powell’s opinion motivated Michael Selmi to offer the following:  
… the Court can provide political resolution, and when done properly, as I 
believe it was in Bakke, the Court can be a model forum for deliberative 
resolution – one where issues are raised and discussed in a context free from 
the dictates of political polls, even if the ultimate resolution mirrors those 
polls. In the twenty years since Bakke, no political body has improved on 
either the Court's deliberation or its compromise. In fact…very few have even 
tried to undertake such a task...while pleasing none of the participants and 
sparking great controversy, [the decision] has remained intact.87   




In 2008, Washington Post columnist Kenneth S. Baer took umbrage with the 
glorification of the 40-year anniversary of 1968, reflecting instead on the many ways 
that 1978 had changed modern America.  Baer said that:  
Our year [1978]…set the contours of today's civil rights battles. In Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court ruled that rigid race 
quotas for university admissions were unconstitutional but that affirmative 
action policies designed to ensure a diverse student body were not. Americans 
have battled over the implications of this decision ever since, but we have 
come to accept diversity as a virtue in universities, corporations and 
throughout American life. That began with Bakke in 1978.88 
The meaning of diversity, like the meaning of equality, was – and continues to 
be – negotiated through what Condit and Lucaites call an “active sociorhetorical 
process…drawn from the common rhetorical culture of the social and political 
collectivity” and enacted through public argumentation.89  Just as the premise of 
equality offers an ideological commitment to those who do not experience it, so too 
does the value of pluralism.  And, just as the rhetorical force of equality is altered by 
its linkages to other premises, the ambiguity of pluralism allows for its meanings and 
enactments to change.   Powell’s decision, while written in the legal jargon of 
jurisprudential certainty, nevertheless reflected, and contributed to, the ongoing 
public discourse about the value of cultural pluralism.  As Fullinwider and 
Lichtenberg assert: “consciousness of color was…always central to American society 
insofar as that society was a committedly racist one. The relevant change here—
marked rather than produced by Bakke—involved (in the wake of both the successes 




and failures of the civil rights movement) the emergence of color consciousness as an 
antiracist position.”90   
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